Transnational Brazilians: class, race, immigration status and family life by Tracy, Natalicia Rocha
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2016
Transnational Brazilians: class,
race, immigration status and family
life
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/19575
Boston University
	BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL BRAZILIANS: 
 
CLASS, RACE, IMMIGRATION STATUS AND FAMILY LIFE 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
NATALICIA ROCHA TRACY 
 
A.A., Quincy College, Massachusetts, 1998 
B.A., University of Massachusetts, Boston, 2005 
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Boston, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2016 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 by 
NATALICIA ROCHA TRACY 
All rights reserved 
	Approved by  
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader   
 Nazli Kibria, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Sociology 
 
 
 
 
Second Reader   
 John Stone, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Sociology 
 
 
 
 
Third Reader   
 Linda S. Sprague Martinez, Ph.D.  
 Assistant Professor, of Social Work 
 
		iv 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my mother who always yearned for more education 
  
		v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I owe a special thank you to my advisor and mentor Professor Nazli 
Kibria, for dedicated support and patience; and to dearest Professor John 
Stone who really understood me and never doubted my abilities from the 
first day.  These good mentors gave me encouragement and the training 
to do this work. Professor Linda Sprague-Martinez, so supportive, thank 
you for the constructive criticism so needed at the finish line.   
 
  My son Matthew always supported and inspired me to keep going. 
 
All my work is also for my Mom, who always wanted to go to school, 
but never was able to go beyond second grade.  
 
I really appreciate all the support that my sister Lenita Carmo gave 
me by accompanying me to dozens of interviews all over the Boston area, 
helping me to transcribe, and covering many meetings at my job so that I 
could work on my dissertation. Thank you for always being a positive 
force in my life and for always having my back. 
  
My sister Dolores has always inspired me because she figured out 
a way to put herself through school against all odds.  
 
I am so grateful to David Outerbridge, my tutor, mentor, my friend 
since my undergraduate years. David, you gave me wings. 
		vi 
Without Tim Sieber who has given many words of encouragement 
and has shared his wisdom with me, I would probably not have been able 
to finish. You took on lots of the work at my job at the Brazilian Worker 
Center so I could find time for my dissertation. You met with me on 
Saturdays and sometimes Sundays to hear my concerns and my ideas.  
 
Anselmo de Oliveira, with care and enthusiasm you translated my 
field work materials from English to Portuguese and assisted in 
conducting my first interviews. I appreciate all you have done!  
 
Professors Xiaogang Deng and Milton Butts, sociologists also, who 
said I shouldn’t stop with my masters: you both encouraged me.  Both 
people of color, minorities, you were helping me with your valuable 
insights while we were all working our way through the system.  
 
I’m grateful to all the people who supported me, my key informants, 
all the people who actually gave me the interviews, who generously 
offered me a piece of their lives and experiences. 
 
Thank you so much Wesley Sartorio, friend and supporter willing 
to meet me in your Graphics Design & Signs shop even late at night. You 
helped me to convert my flowcharts into quality, high-resolution figures.   
 
		vii 
Other important supporters were Kika Albuquerque, Patricia 
Pereira, Luci Salon, and ISCTE-the Lisbon University Institute. 
 
Financial Support was critical: The Outerbridge Education Fund 
gave me means, when I only had the will. The Whitney Young 
Fellowship for minority fellows studying race and urban problems was 
awarded to me in 2008-9 by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. 
I’m also grateful to the Department of Sociology for paying for the last few 
years of my continuation fee.  
  
		viii 
TRANSNATIONAL BRAZILIANS: 
 
CLASS, RACE, IMMIGRATION STATUS AND FAMILY LIFE 
 
NATALICIA ROCHA TRACY 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2016 
Major Professors: Nazli Kibria, Professor of Sociology and  
 John Stone, Professor of Sociology 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes Brazilian immigrants in Boston, and 
their family and community adaptations as transnational migrants. The 
central research question was:  what is the impact of national 
immigration policy on the dynamics of family and community life? The 
study calls for more attention to class, race, and immigration status as 
variables in shaping transnationalism and immigrant outcomes. 
The immigrant community is diverse, with significant divisions 
across class and immigration status, leading to quite different 
experiences for the undocumented working class and the mostly 
documented elite. Migrants’ prior class and racial standings define 
different migration pathways, access to visas, and once arrived, varying 
immigration statuses and manner of economic incorporation.  Both 
populations are fully transnational, the majority engaging in everyday 
“transnationalism from below.” 
Brazilians import their prior beliefs and practices regarding race 
and class, and try to maintain them. The U.S. opportunity structure 
partially levels class differences, but immigrants of different class origins 
can have problems collaborating as equals, leading to considerable labor 
		ix 
exploitation in the ethnic economy. Overall, Brazilians do not 
acknowledge race, or its link to class in Brazil, and see the U.S. as more 
racist. Racialized by Americans more on account of cultural differences 
than color, Brazilians perceive this as discrimination for being 
immigrants. 
Family life displays more egalitarian gender roles, companionate 
marriage, and nuclearization of family structure.  Immigrants continue to 
maintain transnational family relations, involving remittances, 
sustaining social networks, and long-distance parenting.  The majority of 
the community is undocumented, but have U.S.-born children and live in 
mixed-status families made insecure by the threat of detention and 
deportation. The desire of both the undocumented and elites to remain 
invisible encourages withdrawal from political engagement, the 
development of community unity and empowerment. 
The study is based upon a multiple methods research design, 
principally a social survey of 49 questions, administered through face-to-
face interviews with a sample of 44 respondents in Boston, and another 
44 in Lisbon, Portugal, where a limited companion study was completed 
for comparison.  Methods also included collection of life stories, 
participant observation, and content analysis of popular culture in the 
immigrant community. 
  
		x 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Dedication…………………………………………………………………………….. iv 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………..……. v 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………. viii 
 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….. xi 
 
List of Figures………………………………………………………..……………… xii 
 
List of Photographs………………………………………………………………… xiii 
 
List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………. xiv 
 
Chapter One: Introduction: Brazilian Immigrants – Diversity and 
 Complexity………………………………………………………… 1 
 
Chapter Two: Research Design, Methodology, & Community  
 Demographics………………………………………………….. 49 
 
Chapter Three: The Transnational Family among Brazilian  
 Immigrants……………………………………………………....85 
 
Chapter Four: Changing Regimes of Race and Class in the 
 Immigrant Setting……………………………………………. 157 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusions - Immigration Policy: Race, Class,   
 Family, and Community……………………………………. 221 
 
Appendix:  Survey Instrument (English)…………………………………….. 292 
 
References Cited……………………………………………………………………296 
 
Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………………………..311 
 
  
		xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. Civic involvements of Boston area Brazilian immigrants…………….. 209 
2. Costs of migration from Brazil to the United States…………………… 234 
3. Results of Receiving DACA within first two years……………………….267 
4. Costs of migration from Brazil to Portugal………………………………. 279 
 
  
		xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1. Five top countries to which Brazilians migrate…………………………… 58 
2. Brazilians in the U.S. 2014…………………………………………………….59 
3.  Gender Distribution of Brazilian Immigrants in the U.S……………….60 
4. Level of education for Brazilians in MA…………………………………….. 61 
5. Top 10 U.S. industries for work for persons born in Brazil…………….62 
6. Brazilian state of origin of sample respondents………………………….. 64 
7. U.S. respondents’ Level of education……………………………………….. 66 
8. Respondents’ occupations in the United States………………………….. 67 
9. Respondents’ occupations in Brazil prior to Migration…………………. 68 
10. Copy of Facebook posting about gender roles in Brazilian    
community……………………………………………………………………..133 
11. 2015 monthly minimum wage: Comparison in 5 countries Brazil, 
Portugal, United States, Germany and United Kingdom……………. 148 
12. Racial Identifications of survey sample Brazilian in Boston……….. 162 
13. U.S. yearly household incomes of respondents……………………….. 188 
14. Flowchart: new class and racial encounters in the Immigrant    
setting……………………………………………………………………………194 
15. Pathways to Migration………………………………………………………. 239 
16. Top 5 Countries by Birth of Undocumented Immigrants Residing     
in Massachusetts…………………………………………………………….. 246 
  
		xiii 
LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
 
1.  Screening two families to see if they fit the survey criteria, & 
scheduling time for later interviews, Caparica, Portugal……………..52 
2.  Thank you note, a US$2.00 phone card, and candy given in    
thanks to survey respondents………………………………………………77 
3.  Interviewing the Pedicurist at a Lisbon Beauty Salon………………...81 
4.  Interviewing at a Brazilian owned Cafe in Lisbon……………………...83 
5.  Coon art poking fun at Afro-Brazilians on bathroom door in 
Brazilian café in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015………………….172 
6.  Racially Derogatory Facebook posting…………………………………..173 
7.  Coon art with stereotypical African features in crossword puzzle, 
Brazilian community newspaper………………………………………….174 
8.  Coon art in Brazilian public establishment…………………………….175 
9.  More coon art in the same Brazilian establishment………………….175 
10.  Typical tourism billboard advertisement for Brazil travel on a   
Lisbon Street…………………………………………………………………. 216 
11.  Protest sign at a vigil in front of ICE Detention Center, Boston….. 221 
 
  
		xiv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BWC  Brazilian Worker Center (Boston) 
DACA  Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
DAPA  Deferred Action for Parental Accountability 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
ICE   Immigration & Customs Enforcement U.S. Department  
                           of Homeland Security 
ILO   International Labor Organization 
OECD         Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
USCIS  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
   U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
	 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction  
Brazilian Immigrants – Diversity and Complexity 
 
This is a study explaining the experiences of transnational 
Brazilians who have migrated to one of the major foreign destinations for 
Brazilians in the 21st century – the metropolitan area of Boston, 
Massachusetts.  The experiences of Brazilians in Boston will also be 
thrown into sharper relief by this study’s comparative reference to 
migrants in another of today’s important destinations for Brazilians –
Lisbon, Portugal. The central research question of the study is to explain 
the impact of national immigration policy on the dynamics of family life 
among Brazilian immigrants in the two research locations.  This study 
employed qualitative methods, including survey and, participant-
observation research, in both Boston and Lisbon between 2009 and 2013.  
Due to my own history as a Brazilian immigrant and my experience as an 
activist in the immigration policy arena in Boston, the study draws on 
my insider’s perspective. I will explain below when discussing methods, 
how this is only partially so. The study concludes in the final chapter by 
addressing the implications of the research for immigration policy reform.  
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A Transnational Immigrant Community Divided by Class, Race and 
Immigration Status 
A major goal of the study is to document how the Brazilian 
immigrant experience is shaped by intersection of legal status and race, 
as well as class-based economic and social structures.  Findings 
indicated varied types of social and economic incorporation produce 
divergent transnational ties between the immigrants and the home 
country. Regardless of class, race, or status differences, however, the 
transnational dimension of their experience is central for all Brazilians, 
and in fact, their overall social status comes to be very much constructed 
within this transnational context.  Interlocking dimensions of class, race, 
and immigration status in the destination settings also result in 
community diversity in patterns of residence, employment, civic 
engagement, community life, culture, identity, and especially family life 
and gender relations, to which Chapter Three below gives special 
attention.   
 The many divisions within the U.S. Brazilian community, and of 
especially the class, racial and immigration status issues, offer many 
incentives for Brazilian immigrants, whether new arrivals or continuing 
residents, to remain invisible from the mainstream society.  This desire 
for invisibility is shaped by the U.S. immigration policy regime and the 
racial and socioeconomic status of the immigrants in U.S. society.  Along 
	 3 
with internal divisions, this stance of invisibility hampers the Brazilian 
immigrant community’s capacity to advocate for its interests within the 
broader society, and to gain recognition for its social and economic 
contributions to host communities.   
 The Brazilian migrant community, whether we are speaking of the 
U.S. or Portugal, is not a homogenous entity, and essentializing portraits 
of the community that overlook its dramatic internal divisions by race, 
class and immigration status miss many key elements of the community 
members’ experience.  These divisions encompass not only temporary 
migrants and first generation migrants who decide to stay and put down 
roots in American or Portuguese soil, as well as their second-generation 
children.    
Like many others who migrate, Brazilians make great sacrifices to 
do so, and once at their destination, they experience many challenges 
and struggles to adapt to the new setting.  In the U.S., most either arrive 
uninspected over the border or end up overstaying their visas to soon 
become undocumented.  Undocumented status in an era of anti-
immigrant sentiment and harsh immigration control, leads to daily fear, 
vulnerability, and other difficulties.  In Portugal, legal status issues are 
not so salient, but economic marginalization and racial stigmatization by 
native Portuguese also play a role in the migrant experience there. 
What do these immigrant challenges and struggles look like, for 
	 4 
working-class as well as the more middle and upper-middle class strata 
of the migrant community?  The following stories of Ana, Carlos and 
Sonia, Sandra, and Raquel1 – immigrants in the Boston and Lisbon areas 
– offer insight into the complexities of the lived experiences of the 
Brazilian migrant, including their reasons for migration, and their 
struggles with the immigration regime of the host society.  
 
An immigrant in the U.S.:  Ana 
Ana, a dentist in Brazil, who first came to the U.S. as a post-doctoral 
fellow in dentistry, and later returned on a tourist visa with her two 
children. Her primary motivation on the second trip was to find a more 
supportive, less discriminatory environment for her transgender ten-year 
old child, born a boy, who was trying to live as a girl and was being 
subjected to severe discrimination in school in Brazil.  She and her 
children overstayed their visas and at the time of the interview they had 
been undocumented for a decade.    
Ana was born and grew up in Brazil in an elite family of Colombian 
and Brazilian heritage.   Her father was a Colombian corporate executive 
on assignment in Brazil who met and married Ana’s mother, a Brazilian.  
While in Brazil, before leaving the country for the U.S., Ana had become 
                                       
1 These names are pseudonyms, as are all other proper names given to individuals in 
the pages that follow. 
	 5 
a dentist, married a wealthy man, had two children, and later divorced.  
One of her two sons showed signs of being transgender early in his 
development, and as a youth began to try to live as a girl.  Ana’s 
community in Brazil was not progressive and did not embrace or tolerate 
her son’s transition.  Wealthy enough to obtain a visa for herself and her 
two young sons, they came to the U.S. as tourists. 
During an earlier trip to the U.S. before she had children, Ana had 
come to Massachusetts to complete a fellowship at Brandeis University, 
and at that time had been able to obtain a driver’s license and social 
security number, both of which she still retains.   She is among many 
currently undocumented immigrants who in their past, under a different 
legal status, were able to acquire a social security number, which they 
continue to use. 
For many years she worked as a health educator for three different 
organizations, ran a radio show, and had two newspaper columns in the 
local ethnic press.  Ana is a member of the boards of directors of many 
important community organizations, and a leader of some influence in 
the region.   During this time of deep community involvement she felt 
conflicted, because despite her engaged life in the U.S., she and her sons 
were undocumented, and she continually feared being discovered and 
being deported. Her oldest son, now having transitioned into and living 
as a young woman, had graduated from high school, but due to the lack 
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of papers she had to delay college attendance, even though her skills and 
high school record qualified her for admission.  
During this decade, Ana felt desperate, trapped by her immigration 
situation.  Her children had grown up in the U.S. for most of their lives 
and had gone through the school system in her town; they had not 
visited Brazil for over ten years.  She felt that if she returned with them 
to Brazil, they would have a hard time adjusting there, as they had 
become strongly Americanized while growing up and attending school as 
“generation 1.5” immigrant children2.  She was advised by all her friends 
to find and settle down with an American husband, but her busy 
professional and community life had left her almost no time to date.   
She would do almost anything to become legalized, but at this point the 
options are limited.  Unlike many Brazilians here who support their 
families, including parents and children back home through remittances, 
Ana receives regular money from her own parents in Brazil to help pay 
for her children’s expenses. 
  
                                       
2 The “1.5 Generation” are those immigrants who come to the U.S. as children or early 
adolescents, usually with their first-generation parents, and who essentially develop 
and come of age in the host country, much as U.S. born second-generation children do.  
They are thus “in between” true first- and second-generation individuals, constitute a 
transitional generation, and thus are given the intermediate “1.5” generational label to 
designate their unique position. 
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Some U.S. immigrants:  Sonia and Carlos 
Sonia, an Afro-Brazilian had experienced many years of job 
discrimination in Brazil before coming to the U.S.   She and her husband 
Carlos had come from Brazil through Mexico, unauthorized.  They had 
been in the U.S. for almost five years.  Both undocumented, they have a 
U.S. citizen son, Alexandre, who is two years old.  They spoke of coming 
to the U.S. because of chronic underemployment and unemployment 
they had experienced in São Paulo, despite being high school graduates.  
During the frequent bouts of unemployment they went through in Brazil, 
they had depended on Sonia’s sister in Somerville to send them money to 
buy groceries so they could eat. 
In Brazil, it had been difficult for either of them to find or keep 
steady jobs.  Sonia had worked as a medical assistant for a time, but was 
mostly unemployed.  The last job that Carlos had before coming, 
required a two-hour bus commute each way, and a fourteen-hour work 
shift as a security guard, six days a week.   He made $600 a month.  Also, 
at that time in Sao Paulo, criminal gangs were attacking, robbing and 
burning public buses, and though this never happened while he was 
riding to or from his job, it was a constant worry.  Some days, he also did 
not have bus fare for the two bus routes required each way, and he had 
to walk for an hour to save on one bus fare.  Returning home late at 
night was dangerous, too, since the police in those neighborhoods often 
	 8 
arrested or shot men on the street without reason.   
Sonia and Carlos decided to come through Mexico after five years 
of unsuccessfully trying many times, with costly fees each time, to gain a 
visa from the U.S. consulate to visit her sister Carmem who lives in 
Somerville.  Carmem had also filed to sponsor her sister’s immigration to 
the U.S. twelve years ago, but as is usually the case with sibling 
sponsorship, she was still waiting for action by the U.S. immigration 
authorities.  There seemed to be no choice but to come across the border.  
The journey from Brazil to Mexico was arduous and took 48 days, 
costing $15,000 each for her and her husband.   They are slowly paying 
off the money to her sister Carmem, who funded their trip, which was an 
adventure with many dangers. They had to cross many different borders, 
traveling through four different countries, take more than one airplane, 
ride hidden in trucks and vans, walk for entire days through forest and 
desert, and take boats across the Rio Grande near Brownsville, Texas, 
before being delivered to a highway rest stop near Boston, where they 
met her sister. They were led by different coyotes, including two very 
young ones about 15 years old, and for a time they were kidnapped with 
dozens of other travelers, and held for ransom, also paid by Carmem in 
Boston, along with other relatives of those being held.  
They arrived safely in Boston, but the trip was just the beginning 
of their struggles because their lack of documentation and English 
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language skills made it difficult for them to get jobs. They were also quite 
terrorized and traumatized by their journey, and this was followed by 
living under a climate of fear of being caught by ICE3 during a time of 
frequent raids and detentions in the Boston area.  Carlos worked as a 
cook mostly and did some construction, including carpentry and painting, 
and Sonia did elder care and cleaning.  They send home remittances to 
Brazil to help Carlos’ family, especially his low-income younger sister, 
who is a single mother and an orphan, since both their parents died 
early. Carlos’ sister has a child, a five-year old little boy, who has learned 
to live within his family’s simple means: all he had asked for from Santa 
Claus last Christmas was a bowl of pasta, his mother reported. They also 
send money to help buy the little boy’s clothes and other expenses, and 
food and clothes for the entire family.   
Like many people here they have to work hard to pay their living 
expenses in Somerville. They also have to pay off the $30,000 travel debt 
incurred by Sonia’s sister, and also save money to pay off their house in 
São Paulo in case they get caught by immigration and get deported.  At 
first, Sonia was terrified of being caught by ICE while pregnant and being 
sent to a detention center.  If they were sent back before the baby was 
                                       
3 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a unit within the Department of 
Homeland Security whose employees act as national-level immigration police.  They 
staff the enforcement units that arrest and detain those in violation of immigration 
laws, and that manage the nation’s extensive network of hundreds of detention centers. 
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born, they would be much worse off than before, and it would be almost 
impossible to get a job, because they had been out of the job market for 
more than a year.  Their son, Alexandre, was finally born in May 2010, 
and is a U.S. citizen.      
Like many immigrants, Sonia knows she is stuck in the U.S. and 
although she misses her eight brothers and sisters, many nieces and 
nephews, and parents in Brazil, she can’t make a living there, and would 
be hungry if she returned.  On the other hand, living under the extreme 
conditions she faces here, she began to suffer from depression for the 
first time and requires regular medication to preserve her mental health.  
She also knows it is very important to maintain continuing connections 
with people in Brazil and send them whatever they ask for, even if she 
and her family here have to sacrifice because of the requests –all because 
her life is so uncertain here.  As she explains, you have to maintain good 
relations with people back home, because if you get sent back, you will 
need their help and be dependent upon resources they will provide. 
 
Immigrant in Portugal:  Raquel 
Raquel was from Bahia, where she was a small business owner, 
operating a hair salon. Seeking better opportunity, she sold her business, 
and moved to Lisbon, where she opened another salon in the 
neighborhood of Arroios, that had a concentration of Brazilian 
	 11 
immigrants.  She married a Portuguese man, and had a son, now four 
years old. Under immigration rules, the boy would become a Portuguese 
citizen upon reaching six years of age.  She remained close to her own 
mother in Brazil, speaking with her on the telephone weekly and bringing 
her to visit in Lisbon from time to time.   
Her Portuguese mother-in-law, however, was very slow to accept 
her as the wife of her son, due to stereotypes she had about Brazilian 
women.  Raquel understood those stereotypes. Considering herself 
fortunate to be a business owner, she commented on how many of the 
younger, more working-class Brazilian women she sees arrive are forced 
into exotic dancing, prostitution, or domestic service to make a living.   
When I interviewed her, Raquel was in the process of transforming 
her shop into a full-service personal care boutique. Friends and 
associates brought her beauty products, perfumes, and cosmetics from 
Brazil, which she sold from a special corner of her shop to a mostly 
immigrant clientele, but also to Portuguese women who patronized her 
business.  She also pointed out how invisible Brazilians were in Lisbon, 
partly because custom did not easily allow establishments owned or 
operated by immigrants – such as Brazilians –to display any ethnic 
symbols of their identity on their store facades.  Even still, the Brazilians 
who were there could easily find one another, and their businesses. 
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Another Brazilian Immigrant in Portugal: Sandra 
In Rondonia in Brazil, high school graduate Sandra moved in 
unmarried with a man from her town, and had three children by him.  
Eventually their union dissolved due to his abuse, but after she left with 
her children, he kept stalking and threatening her.  Afraid for her life, 
she went back to him several times, but finally escaped by leaving the 
country for Portugal. She left two of her children with her sister, and 
another with her brother.  Once in Portugal she worked hard to save 
money to send to support her children in Brazil, and eventually to bring 
them to Portugal, to join her in her small two-room apartment.   
It had been very hard for her to be away from her children.  She 
used to talk with them on the telephone several times a week, at which 
time they would complain and constantly ask her to bring them to 
Portugal.  She made only 600 Euros a month ($738 at the time, in 2010), 
working as a maid for a wealthy landowning family in a small rural 
hamlet an hour outside of Lisbon, in the township of Sintra, where the 
mainstay of the local economy was agriculture. At the time of the 
interview, she was close to having five years of employment with her 
employer, which would soon gain her official residency in Portugal.  
She had recently sent for her daughter, who could not adjust to 
the rural hamlet, and who returned to Brazil in less than a year.  She 
then sent for her son. Her children, when they came, saw for the first 
	 13 
time what a hard life she was living in Sintra.  Her son entered the local 
high school.  He had been an outstanding student in Brazil attending an 
academic high school, that would direct him to university entrance. As 
an immigrant in Portugal, however, his earlier academic achievements 
were not recognized and he was tracked into a different kind of academic 
program: a hospitality training program that would prepare him for 
restaurant or hotel work.  This career path was more in keeping with the 
other service jobs that Brazilians were expected to fill in his area, and 
more widely in Portugal, such as domestic service, restaurant work, 
landscaping, hair-cutting, farm work, and food service.  Raquel was 
disappointed the school system was not recognizing her son’s talents and 
capabilities.  For Raquel herself, life in Portugal also was not easy, due to 
the low wage job she had, and the prejudice and disrespect she reported 
feeling all the time against Brazilian women, stereotyped as sexually 
loose home wreckers interested in stealing Portuguese husbands from 
their wives. 
 
Diverse Origins of Immigrants, and Ambiguity and Fluidity in 
Immigration Status 
What can we learn from these profiles of Ana, Sonia and Carlos, 
Raquel, and Sandra, about Brazilian immigrants in Boston and Lisbon?   
Most of all, these stories show that Brazilians, as many other 
	 14 
immigrant groups, are highly diverse in their social origins and ways of 
life.  They come from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, and while 
there is a leveling process they all go through as immigrants, they are 
still quite varied in their work lives, social values, lifestyles, opportunities, 
and previous understandings of U.S. culture and society.  The 
advantages of class and race are transported from Brazil to the host 
society, shaping social networks and capital, which in turn influence the 
economic and social outcomes immigrants experience abroad.   
As I will show in the chapters that follow, immigration status is an 
especially powerful factor in shaping the lives of these immigrants. For 
Brazilians trying to come to the U.S., it is difficult to get a visa, and only 
the privileged can easily enter with proper authorization.  In order to 
come at all, many have no alternative but to cross the border from 
Mexico “without inspection.”   The number of undocumented among 
Brazilians in the Boston area is high, typically estimated at 70% or more 
of the local immigrant population (Fritz 2011), combining both border 
crossers and those who overstay their visas.  Borders between Portugal 
and Brazil, on the other hand, as I will explain, are mostly open, and the 
climate toward immigrants more positive; however, here too class 
differences in the community greatly shape differential economic 
outcomes, and Brazilians’ cultural differences from the Portuguese are 
often seen in racial terms, resulting in their marginalization. 
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Confusing distinctions further, the line between who is 
documented and who is undocumented is also very fluid, not only within 
families and social networks, but also even during the life course of a 
single individual.  As Leo Chavez remarked long ago (Chavez 1992), it 
makes little sense to talk of “the undocumented family,” or even the 
“undocumented person,” as if they were fundamentally different and 
apart from other immigrant families and people.  As seen in the earlier 
portraits, families contain members with different immigration statuses, 
and over time individuals can and do change their status from 
undocumented to documented, and often back again. 
Brazilians make the difficult decision to leave Brazil for all sorts of 
reasons.  Some people come to the U.S. to study and experience North 
American culture, or to improve their language skills in that lingua 
franca of today’s business and information world, English.  Many go to 
Lisbon to take advantage of higher education opportunities that are more 
difficult to obtain in Brazil.  Some come to escape discrimination that 
limits their upward mobility at home, on the basis of gender, race, class, 
or sexuality; or to surpass racial ceilings that limit their upward mobility 
at home; and, many to escape domestic violence.  
Chronic unemployment and poverty, the lot of so many in Brazil, 
are what most people hope to escape. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Five (pp. 252-53), in recent years real unemployment has often been in 
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the 20% range.  Brazilians thus go north or across the Atlantic to work.  
Although many are undocumented, they still decide to stay, to put down 
roots for the long term, even though it means sacrifices, including giving 
up a familiar life at home for a great deal of uncertainty. Once abroad, 
few wish to go home again, and it is almost universal that they realize 
they have a lot more opportunity available where they are, even if it 
means that they must suffer downward social mobility in their profession 
and socioeconomic status. 
 
The Racialization of Brazilians  
The color of your skin, of course, is another important factor; it 
has a profound impact on your life chances when you arrive in the U.S. 
in particular, just as it does in Brazil. In fact, the Brazilian community 
imports with it the racial hierarchies characteristic of their home country, 
and reproduces them in relations among employers and employees, and 
among different segments and strata within the community.  Lighter 
Brazilians claim to be color blind, both at home and typically in the U.S., 
denying that color is a determinant of life chances, and seeing 
disadvantage as class-linked alone.  The usual view is that the U.S. is 
inordinately preoccupied with color.  Some darker Brazilians hold these 
views too, but they are still more readily racialized in the U.S. as “brown,” 
and subjected to institutional racism both within U.S. society and within 
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the Brazilian community itself.   In Brazil, racial identities are based 
more on culture, though color also makes a difference. In Lisbon, racism 
expresses itself through cultural stereotypes, and Brazilians are 
“tropicalized” as exotic, happy, compliant, and sensual transplants. 
White Brazilians, if they are lucky, can sometimes escape racial 
stigma in the U.S. Their ability to do so is enhanced by their legal status; 
that is, they have the class privilege and resources to easily obtain 
visitors’ visas to enter the U.S. in the first place, since they can gain easy 
access to visas at the U.S. consulates in Brazil.  To obtain a visa, they 
are required and able to show they have substantial resources at home – 
jobs, property, businesses – that is, that they have something to return 
to, even if many overstay their visas and thus become undocumented.  
Most darker Brazilians in recent years have not enjoyed such class 
privilege, or access to visas as a legal pathway into the U.S., and the only 
practical option they have is to enter through crossing the border 
unauthorized.  There really is no “line” for them to “get on,” to wait their 
turn to enter legally.  This, of course, greatly limits their ability later to 
adjust their status; they do not have the same latitude as those who 
entered on visas, but overstayed them. 
As I will show in the chapters that follow, whatever their status 
might be, the Brazilian migrants are highly engaged in the labor force 
and make important economic contributions.  Most immigrant families 
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are hybrid and “mixed status,” with members who span the categories of 
citizens, permanent resident, or undocumented (in the U.S.), or 
immigrant, resident, or citizen (in Portugal).  Whatever the 
marginalization involved, the typical immigrant and their family must 
adapt to living transnational lives, and generally have social networks 
that include friends, co-workers, or neighbors who are Brazilians, but 
also members of other immigrant groups, as well as Americans.  Both 
immigrant groups and their families are firmly “here” in the host society, 
even if they are incorporated in different ways. 
 
Transnationalism, Class and Immigration Status in the Brazilian 
Community   
This study examines the Brazilian immigrant community in Boston, 
as well as in Lisbon, with attention to its internal diversity.  I look at the 
impacts of class, race, immigration status, as well as the implications of 
different types of transnationalism on the quality of people’s life 
experience in the host society.  In examining these intersecting 
inequalities, I highlight the significance of immigration status and class 
distinctions for developments and forms of transnationalism. These 
factors have received inadequate attention in transnationalism studies, 
where the underlying assumption is that a common national origin or 
ethnic culture creates a fundamental unity of experience across the 
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entire group.  As Levitt and Jaworsky have pointed out, “Migrants vary 
considerably, and broad, ‘taken for granted’ categories such as ethnicity, 
nationality, or religion mask the diversity within what can be extremely 
heterogeneous groups” (2007:144).  Chapters Three and Four, which deal 
with family relations and the intersection of class, race and immigration 
status, examine these issues in some detail.   
Transnationalism, a framework that emerged in the early 1990s, 
tries to explain how and why immigrants retain ties to their home 
countries and communities, even while living and adjusting to life in a 
distant host society.   The first published definition of transnationalism 
termed it, “the process by which immigrants build social fields that link 
together their countries of origin and their countries of settlement” 
(Schiller et al. 1992: 1). Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt define 
transnationals as “a growing number of persons who live dual lives: 
speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and making a 
living through continuous regular contact across national borders.  
Activities within the transnational field comprise a whole gamut of 
economic, political and social initiatives” (Portes et al. 1999: 217, 222; 
also see Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007: 42).   
Transnationalism is not a simple, unitary phenomenon.  Theorists 
have long distinguished among different types and levels of 
transnationalism.  For example, Portes et al. (1999) differentiate “high” 
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and “low” varieties of transnationalism.  High forms are those that are 
more formally institutionalized, and that involve higher-level state or 
national processes, whereas low forms are the outcome of individual, 
local, or community-level activities  (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999).   
Itzigsohn, Cabral, and Medina (1999) also differentiate “narrow” forms of 
transnationalism, by which they mean highly focused, institutionalized, 
continuous activities that involve regular travel back and forth, and 
“broad” forms that involve occasional or no movement. 
Another distinction some have made is between transnationalism 
“from above” and “from below.” The difference here, once again, is about 
whether the activities are pursued by states, corporations and global 
elites, or whether they are taking place more at the local level by migrant 
individuals or communities. (Guarnizo et al. 1999; Smith and 1998).  As 
Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) put it, the difference is between 
activities “initiated and conducted by powerful institutional actors, such 
as multinational corporations and states, and those that are the result of 
grass-roots initiatives by immigrants and their home country 
counterparts” (Portes et al. 1999:221).   
When comparing immigrant actors within these two radically 
different scales of transnational engagement, it seems obvious that there 
are significant class differences between two broad sets of immigrants 
involved. One group acts as members of “global elites,” working as 
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representatives or in a privileged relationship to “powerful institutional 
actors” such as states and corporations, whereas the other group acts as 
“migrant individuals” who engage in “grass-roots initiatives” at the level 
of local “communities.” The material exchanges at this lower level – in the 
form of individual remittances, or small scale investments – occur on a 
modest scale, and the actors moreover need not actually engage in much 
physical movement back and forth in order to accomplish their goals 
(Portes et al. 1999:221).   
 In the U.S. these broad class lines are indeed very evident in the 
way that the two segments – a mobile, usually upper middle class 
transnational group of highly educated managers and professionals, and 
a less educated, lower white collar or blue collar group of workers – 
engage with the U.S. occupational structure, and are incorporated into 
the host society.  The more elite sector’s labor market involvement is also 
different in being firmly located within the formal sector, whereas the 
lower status group is heavily confined to the informal job sector.  
The class divide that characterizes the immigrant community, and 
their labor market incorporation, is strongly reinforced by another key 
variable: their immigration status.  Unauthorized entry and presence in 
the host country is not only associated with being lower class in Brazil, 
as I will explain; but also immigrants’ ability to enter legally with a 
temporary or permanent visa, and to gain permanent residency or 
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citizenship, tend also to be associated with having upper middle class or 
higher status in the sending society.  The differences in immigration 
status – especially being “in” or “out of” status – thus strongly reinforce 
the pre-existing class lines that immigrants bring with them from Brazil.   
 Another issue is how to measure the intensity or degree of 
transnational connections when comparing the two class segments.  The 
conventional wisdom, of course, is that the more elite the sector, the 
more likely it is that the immigrant will be “integrated” with the host 
society, presumably in the formal sector, and therefore be better 
positioned to play a stronger transnational role. “The more legally, 
culturally, and socially integrated a migrant is, the more likely it is that 
he or she will be able to engage in collective transnational activities,” and 
control resources for which he or she can play a stronger broker role 
(Castañeda et al. 2014:327).  This suggests that immigrants of more 
humble backgrounds, who may be undocumented, and less capable of 
back and forth movement, are somehow less fully transnational.  This is 
an assumption that my findings do not support.  In fact, I will suggest 
that it is the less elite immigrants, mostly undocumented, who engage in 
a deeply rooted “everyday transnationalism” in spite of the barriers to 
their being physically mobile across transnational space. They engage in 
regular, often intense communications with relatives at home, usually in 
order to sustain family relationships, and a continual series of economic 
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transactions through remittances to their home communities. In this 
sense, all my subjects were transnational people, even if they manifested 
that in different ways. 
 Another school of thought in the sociology of transnational 
migration stresses the concept of “reactive transnationalism” (Itzigsohn 
and Georguli-Saucedo 2002), in which “immigrants with low social 
standing...engage in more transnational practices to escape their 
exclusion,” especially “when immigrant integration is very low, or when 
the immigrant is faced with low wages, a stigmatized socio-economic 
position, and racialization” (Castañeda et al. 2014:327).  These ideas 
receive support from my findings, although I will argue that this 
perspective can underestimate the extent of integration these same 
migrants have in the host society.  
A corollary line of research emphasizes that elite immigrants are 
“cosmopolitans” for whom national boundaries hold limited significance. 
They are “itinerant professionals who traversing the global market of 
work and career opportunities move across borders with relative ease” 
(Colic-Peisker 2008). In my findings, the experiences of middle and upper 
class migrants differed greatly from those of lower socioeconomic status. 
These class differences, as I also will show, affect even the most private 
domains of migrant life, including the family.   
Because they are already culturally fluent in the host society, the 
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elite are less challenged to create new cultural hybridities or develop new 
forms of family life and gender roles when arriving in the host society 
than their lower status compatriots. Elite status, strongly associated with 
the ability to obtain and migrate with legal standing, also typically means 
minimal disruption and fracturing of family ties, allowing migrants more 
easily to bring children with them (instead of leaving them behind), and 
to maintain ties with extended kin through regular visiting across 
transnational boundaries. The result is a much lower incidence of 
families with sharply mixed immigration statuses.  
The mixed status condition of so many Brazilian families, I will 
show, creates a sense of insecurity in family life for immigrants.  Even 
when middle and upper-middle class persons experience downward 
mobility, as they sometimes do, they continue to enjoy some privileges 
that lower status migrants do not, such as the ability for their Brazilian 
family members to obtain visas for visiting them. Rules allowing some 
visitors to adjust their status once in the U.S. also favor those who come 
with legal standing.  Once having legal standing, even if you overstay 
your visa and become temporarily undocumented, you can always adjust 
your status to a legal one through marriage to a U.S. citizen.  The option 
of converting to legal status even upon marriage, however, is not open to 
those who cross the border uninspected. 
Transnationalism is thus an important dimension across class 
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segments within the community.  Brazilian immigrants maintain 
transnational connections, and these transnational connections take 
different forms, depending on their class background and the resulting 
immigration statuses and economic standings in the host society they 
are likely to have.  In Alejandro Portes’ terms, there are both “high” and 
“low” forms of transnationalism, although these types do not necessarily 
remain stable for individuals and families over time (Portes and Rumbaut 
2006).  Some are able to travel back and forth to Brazil, because their 
statuses or economic standing allows it, but most are not.  This has 
profound effects on the ability of the different class segments to sustain 
their relationships with family in Brazil. 
 
The History of Brazilian Settlement: Two Immigrant Waves, to both 
the U.S. and Portugal     
 
This study contributes to the understanding of the Brazilian 
diaspora in two of the most significant destination countries for 
emigration from Brazil – the U.S. and Portugal. Although Brazilians 
reside in virtually all countries of the world (Ministerio das Relações 
Exteriores 20l4), the U.S. has the highest number of Brazilian 
immigrants. According to the Brazilian foreign affairs ministry, 2.5 
million Brazilians were residing outside Brazil in 2008 (Vianna 2001: 1); 
the 2014 figure is 3.1 million, and shows that outmigration is continuing 
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(Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2014).  The top receiving regions are 
North America4, Europe, and Asia, in that order. Brazilian outmigration 
first gained momentum during the 1980s, triggered by a hyperinflation of 
50% per annum (Sales 2008:245).  
Brazilians are driven to emigrate because prevailing wages in their 
home country are very low; the Brazilian minimum wage just increased 
in January 2016 to 880 Reais, or exactly $220 monthly (using the 
exchange rate current on January 13, 2016).   Living costs are similar to 
U.S. and Portuguese levels, however, leaving most in dire economic 
difficulty.  In addition, there is considerable under- and unemployment, 
including a  “high level of disguised unemployment in most of the areas 
in the country; excess supply of labor has been a distinct feature of the 
Brazilian economy” (Domingues and Lemos 2004:7). 
In the first wave during the 1980s, those leaving Brazil were mostly 
white, educated, middle and upper class migrants. This group entered 
the U.S., Japan, and several European countries with tourist, temporary 
work, and student visas.  Researchers agree they came to escape an 
economic recession and hyperinflation (Margolis 1998:33; Sales 
2008:246-247) and to accumulate resources to maintain their declining 
                                       
4 In 2008, Martes reported a number of 784,000 Brazilian immigrants living in the U.S. 
alone (Martes 2008:147), using Brazilian government statistics.  A more recent updated 
count by the Ministry of Foreign Relations reports 1,315,000 Brazilians living in the 
U.S., and 300,000 who are registered with the Brazilian Consulate in Boston (Ministério 
das Relações Exteriores 2014). Most estimates of Massachusetts’ Brazilian immigrant 
population are within the 250,000-300,000 range. 
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status at home.  They also tended to see themselves as sojourners or 
temporary migrants. 
 After this first surge of immigration, a later second wave arose in 
the mid to late 1990s and altered the mix of Brazilians leaving for the 
U.S., Europe, Japan, and other locations.  This second wave has been 
more mixed in socioeconomic class and education level, and more 
racially diverse, often from rural areas, and often darker in color (Braga 
and Jouet-Pastre 2008:5-6; Malheiros 2007; Ramos-Zayas 2008:271-
274).  This was true not only within the immigrant flow to North America, 
but also to other migrant destinations. 
 Comparing Brazilian Immigration to the U.S. and Portugal 
The present study will mainly focus on immigration to the U.S., 
and to the Boston metropolitan area of the New England region, in 
particular.  Some comparative data will be provided throughout, 
however, from Brazilian experiences in the Lisbon metropolitan area of 
Portugal.  One of the significant differences between the two cases in 
comparison here is the stricter regulatory controls on immigration in the 
U.S.    
Brazilians attempting to enter the U.S. today face stringent 
immigration controls, conditions that are responsible for the large 
number of undocumented people, and of mixed status families in 
Brazilian American communities.   As noted above, estimates such as 
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Fritz’ (2007), and Margolis’ (2008b), suggest nearly three–fourths of the 
Brazilian community’s adults are undocumented. Even as many as a 
third of the earlier, first wave of Brazilians are believed to have 
overstayed their visas, remaining in the country in an unauthorized 
status, as well, so this is a long-standing pattern that has only 
intensified recently.   The pressures of U.S. border control after 
September 11, 2001, led to severe restrictions on the number of visas 
granted to Brazilians, making it more difficult even for middle and upper 
class people to obtain entry legally (Margolis 2008a).   At present, most 
Brazilians, from middle-class persons to those of the lower rungs of 
Brazilian society, enter the country over the Mexican border uninspected 
(Margolis 2008b).  
Peixoto et al. indicate that many Brazilians who were blocked from 
entering the U.S. after the post-9/11 restrictions went to the more 
accessible Portugal instead (2009: 188).  Many of my Brazilian research 
subjects in Lisbon said the same thing.  In contrast to the U.S., the 
Portuguese and Brazilian governments established a 2003 bi-lateral 
accord, the “Safe Haven Agreement,” that guarantees Brazilian 
immigrants easier entry and a quicker pathway to dual citizenship than 
other foreign nationals. The act was reciprocal, allowing Portuguese 
similar rights in Brazil.   This accord builds on nineteenth-century 
conventions recognizing common cultural and linguistic bonds among 
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lusophone countries within Portugal’s then former empire.  In Portugal, 
Brazilians have easier entry as they are admitted as “tourists” without 
needing any visas, though they frequently overstay the 90 days they are 
permitted (Malheiros 2007). 
Anyone who secures a labor contract for a job gains residency, but 
this is difficult, and most Brazilians enter the informal economy and, 
lacking a labor contract, fall out of legal status (Malheiros 2007).   
Between 1992 and 2007, however, six different programs were instituted 
by the Portuguese parliament to regularize the status of undocumented 
immigrants, including many Brazilians (Peixoto et al. 2009:188). The 
number of unauthorized Brazilian immigrants, as a result, is much lower 
than in North America (Da Silva 2006), but there are still mixed-status 
families. Among the specific attractions of going to Portugal is that, once 
established there, immigrants can also use the country as a portal to 
other national locations within the European Union that pay better 
wages and have a higher standard of living. 
 Migrants bring clear economic benefits to the host societies, as 
many sectors of the Portuguese and U.S. economies depend on 
immigrants as a labor force, especially in low-wage service work.  The list 
of relevant sectors given by Peixoto et al. for Portugal parallels that of the 
U.S.:  “construction, accommodation and food service activities, services 
to companies, and domestic service” (Peixoto et al. 2009:180). The growth 
	 30 
of economic sectors such as these, with menial, difficult, or arduous jobs 
not desired by citizens, has led businesses, if not governments, to 
tolerate or abet immigrant workers’ entering to take up this work, even if 
it means they are undocumented (Chavez 1992; Coutin 2007).     
In Portugal the informal economy, with “its large demand for 
labour,” was estimated to be a full 22.3% of GDP in 2002-2003 (Peixoto 
et al. 2009:188).  In the U.S., a recent estimate from the ILO reported by 
the Urban Institute suggests 3-40% of all employment, and 5-10% of 
GDP, lie in the informal economy (Nightengale and Wandner 2011).  The 
World Bank suggests the informal economy accounts for 25% of U.S. 
employment.  In both Portugal and the U.S., of course, undocumented 
immigrants make up a large portion of the workforce in the informal 
economy. 
 A major difference between the U.S. and Portugal, of course, is 
their immigration histories.  Brazilians coming recently to Massachusetts 
have entered into a social fabric historically constructed from multiple 
immigrant flows over the past several centuries, including significant 
earlier Lusophone waves of Portuguese and Cape Verdeans; Brazilians, in 
fact, were in 2007 the most rapidly growing national grouping in today’s 
immigrant mix: “Massachusetts is now the primary U.S. destination for 
Brazilian immigrants (27%)…which is reflected in the fact that Brazilians 
are now the fastest growing immigrant community in Massachusetts” 
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(Lima, Toponarski, and Blake 2007:2).  At present, Massachusetts, with 
its 300,000 Brazilian residents, has the largest Brazilian community of 
any state in the U.S., just ahead of Florida, with 285,000 (Ministerio das 
Relações Exteriores 2014). 
  Though the U.S. has a long history as an immigrant-receiving 
country, Portugal never did until the late 1970s.  Before, Portugal had 
been an emigrant sending country throughout the centuries when it 
controlled a far-flung empire, as well as during the 1950s and 60s, when 
millions left as labor migrants to northern Europe.  It is estimated that 
one third of the Portuguese nation, in fact, or five million people, live 
outside its borders as immigrants in the U.S., South America, and 
Europe (Feldman-Bianco 1992).  Since the demise of Portugal’s African 
empire in the mid 1970s, and the expansion of the European Union to 
include former eastern bloc countries, the country has become a 
significant immigrant destination, with Brazilians, Cape Verdeans, and 
Ukranians, in that order, being today’s most numerous groups (Peixoto et 
al. 2009).  Today it is estimated that 15-20% of the population of 
metropolitan Lisbon, which composes one-quarter of the nation’s 
population, are immigrants.  Up to two thirds of all the country’s quarter 
million immigrants are estimated to live in the Lisbon area as well 
(Peixoto et al. 2009).   
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Writing for Portugal’s major organization serving Brazilian 
immigrants, Vianna has reported a count in Portugal of 33,050 illegal 
Brazilian immigrants (Vianna 2001:4). Martes reported for Portugal, as 
well, a total of 86,000 legal Brazilian immigrants (2008:147).  If these 
figures are correct, the Brazilian total would be approximately 120,000, 
mostly in Lisbon and its metropolitan area. However, this number of 
undocumented Brazilians may be a low estimate (Malheiros 2007).  More 
recent numbers from the foreign affairs ministry report 166,775 
Brazilians to be in Portugal (Ministerio das Relações Exteriores 2014). 
 
Transnationalism, the Difficulty of Travel Home, and Remittances 
In the economic domain, Brazilians maintain ties with Brazil 
through business investments, remittances, personal connections, and 
political connections.   Brazilians send large flows of remittances to build 
houses, develop communities, start businesses, and support their 
families (Lima and Siqueira 2008).  From the U.S. New England region, 
they send an average of $875.00 a month per immigrant, mostly to 
parents, secondly to spouses, and thirdly to their children left behind 
(Lima and Plastrik 2007). Exchanges of goods flow across borders 
through businesses that Brazilians start in the U.S., at three or four 
times the rate of other immigrant groups (Lima and Siqueira 2008).  
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In Portugal, transnational flows of people, resources, and 
investment are even more evident, since Brazilians are legally free to 
come and go from Portugal (Peixoto 2007:77). Also, the same high rate of 
small-scale entrepreneurialism so evident in the U.S. is present there, as 
two-thirds of the immigrants express the desire to start a business in 
Portugal (Inter-American Development Bank 2006).  Remittances are also 
very high, estimated at 420 million Euros a year flowing from Portugal to 
Brazil, with the average remittance being 320 Euros per month (Inter-
American Development Bank 2006). 
It is interesting to note that The Pew Research Center’s findings on 
more recent world remittances show that, overall, Brazil now receives 
nearly five billion dollars a year ($4,936,000,000 to be exact) in 
remittances from over 80 countries around the world annually.  
Immigrants in the U.S. send the most of any country, $1,306,000,000 in 
2012; Portugal was fourth in the same year, when immigrants there sent 
home $243,000,000 to Brazil (Pew Research Center 2014), a figure lower 
than a decade ago. This reflects the severe austerity and recession that 
have affected Portugal during its recent economic contraction.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the large size of the Brazilian 
economy (recently the fourth largest in the world), in 2012 Portuguese 
migrants in Brazil sent more money home to Portugal ($359,000,000) 
than the country received from Portugal.  Remittances are also actually 
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more important to Portugal than to Brazil: in 2014 Brazil’s remittances 
received constituted only one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the nation’s 
GDP. In Portugal, by contrast, remittance inflows are double that portion 
of GDP (0.2%) (World Bank 2014). 
The relatively low wages in Portugal, as compared to the U.S., 
however, despite the absence of barriers for free travel between Lisbon 
and Brazil, actually preclude a fuller transnationalism with regular back-
and-forth movement.  Lisbon Brazilians cannot easily afford the trip.  In 
Boston, the major barrier to travel is due to immigration status. If they 
try to leave, they may be apprehended at the border for illegal presence; 
be imprisoned if they are found to have been already deported; and be 
banned from any legal re-entry into the U.S. for ten years.   In both 
Boston and Lisbon, in other words, Brazilians are largely trapped in the 
immigrant setting, and unable to return home, though for different 
reasons. 
Brazilian immigrants on both sides of the Atlantic are engaged to 
some extent in political transnationalism.  Encouraged by the Brazilian 
state, Brazilian immigrants stay involved in home country politics.  To 
maintain a current Brazilian passport, they are required to vote in their 
national elections through the appropriate Consulate. The Brazilian 
government’s Ministry of External Relations, working through the 
consulates in Lisbon and in Boston, has also implemented external 
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electoral districts, which allow emigrants in these locations to vote for 
representatives in the Brazilian Congress (Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores 2008). Major political parties, such as the currently ruling 
Workers’ Party, also have organizers working in the U.S. and in Portugal 
to build support for their candidates.   
The Brazilian government also encourages immigrants to engage 
simultaneously with the U.S. and Portuguese systems, advising them to 
seek dual citizenship and aspire to political office, so they can shape 
foreign policies in those host societies that are more responsive to the 
Brazilian state.   The present study will assess how the two countries’ 
immigration policies, and differing patterns of cultural and linguistic 
affinities, shape transnational patterns that are evident in the Brazilian 
immigrant communities there.   
 
Transnationalism, Family Life and Gender Roles 
 Research has long drawn attention to how transnational migration 
changes families in response to the challenges of sustaining relations 
across borders. Migrants invest enormous social and material resources 
in maintaining ties with kin at home across transnational space 
(Parreñas 2005; Pribilsky 2007; Schmalzbauer 2005; and Smith 2005).  
While immigrants mostly remit out of a desire to support family back 
home, some feel pressure to remit to relatives at home when they 
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themselves are in a precarious economic position, especially if 
undocumented (Mahler 1995). Remittances, of course, are very important 
to the Brazilian economy.  Of 24 Latin American nations surveyed in a 
recent Inter-American Development Bank report, Brazil was second after 
Mexico in the annual total of 2008 remittances received, a total of 7.2 
billion in U.S. dollars (Inter-American Development Bank 2009),  
A key question of this study is how social hierarchies and relations 
within the family are called into question by migration.  Previous studies 
have revealed how transnational migration often leads to the 
development of “fractured families” (McGuire and Martin 2007). Family 
members are left behind, supposedly for their own economic good, to 
allow emigration for others (McGuire and Martin 2007:186; also see 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007:24-25). Stress is placed on the parent-child 
relationship, for children especially, when separated due to immigration 
(Parreñas 2005; Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 2007).    Even when 
families or family segments immigrate intact, family relations are often 
strained. Kibria’s study of Vietnamese immigration, for example, 
suggests that, “In addition to altering family boundaries, migration to the 
U.S.…also challenged the traditional gender and generational hierarchy 
of family life” (Kibria 1993:8).   
 According to available studies, Brazilians in the U.S. generally 
adopt more gender equality in all aspects of family life, including 
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responsibilities for child discipline, household chores, financial 
management, and even sexuality. Family relations, especially between 
husband and wife, become more egalitarian when women join men as 
wage laborers.  The most extensive study of gender role changes among 
contemporary Brazilian immigrants, by DeBiaggi, finds significant 
changes when looking at family units both in the U.S. as immigrants and 
as return migrants to Brazil (2001). These changes, however, vary by 
social class. The disruptions of traditional patterns are stronger for the 
lower classes (Goldani 1999).   
In Portugal, however, research has reported less of a shift away 
from the patriarchal relations characteristic of Brazil than in the U.S., 
since Portuguese society itself displays more patriarchal patterns.  
Because of their mastery of the Portuguese language, Brazilian female 
immigrants have more employment opportunities open to them, 
particularly in retail services, and make more money than in Brazil, 
(Padilla 2005a). Some mixed status family situations, depending on the 
family configuration involved, may yield more female power in the family, 
but where the male partner is documented and the woman is not, this 
seldom happens. 
Another central issue to be addressed is how immigration policy 
and status affect the character of family life.   Being undocumented 
causes family problems inside the host country (Chavez 1992; DeGenova 
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2005; Mahler 2005).  Most undocumented immigrants live in “mixed 
status families” (Chavez 1992), often combining citizens, the 
undocumented, and legal residents. According to the Pew 2009 U.S. 
national survey (Passel and Cohn 2009), mixed status families are a 
majority of all immigrant families headed by someone undocumented.  
Since most migrants come as young adults (Chavez 1992:129) and 
enter childbearing years while in the U.S., they often give birth to 
American citizen children in this country. Of an estimated 6.6 million 
“unauthorized families” in the U.S. in 2008, containing 8.8 million people 
overall, 73% of all children (or a total of four million) were U.S. citizens 
(Passel and Cohn 2009:7-8). The most common U.S. Brazilian family 
pattern, in fact, involves second-generation, American-born children 
living with their unauthorized parents. Families without children, 
however, can also be mixed, such as families connected through adult 
siblings, with typically close relationships in the Brazilian family. 
In Portugal, the family configurations are different.  There is no 
provision for birth citizenship, and only at age 18 may children born in 
Portugal of immigrant parents apply for citizenship.  Mixed status 
families are more likely to be, then, parents with legal residency or 
citizenship, and children without status, despite their birth and having 
grown up in the country.   Undocumented, second generation children 
are typically among the main beneficiaries of the Portuguese state’s 
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frequent regularization schemes.  This is only one of the ways that mixed 
status family configurations differ across immigration contexts, as a 
consequence of differing immigration control policies.     
Of course, immigrants and their children from other areas of the 
European Union, especially the eastern bloc countries that today supply 
more and more of the immigrant workforce in Portugal, enjoy European 
rights to services, education, and employment, even if they do not vote in 
national-level elections.  Immigrants from Africa and Brazil do not enjoy 
such automatic rights.  Patterns of mixed status families thus also vary 
depending on the nationalities of the immigrants involved and what 
rights they enjoy under current policy.  The study will attempt to 
examine how policy differences affect family dynamics, for example, by 
assessing which policies are more likely to favor preservation of 
traditional family structures and parental authority.  
 
Racialization and Identity 
  Another key issue for the study is to define and compare the 
racialization processes that Brazilians encounter in the U.S. and Portugal, 
and how they impact life within the migrant community.   A related 
concern is to assess how new emerging racial and class orders in the two 
receiving societies are affecting the fates of Brazilian immigrants both 
inside the family, and in social domains outside of it, by introducing new 
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distinctions, and even inequalities, among members of families and 
communities.   
 Today it is often supposedly “essential” cultural differences that 
are assumed by many to divide the globe’s peoples ethnically, and this 
trend has been interpreted by many scholars as a kind of “new racism,” 
often ostensibly “color-blind” and “anti-racist,” hidden under prevailing 
ideologies of individualism and meritocracy (Balibar 1992; Bonilla-Silva 
2003; Winant 1999, 2004).  As Winant notes, racial discrimination still 
often targets phenotypic differences, but now can engage with other 
traits like behavior or culture:  “The boundaries of the race concept are… 
problematic: to what extent is race somatized, phenotypic, 
corporeal…and to what extent is race performative, somatized, cultural?” 
(Winant 2004:35).  What might operate in particular cases is a matter for 
empirical examination. 
New racial “Others” continue to be created through the 
racialization process.  As Omi and Winant explain: “We employ the term 
racialization to signify the extension of racial meaning to a previously 
racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group. Racialization 
is an ideological process, a historically specific one” (Omi and Winant 
1994: 64).  In the U.S., immigrants with some African descent experience 
racialization as blacks from the country’s “One Drop Rule,” and its black-
white binary.  This has posed a challenge that has long plagued arriving 
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immigrants of color, including West Indians, Haitians, and Cape 
Verdeans (Halter 1993; Waters 2001). The tendency to racialize is also 
aimed at those outside the African diaspora. Regarding “Asians,”5 the 
racialization process forces Asians of many nationalities and cultures 
into a putatively “homogenous” racial category whether they wish it or 
not (Kibria 1998).  
Racialization of Brazilians is occurring in both the U.S. and in 
Portugal, though in different ways that reflect the countries’ varying race 
relations histories.  In today’s U.S., Brazilian immigrants – encountering 
considerable cultural and language discrimination by the U.S. host 
society, much as Latinos and others are experiencing – are undergoing a 
racialization process and being subjected to increasing racism as 
immigrants (McDonnell and Lourenço 2008).  Where color becomes an 
issue, as it does only for some, they are usually categorized as brown or 
mixed race Latinos.  
Racialization of Brazilians in the U.S. may be mimicking the 
contemporary version evident among Latinos, as they encounter the 
American racial order (Waterson 2008).  Reflecting both class and color 
differences, Latinos are increasingly segmenting into two streams 
                                       
5 This ethnic label is placed in quotes to signify that the category is problematic, in the 
sense that it racializes very diverse groups into an oversimplified, supposedly 
homogeneous population.  In this essay, other labels appear in quotes, as well, such as 
“brown,” “immigrant,” “less than white,” etc., to signify that they, too, are problematic, 
contested, or semantically loaded terminology. 
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experiencing different outcomes in terms of assimilation and integration 
into U.S. society.  The more affluent, better educated, and English-
dominant are increasingly becoming whitened and assimilating into 
white American society; but, a second group – poorer, more Spanish-
oriented, with more recent migration, and with either more indigenous or 
African (darker) appearance -- are increasingly becoming racialized as a 
“brown” Latino racial Other (O’Brien 2008).  A similar bifurcated process, 
we will see, is occurring among Brazilians in Boston.  
 Brazilians are racialized on the basis of skin color, but also because 
of other social and cultural features, such as, “presumed ethnicity or 
nationality, language, accent, and gender, or a combination of the factors” 
(McDonnell and De Lourenço 2009:240-241).  Many Brazilians change 
their racial identification as a result, away from “white” to “non-white” 
and “Brazilian” (2009:241).   In only a few locations, such as in Florida 
where Latinos have a higher social and political profile, do Brazilians 
sometimes self-identify as “Latinos,” especially in the second generation 
(De Oliveira 2003; Resende 2003). Brazilians can thus display 
“situational ethnicity,” which is “premised on the observation that 
particular contexts may determine which of a person’s communal 
identities or loyalties are appropriate at a point in time” (Paden 1970:268, 
quoted in Okamura 1981:452).  
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Cultural Imperialism and “Color-Blind” Racialization on Account of 
Culture.  
 In Portugal, prevailing racial ideologies dating from the colonial era 
are that the country historically is the “least racist” country in the world, 
and does not categorize or discriminate against anyone on account of 
their skin color.  As in many other European countries with an 
ostensibly “color blind” approach to racial tolerance, the Portuguese 
focus mainly on cultural and ethnic traits to define some groups as 
inferior (Padilla 2005a:4).   
Peixoto et al. report research indicating that Portuguese attitudes, 
in two thirds of their respondents, showed prejudice toward immigrants 
perceived of a “different racial/ethnic background” than the Portuguese 
themselves (2009:194).   Despite Brazilians having some privileges or 
easier adaptation compared to other immigrant groups, there is evidence 
the Portuguese exoticize Brazilians as tropicals who are simple, sensual, 
disorganized, and naïve in their thinking, stereotypes which are 
reinforced by the media (Padilla 2005b). The attitude is worse toward 
darker Brazilians than whites, and toward women. “Females seem to be 
the principal victims of stereotyping in the Portuguese society. They are 
being exoticized, have a reputation for being easy and are stigmatized as 
prostitutes” (Malheiros 2007:35; see also Padilla 2005a:10-12).  Padilla 
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reports documented discrimination in employment, housing, and health 
services, as well as general social attitudes (Padilla 2005a:4-7). 
Because of Portugal’s long history as a colonial master of Brazil 
from 1500 until its independence was declared in 1822, immigrants 
share important cultural and especially linguistic ties with the 
Portuguese:  they speak the language, and think they understand the 
culture.  Arriving in Portugal, Brazilian immigrants are also somewhat 
pre-adapted to life in Europe through Portuguese-language media 
representations and through family contacts with relatives who have 
gone there earlier.  Many Brazilians also have some Portuguese ancestry, 
and they believe they share many cultural and linguistic affinities with 
Portugal that will make their adaptation easier (Peixoto 2007).  It is not 
always true, as we shall see in Chapter Four. 
For Brazilians going to the U.S., thanks to globalization, before 
leaving home they also are aware of the destination society, and 
American cultural values, from the media and from stories of family and 
friends abroad.   The resulting rapid acculturation that Brazilians 
undergo once in the U.S. reveals visible change in their tastes, habits, 
and forms of expression.   In the U.S., a new Brazilian-American identity 
is emerging, that of the Brazuca.6 Different social classes show varying 
                                       
6 Some literature identifies a new emerging identity for Brazilians in the U.S., that of 
“Brazuca.”   Tosta’s definition of Brazuca focuses on the transnational character of the 
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manifestations of change, however.  More elite Brazilians have had more 
exposure to U.S. products and ways before arriving, but those from more 
humble origins know less, and they have less freedom to experiment 
once in the U.S., often because they lack documentation.   They appear 
more “conservative” in their Brazilianness, less cosmopolitan than those 
who are documented (Ramos-Zayas 2008:271-284).   At the same time, 
as I will explain below, they also display more change in behavioral 
patterns.   
 
Chapter Preview 
Chapter Two, that immediately follows, outlines my research 
methodology, and the characteristics of my research samples in each 
setting, and explains in detail the entire process and my experiences of 
conducting the field work in Boston and in Lisbon.  Also included is an 
extended discussion of my own role as a partial “insider” researcher, as 
someone who has lived and worked in the Boston area Brazilian 
Immigrant Community for nearly two decades, including the special 
                                                                                                                  
population. He says a Brazuca is, “a true Brazilian who cannot manage to live in Brazil 
but who remains in a back-and-forth (vai-e-vem) existence between there and America 
without end” (Tosta 2004:580).   In Jouet-Pastre’s and Braga’s recent anthology, 
Becoming Brazuca: Brazilian Immigration to the U.S., Margolis defines the identity in a 
more general way:  “Brazuca is a colloquialism for Brazilian immigrant in this country 
that first appeared in…the late 1980s” (Margolis 2008b:342).  Margolis and others 
argue that the identity label is an attempt to distinguish Brazilians as unique and not 
part of the Latino category.  Interestingly, the term has also been adopted for use in 
Lisbon, to describe the Brazilians newly adapting to Portuguese society. 
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insights and pressures on me as a member of the community.  My 
assessment of the benefits of this engagement as a partial insider-
researcher is overwhelmingly positive.  
Chapter Three explores how Brazilian American immigrants 
sustain their family life in the face of the challenges of migration and 
adjusting to profound changes as they become immersed in a 
transnational field of action, leading many to have to parent their 
children from afar, across transnational space.  The new pacing of life in 
the U.S. involves family members in more intense work outside the home 
and creates new modes of social relations within the family, affecting 
conjugal relations, relations with extended kin, and new parenting 
practices. Especially impacted are gender role relations that become 
more egalitarian due to the increasing economic independence of women.  
Another defining characteristic of the immigrant family is that its 
members are typically “mixed” in immigration status, something that 
creates special vulnerabilities to family unity under the current U.S. 
immigration policy. 
Chapter Four examines some of the imported practices and beliefs 
Brazilians bring with them regarding race and class relations, including 
the pervasive and largely unexamined racism embedded in the Brazilian 
popular culture, that continues to be exhibited in the migrant setting.  
Imported notions of Brazilian class and race interact with the U.S. class 
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and racial order.  The resulting patterns create continuing, serious 
divisions of culture and life circumstances for different segments of the 
Brazilian immigrant community, while at the same time collapsing some 
of the distinctions imported from Brazil. This results in both continuing 
exploitation and conflict along class and race lines within the immigrant 
community, but also new, less stratified patterns of inter-racial and 
inter-class relations among immigrants that sometimes, in their own 
turn, provoke new forms of local conflict.  These conflicts and the 
barriers to civic engagement posed by the insecure immigration status of 
immigrants render the Brazilian immigrant community quite invisible on 
a public level in Boston, as well as elsewhere in the U.S. 
Finally, Chapter Five concludes the work by focusing on U.S. 
immigration policy, which is a key definer of life experiences and 
opportunities, and the types of social and economic integration permitted 
of Brazilian and other immigrants.  In the Brazilian case, current policy 
strongly favors and welcomes elite class and racial segments of the 
Brazilian population, allowing race and class factors strongly to shape 
whether Brazilians enter with a visa or come over the border without 
inspection, and thus the differential distribution of opportunities and life 
experiences to Brazilians in the immigrant setting.  U.S. Immigration 
policy has recently been undergoing change, and more is no doubt to be 
expected in the near future.  The chapter concludes by examining 
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current and incipient shifts in immigrant rights and the level of social 
integration they are promoting, and addresses the impacts these are 
having, or are likely to have, on family and community life in the years to 
come.  With the current emergence of a second generation in this 
relatively new immigrant population, there is the promise of more self-
conscious ethnic representation at the civic and political levels in the 
next generation.  
Each chapter, while focusing principally on the immigrant 
community in the U.S. New England region, takes a comparative glance 
at the similarities and differences within the lives and circumstances of 
Brazilian families who are residing in Portugal. 
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Chapter Two 
Research Design, Methodology, & Community Demographics 
 
 Introduction. This chapter describes the mixed methodology used 
in the research, both in Boston, and in Lisbon, and the characteristics of 
the respondents in the study samples surveyed.  I discuss several 
important aspects of my fieldwork, and also outline some of the 
differences between the situations of the Brazilian community in Boston 
and Lisbon that had implications for my fieldwork.  My status as a 
“partial insider researcher” in the study communities in both settings 
(though much more so in Boston than in Lisbon), had important 
consequences, especially for the kinds of relationships of trust that I was 
able to build with respondents. 
 Sampling and Recruitment. The combined total number of 
respondents surveyed in Boston and Lisbon was eighty-eight, of which 
forty-four were in the Boston sample and forty-four in Lisbon.  The 
criteria for participation included being at least 18 years old of age, 
residence in the United States or Portugal for at least three years, and 
sharing a household with family members in the immigrant setting, i.e., 
at least one member of the household had to have been born in Brazil. 
The participants were selected using a stratified convenience sampling; 
that is, to ensure diversity I deliberately sampled by gender, race/color, 
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class, and level of education. The research employed non-probability 
sampling strategies, including both snowball and convenience sampling. 
 Gaining Entry to Interviewing Sites and Access to Respondents.  
I started by approaching community leaders/brokers in the city of 
Boston and its wider metropolitan area, including Cambridge, Somerville, 
Woburn, Quincy, Stoughton, Weymouth, and Lowell, all locations of large 
concentrations of Brazilians. This generated initial contact with possible 
participants.  I spoke to five community brokers/gate keepers in the U.S. 
and five community Brokers in Portugal. In the U.S., I drew these key 
informants from a variety of community organizations and businesses.7 
 In the comparative Portuguese case, the same procedures were 
followed to locate Brazilian respondents residing in the Greater Lisbon 
area, including its towns such as Sintra, Ericeira, Setubal, Almada, 
Seital, and Cascais, all of them communities with high numbers of 
resident Brazilians (Casa do Brasil em Lisboa 2007:229). In Lisbon as in 
Boston, I gained access to community and potential participants through 
                                       
7 Organizations or places where I found such people included the Brazilian Immigrant 
Center (Boston); Café Brasil (Allston, Boston), Sophia’s Hair Salon (Chelmsford); 
Ipanema Hair Salon (Cambridge);. Nice Hair Salon (Watertown); hair salons in Malden 
and Melrose, Express Graphics and Signs (Stoughton), JC Ethnic Store (Quincy), 
Brazilian Bakery (Allston), Brazil Bakery (Somerville), Brazuca Ethnic Store 
(Weymouth), Terra Brasilis Restaurant (Quincy), Tudo na Brasa Restaurante (Woburn); 
and a Brazilian family-based day care center (Quincy). 
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organizations, institutions and businesses with ties to immigrants.8  I 
also sought the assistance of researchers, faculty and students at the 
New University of Lisbon, and at Lisbon University Institute-ISCTE. 
 In addition to providing me with initial contacts and introducing 
me to other leaders in the community, the key informants gave me an 
overview of the entire community based on their observations and 
encounters they had with it.  Their assistance was crucial, enabling me 
to gain access to both communities, especially in Portugal with which I 
had little prior familiarity.  
Another method I used to locate informants was to visit places 
where I already had established contacts with Brazilian businesses and 
organizations, because of my community involvements.   In both 
countries, certain neighborhoods were also appropriate study sites 
because of the visible number of thriving Brazilian ethnic establishments, 
such as hair salons, supermarkets, bakeries and cafes, restaurants, and 
clubs.  Besides businesses, these neighborhoods also tend to have 
nearby residential concentrations of Brazilian immigrants. I found it 
relatively easy to locate research subjects in these neighborhoods.  As I 
explain below, many of the neighborhood establishments function as 
                                       
8These included organizations and businesses such as the Casa do Brasil (Bairro Alto, 
Lisbon; Lucia Hair Salon (Arroios, Lisbon); Jorge Café (Arroios, Lisbon); and Minas 
Flavor Bar and Restaurant (Caparica).  
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community centers or “third places” in people’s lives, in addition to home 
and work. 
Photo 1:  Screening two families to see if they fit the survey criteria, 
and scheduling time for later interviews, Caparica, Portugal. 
 
 
Survey Research Instrument. A questionnaire (see Appendix) 
composed of a mix of 49 closed and open-ended questions was used to 
gather data.  This instrument was designed to provide detailed 
demographic information, responses exploring immigrants’ reports of 
family and individual life changes that may have accompanied their 
	 53 
migration, and their perceptions of their place within the immigrant 
Brazilian community as well as in the wider host society.  Questions 
directly inquiring about immigration status were never asked, but 
inquiry into the dynamics of “mixed status” families with which 
respondents might be familiar often revealed information on the 
immigration status of respondents.  Questions were divided into sections 
that probed on relevant issues.  The questions covered a variety of topics, 
including transnationalism; mixed status family formation and 
operation; family dynamics, including conjugal relations and parent-child 
relations; courtship; gender roles; race and identity; and the immigration 
experience.   
The open-ended questions, such as those focusing on the 
comparative quality of life between country of origin and host society, 
often elicited long responses delving into personal histories and 
philosophical reflections on the immigration experience.  These 
responses were recorded and transcribed.  Sometimes these revelations 
continued for some time after the formal survey was complete.  It often 
happened that answering the survey questions opened up issues and 
emotions for respondents, and afterward they would begin to pour out 
their hearts about their struggles and hopes with me. I began to ask if 
they would approve of my taking notes, and I often ended up doing so. 
	 54 
Testing and Pre-testing of Interview Instruments: I did not 
pretest the survey instrument among respondents, though I received 
feedback from my dissertation committee, as well as friends and 
colleagues within the community.  The survey was administered in face-
to-face interviews and conducted in Portuguese, thereby eliminating any 
opportunity of to have a respondent misunderstand the question because 
of language barriers.  
Of all the questions in the survey, there were two that the 
respondents typically had problems answering. The difficulty in these 
cases arose because respondents were not familiar with the terminology 
used. One was question No. 3 under the demographic section: 
“Race/ethnicity.” Most of the respondents were not sure how to respond 
to it, because Brazil has a history of not discussing these maters using 
such terminology. Most of the citizens of Brazil use “Brazilian” as an 
identity that encompasses nationality, and embraces all races and 
ethnicities. The second question was No. 33 under the section Race, 
Ethnicity & Identity: “What does the term Brazuca mean to you?”  This 
question was posed as a response to recent published work on Brazilian 
immigration that has argued this term is in wide current use.   Most of 
the respondents, however, answered they had never heard the term 
Brazuca, and when they did, the majority had heard it as a term used in 
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a negative, derogatory manner.  This was true for the respondents in the 
Boston Area, and in Lisbon and surrounding towns.  
Data Collection.  Guided by the survey instrument (see appendix), 
interviews were in-depth and conducted face-to-face, and responses 
recorded using paper and pen, and tape recorder.  I made a deliberate 
effort to stratify the interview sample by recruiting people from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds, education levels, and professions as varied 
as restaurant dishwashers and house cleaners, to doctors, professors, 
community leaders, and businesses owners.  To ensure that language 
did not become a barrier for respondents, all research materials, 
including the informed consent form and survey questions, were 
translated into Portuguese.  Interviews were always conducted in 
Portuguese, as well.  
Data Analysis. I entered the survey results into SPSS, including all 
the closed-end questions, and generated descriptive tables and some 
cross-tabulations. Tape recordings of the open-ended questions were 
transcribed with the help of several bilingual assistants.  Using grounded 
theory methods, the responses were coded and recoded as I examined 
them for patterns and common threads.  Responses from Boston and 
from Lisbon were then compared to note similarities and differences.  
Field notes that were taken on site were transcribed from handwritten to 
typescript records.  All the personal stories and responses that were 
	 56 
collected were organized, and had all identifiers removed, with all 
individuals being assigned pseudonyms in order to protect respondents’ 
identities. 
Fieldwork and Research Assistants: In conducting my fieldwork, 
I drew on the assistance of three field assistants, two in the United 
States and one in Portugal:  all of them were Brazilian and were 
connected to the communities, that facilitated my access to the 
respondents. The research assistants accompanied me to various 
community gatherings and places.  Once the data was collected, the 
research assistants helped me to organize the data. 
  
National Data on Brazilians Residing in the United States 
When it comes to the number of Brazilians in the U.S., no one 
seems to know for sure, and this is largely due to the fact that many 
cross the border without inspection and try to maintain a low profile 
once arrived. According to data collected by the Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores (2014), in its Project Brasileiros no Mundo9, there are one 
million three hundred and fifteen thousand (1,315,000) Brazilians 
residing in the United States. However, compared to the U.S. Census, in 
                                       
9 The publication Brasileiros no Mundo (Brazilians in the World) issued by the Ministério 
das Relações Exteriores (2014) explains that their statistics on Brazilians were obtained 
through analysis of consular registration and other records. They also state that the 
number may not be reflective of the total population, with the exception of Japan that 
has small numbers of undocumented Brazilians.  
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the 2011 American Community Survey, there were 338,848.  The 
number of Brazilians reported by the U.S. Census is thus four times 
lower than the data obtained from the Brazilian ministry. 
 There might be several reasons for such a discrepancy.  
Undercounting is well documented for U.S. minority groups who are less 
likely to participate in the U.S. Census. In addition to Brazilian 
immigrants trying to maintain a low profile and being less likely to 
respond to the U.S. Census, those that do answer categorize themselves 
as “other” or “white.” I would also point out that the data from the 
Brazilian government are from 2014 compared to the U.S. Census data 
collected in 2011. Figure 1 shows the top five countries in the world for 
the Brazilian diaspora.  
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Figure 1: Five Top Countries to which Brazilians Migrate 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the top country for Brazilian 
migration is the United States, home to 1,315,000 Brazilians.  The 
second country is Paraguay, with a Brazilian population of 349,842. The 
third is Japan, known to have most accurate count, with 179,649. 
Portugal is fourth, having 166,775; and, finally Spain is fifth, with 
128,638.  
  
USA		 Paraguay	 Japan	 Portugal	 Spain	
1,315,000	
349,842	 179,649	 166,775	 128,638	
Five	Top	Countries	to	which	Brazilians	Migrate		
Data Source: Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2014 	
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Figure 2: Brazilians in the U.S. 2014 
 
 
Figure 2 above provides the numbers of Brazilians residing in major U.S. 
cities10 in eight different states in the United States.  According to data 
collected by the Ministério das Relações Exteriores, in their Project 
Brasileiros no Mundo, the top three states that have the largest number 
of Brazilian immigrants are Massachusetts (300,000), New York 
(285,000), and Florida (250,000).  The other five top states begin with 
California, where an estimated 150,000 Brazilians reside, a figure drawn 
from data collected by the Brazilian consulates in Los Angeles. 
                                       
10 The cities are mentioned because the Brazilian consulates where data were collected 
were located in these cities in each state. 
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Brazilians in the U.S.  –  2014     
Data Source: Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2014 
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Next are Georgia (90,000), Texas (85,000), Connecticut (60,000), and 
Illinois (55,000).  
Figure 3: Gender Distribution of Brazilian Immigrants in the U.S. 
 
Figure 3, which draws on data from the U.S. Census’ American 
Community Survey from 2011 gives us the gender distribution of 
Brazilians residing in the five U.S. states with the highest numbers of 
Brazilians. With the exception of Massachusetts, in all the other states – 
Florida, New York, New Jersey, and California – women were in the 
majority, and the last bar in the graph shows that overall 54% of 
Brazilians in the U.S. are women.  In my own Boston and Lisbon samples 
53%	 43%	 45%	 46%	 42%	 46%	47%	
57%	 55%	 54%	 58%	 54%	
Gender Distribution of Brazilian 
Immigrants in the U.S. 
Male		 Female	
Data	Source:	US	Census	Bureau:	2009-2011	American	Community	Survey			
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I had a high participation of females due to the fact that I was interested 
in the migrant family experience, and most of the time the women were 
available and willing to sit down and speak with me about those issues.   
Figure 4: Level of Education for Brazilians in MA 
 
Most research studies on Brazilians have shown that they tend to 
be more educated compared to other groups of immigrants from Central 
and South America. (Siqueira and Lima 2008, Martes 2008, Margolis 
1998).  This holds true in my sample. According to the U.S. Census, 18% 
of Brazilians have a bachelor’s degree or higher, 43% graduated from 
high school, and only 21% have not finished high school. These numbers 
are also consistent with my findings. 
  
Less	than	High	School	Diploma	 High	School	Graduate,	Including	Equivalency	
Bachelor's	Degree	or	Higher	
21%	
43%	
18%	
Level	of	Education	of	Brazilians	in	MA	
Data	Source:	US	Census	Bureau:	2009-2011	American	Community	Survey				
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Figure 5: Top 10 Industries for Work for Persons Born in Brazil 
 
Figure 5 above, adapted from Barker, Siqueira, Brinkerhoff, and 
Walter (2014) shows the top ten U.S. industries in which Brazilian 
immigrants work. Sixteen percent of Brazilians work in the construction 
industry; 19.7% are in professional, scientist, management, and 
administrative positions; 17% are in other services; and, 17% are in art, 
entertainment, recreation, accommodations and food industries. 
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Boston Survey Sample Demographic Profile  
Thirty percent (30%) of my sample is male and 70% is female. In 
terms of racial self-identification, 43% are white, 19% black, and 38% 
“mixed” or ”just Brazilian.”  
Twenty-three percent of my respondents were between 18 – 29 
years, 34% between the ages of 30 – 39, 32% between the ages of 40  – 
49, and 11% between the ages of 50  – 59.   
When it comes to religion, the majority of the respondents (63 
percent) are Catholic, and 37% reported themselves to be Evangelical 
Christian/Protestant.  
Seventy four percent of the persons I surveyed said they were 
married; 18% were single but cohabiting with a partner; 5% were 
divorced; and 3% of the respondents reported that they were separated 
but had entered into other relationships.  Most respondents reported 
modest incomes, although there was a wide range in the sample. Two 
percent reported $19,999 or less; twelve percent reported between 
$20,000 and $29,999; twenty-six percent reported between $30,000 and 
$39,999; ten percent reported between $40,000 and $49,999; twenty one 
percent reported between $50,000 and $59,999; twelve percent reported 
between $60,000 and $69,999; and twelve percent reported to have a 
household income of $70,000 or higher. These findings suggest mostly 
middle-income families in my sample.  In many of these cases low middle 
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incomes were achieved by pooling income from several low-wage jobs to 
make ends meet; however at the other end of the spectrum, about 10% 
were upper middle income.  
    
Figure 6:  Brazilian State of Origin of Sample Respondents in Boston       
Showing Heaviest Concentration from Minas Gerais 
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Brazilians in my U.S. sample came from 11 states in Brazil, with 
the largest numbers (44%) from Minas Gerais. The state with the second 
largest numbers is Espirito Santo, at 13%. Bahia came in third, at 9%.  
Of the remaining, 7% each came from the states of Santa Catarina, São 
Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, 4% were from Rondonia, and 2% each arrived 
in the U.S. from Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Paraiba. 
   As I mentioned earlier, I limited my sample to those whose families 
had been in the U.S. for at least three years.  My goal was to capture the 
experiences of family migration.   Of those I surveyed, 16% reported 
length of residence in the U.S. to be between three and five years, 64% 
more than five and less than eight years, and 15% eight years or more.  
The level of education of the U.S. Brazilians in my sample, as noted 
earlier, was quite high.  About 10% reported to have completed 
elementary and middle school. More than half (52%) have a high school 
diploma, 25% have earned an Associates or Bachelors Degree, and 
almost 7% have obtained a Masters degree or higher.  Overall, then, they 
are a well educated group – a third have higher education degrees, and 
most of the rest are secondary school graduates.  The comparable figures 
for the general population between 25 and 64 years of age in Brazil are:  
high school graduates 45% and those with tertiary-level degrees 14% 
(OECD 2016). 
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Figure 7: U.S. Respondents’ Level of Education 
 
Like so many immigrants in the United States, many of the 
Brazilians in my sample had experienced considerable downward 
occupational mobility with migration to the Boston area.  For women, 
becoming domestic workers – moving “from mistress to servant” in 
Margolis’ terms (Margolis 1990) – was the most common history.  
Becoming self-employed through entrepreneurship in establishing small 
businesses was also a common pattern, one that is widely observed in 
the literature on Brazilian immigrants (e.g., Lima and Siqueira 2011). 
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Figure 8: Respondents’ Occupations in the United States 
 
 
In contrast to the mostly manual labor they performed in the 
United States, in Brazil these same immigrants were either students (the 
most single common occupation) or mostly engaged in white-collar 
service employment, in positions such as secretaries, attorneys, or 
teachers.  The one prominent occupation in both places was beautician, 
a business that many women carried with them from Brazil to the U.S. 
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Figure 9:  Respondents’ occupations in Brazil prior to migration 
 
Portugal Social Survey Demographic Profile 
The Brazilian community in Portugal is less visible than that in the 
U.S. In Massachusetts, even though many Brazilians maintain a low 
profile, all one needs to do is walk through certain neighborhoods and 
you will see businesses of all kinds with Brazilian flags in front of them.  
In Portugal, it was difficult to identify Brazilian businesses without a 
local person to help, because it is not customary or allowed in public 
regulations for business-owners to display their nationality through flags 
and symbols. This reflects the Portuguese national preoccupation that 
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ethnic divisions should to be avoided.   
The gender distribution for the respondents in Portugal was 34% 
male and 63% female (3% gave no response). Thus in both the U.S. and 
Portuguese samples, women outnumber men.  As for race, those in 
Portugal were less inclined to identity as white.  In relation to race, 
Brazilians residing in Portugal have identified themselves as less white, 
overall, than in the U.S.: twenty-seven percent self-identified white, 18% 
black, and 55% mixed. 
Three percent of the sample was between the age of 18 – 29; 57% 
aged 30–39; 11% aged 40–49; 17% aged 50–59; and 5% for ages 60 or 
older. On the whole, the Lisbon sample was older than the Boston one; 
especially in Boston, there were many more younger adults, in their 20s 
and 30s, and more middle-aged adults in Lisbon.  As for religion 33% 
disclosed that they were Catholic; 52%, Evangelical Christian or Baptist; 
6% had other; and 9% stated that they did not have a religion.  
The Portuguese sample contained fewer married persons and more 
single persons than the U.S. sample.  Forty-give percent were married; 
30% were single; and 15% divorced. Income levels were homogeneous. 
The vast majority of respondents reported their income to be between 
600 and 1,500 euros per month ($654 to $1635 US). These low levels of 
income were, however, more than they reported earning in Brazil. One 
fifth reported a household income higher than 2500 euros per month.   
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Brazilians in my sample from the Lisbon region came from twelve 
states in Brazil. The numbers from different states are roughly equivalent, 
unlike in Boston where a majority of the Brazilians are from one state, 
Minas Gerais.  In Lisbon 14% are from Goiás, 11% each from Rio Grande 
do Sul, Espirito Santo, Parána, and Rio de Janeiro; and 10% Para. 
Surprisingly, only 7% reported to be from Minas Gerais, the most 
common state of origin in Massachusetts. Of the remainder, 5% were 
from Brasilia and Bahia, and 2% of the respondents were from Iguaçú 
Falls and São Paulo. As for time residing in Portugal, 27% had been in 
Portugal between 3 – 5 years, 21% more than 5 years up to 7, and 50% 
of the sample had been residing in Portugal for 8 years or more.  
 
Doing Research as an Insider – Benefits and Challenges.  
When it comes to conducting social research, being an insider or 
an outsider both have their own advantages and disadvantages.  In this 
case, I am Brazilian and an active member of the immigrant community, 
making me an insider. At the same time, my perspectives are also shaped 
by my thoroughly bi-cultural life, my dual citizenship, participation in a 
family with a US-born child and an American spouse, and my residence 
in the United States for all of my adult life. That is to say, I was both an 
insider and an outsider in the community. 
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 Of particular relevance to my research project is my involvement 
with the Brazilian Worker Center (BWC)11, New England’s largest and 
most comprehensive non-profit serving the Brazilian immigrant 
community. I am currently Executive Director and earlier was a member 
and officer of its executive board for four years, These involvements have 
helped me to gain access to diverse segments of the Brazilian community, 
from upper class professionals to low-paid service workers, which has 
given me the opportunity to learn about the everyday issues, problems, 
and hopes of immigrant Brazilians.  All this has given me an 
understanding of the great diversity within the community, as well as the 
commonalities in people’s everyday problems living in the United States. 
In comparison to this intimate knowledge of and relationship to the 
Brazilian community in Boston, in Lisbon I occupied a more distant 
position.  To be sure, here I shared much in common with those I studied, 
but in the Lisbon context I was not seen as an insider in the community  
The question of the relative benefits and disadvantages of the 
researcher’s having  “insider” or “outsider” status in the study 
community under study is one that is familiar to social scientists. Robert 
K. Merton took note of it in his seminal essay, “Insiders and Outsiders: A 
Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge” (1972).  Merton’s essay appeared 
                                       
11 At the time the research was being conducted, the organization was named the 
Brazilian Immigrant Center.  Its name changed in May 2015 to the Brazilian Worker 
Center. 
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at a time of considerable debate in the social sciences over whether 
insider knowledge, identity, and standing were necessary to conduct 
valid research on minority communities. Merton defines and assesses 
two positions on the Insider/Outsider question, and finds faults with 
both of them as singular approaches to social analysis, arguing that both 
dimensions are needed for full analysis. His insights have been 
incorporated into qualitative research. Some degree of reflexivity and self-
consciousness about the researcher’s position within the study 
community are expected features of qualitative research today. 
“Insider researchers” are to some degree members of their study 
communities, organizations, social groups, or cultures. Some have 
argued that this gives them a “pre-understanding” of the respondents’ 
“knowledge, insights and experiences” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007), 
easier access or entrée to the research community, and less suspicion 
and distrust from the community (Zinn 1979:212). All of this can 
facilitate valid research. On the other side, concerns about insider 
research focus mostly on bias and favoritism that can result in the 
production of ethnocentric, subjective, and less than objective findings 
(See also Zinn 1979:210-211). As some have pointed out (e.g., Greene 
2008, Brannick and Coghlan 2007) the use of multiple methods or 
triangulation can guard against such distortions in data collection or 
analysis.  
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Qualitative researchers generally are both “insider” and “outsiders.”  
As Merton points out, individuals occupy multiple statuses.  In my own 
research, for reasons that I have explained, I was never a complete 
insider, but instead only a “partial insider” (Chavez 2008, Greene 2014). 
 My perspective on the Brazilian community – especially in New 
England – has also been deeply shaped by my past experience with four 
different research projects (three of which have been my own, and the 
other a large-scale UMass-Harvard survey where I played a leadership 
role). Prior to the current study, I had conducted over 400 interviews 
with Brazilian immigrants on various topics.  Counting all these projects 
I have been studying this community in one way or another for more 
than a decade.  My history in the community as a researcher has been 
another way in which I have come to this study with insider knowledge of 
the community.  
However, as Merton points out in his seminal 1972 statement, 
insider status often gives only “acquaintance with” rather than 
“knowledge about” the research setting (1972:41). Systematic research is 
necessary in the research setting in order to obtain true “knowledge 
about” the topic in question.  Nonetheless, the insider’s “acquaintance 
with,” or “pre-understanding,” of the community as some have referred to 
it, makes the building of rapport and trust, and entry much easier.  
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It is ironic that in many parts of the world, insider research is still 
not considered good research because of its supposed biases.  This 
prejudice serves to exclude many, usually under-represented categories 
of people from undertaking and gaining recognition for research on their 
own communities and populations. It also blocks many who are working 
at the grassroots level from conducting and disseminating research 
about the social work in which they are involved.   Insider research, it 
goes without saying, should never be an excuse for the conduct of less 
than rigorous, systematic investigation. However, in conducting this 
study, I have been aware of always having to examine, question, and 
check my biases, given my community involvements and position.  
On balance, my professional and research experience in the 
community, and the fact that I share nationality, language and culture 
with my study population, I believe gave me a research advantage, at 
least in terms of time, access, and trust needed to do the investigation.  
As a native speaker of Portuguese, I understand the nuances behind the 
speech, and tacit behavior and values. In the current anti-immigrant 
climate in this country (as well as in others), immigrants feel more 
vulnerable than usual, and the presence of an outsider researcher can be 
viewed as threatening, and even prompt more caution and evasion in 
interview responses.  
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The Brazilian community in New England and elsewhere in the 
United States is a majority undocumented population as I have 
discussed in Chapter One.  Every person I interviewed spoke openly with 
me about immigration status, although my interview questions never 
confronted them directly about this issue, indirectly involve their status.  
By the end of the typical interview, once the subject and I had gotten to 
know one another, they usually poured out their hearts to me, revealing 
the frustrations they felt over barriers to regularization of their status, 
and their hopes for an amnesty that would allow status adjustment.  
My respondents often expressed sympathy for me as a student.  
They felt some responsibility to help me complete this task, so I could 
finish my studies and my degree. They spoke with pride to see someone 
from “inside the community” working on a PhD.  In a hair salon where I 
surveyed customers, owners and workers often told their clients that 
they should support me by giving me an interview or providing me with 
their friends’ contact information. 
 I encountered a great deal of pain and frustration among Brazilian 
immigrants.  Most of my interviewees feel trapped as immigrants in the 
U.S. because they are undocumented; they cannot come and go to Brazil.  
Thus they could not return to Brazil for their parents’ funerals, or to see 
their children grow up (though in some cases they were supporting them).  
Many spoke of not having a choice about being here, where they can be 
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caught in a life of loneliness and despair, all so that they can support 
beloved family members back home with their remittances. 
My survey questions often prompted respondents to share with me 
their emotionally complex immigration stories.  This, of course, gave me 
the opportunity to probe and ask them more questions, generating 
detailed stories.  While I had a specific focus on family life, our 
conversations delved into a variety of topics, such as their experiences in 
the workplace, and their hopes for immigration policy changes. 
 My interviewees never asked for anything in exchange for talking 
with me, or answering my questions.  Perhaps it is because, as Dell 
Hymes (1982) once said, in these situations offering someone respectful 
listening to their story can be a valuable return gift to them.  Some 
expressed satisfaction with the interview as an opportunity to talk about 
their experiences.  Sometimes they would ask me questions about my 
own personal life and plans.  They understood how helping others know 
about their stories might possibly improve the way the larger society 
treated them and their community. As a small token of appreciation, I 
always had with me a thank you note for them, and a two-dollar 
telephone card and sometimes chocolate, and I would hand that to them. 
They were always happy to get that phone card for calling Brazil:  they 
could talk for an hour on it. 
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 Photo 2:  Thank you Note, a US$2.00 Phone Card and Candy Given in 
Thanks to Survey Respondents 
 
 
Limitations and Anticipated Barriers to Doing the Research.   
The barrier most anticipated was that of time constraints making it 
difficult for immigrants to participate in a face-to-face interview due to 
heavy work hours and family commitments. This proved not to be a real 
problem in either Boston or Lisbon, as most people were generous with 
their time.  Sometimes it was true that I had to be creative to get access 
to certain respondents who were extremely busy, interviewing them while 
they cared for children, or booking an appointment for a manicure with 
someone so that I could interview them while they worked on my nails. 
In relation to the issue of immigration status, I had anticipated 
that it might be a barrier and that some potential respondents might 
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hesitate to participate because of concern about disclosure of personal 
information that could potentially harm them. For example, they might 
be working with a false social security number, or feel it is in their 
interest to conceal information about the undocumented persons in the 
community.  Of course, I emphasized to all participants, including my 
initial key informants, that the information to be collected could not be 
linked back to individual participants. 
 
Fieldwork Settings and Circumstances, Familiar and New 
My home is in Greater Boston, where I have been residing for two 
decades, and as noted above, I have conducted my own studies or have 
been a fieldworker in some other people’s research projects.  With many 
social network connections, and personal and professional friends, it was 
not difficult to know my way around the social landscape, find subjects, 
and set up interviews.   
            It was different in Lisbon, where I made several trips to conduct 
research:  in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, and two other times for 
conferences. All in all, I spent 11 weeks in the country. The initial idea of 
doing a comparative research was daunting, because of my relative lack 
of social connections there and limited general knowledge of the country, 
even though I had been there twice before.  Because Brazil had been a 
colony of Portugal, and we spoke a common language, I thought that I 
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had a sense of what to expect.  Like so many of the Brazilian immigrants 
I encountered there, I quickly discovered that Portugal was quite different 
socially and culturally from Brazil, and that all I could count on was the 
similarity in language, but not much else.   
 I had heard that the Portuguese were rude and unwelcoming to 
immigrants, especially Brazilian women who are stereotyped as “loose” 
women who are out to steal husbands from Portuguese women.  These 
fears did not prove real, however, as Portuguese collaborators in Lisbon 
treated me with a great deal of respect.  I maintained strong ties to 
university-based researchers there, who were aware of my visiting and its 
purpose.  There were only a few occasions, especially in working-class 
Brazilian bars in Lisbon and in nearby coastal Caparica, when they were 
filled with poorer male laborers who were drinking heavily, aggressive to 
one another, and using crude language not particularly friendly to 
women, when I did not find it comfortable to stay to continue my 
research.  This was true even though I had arranged earlier with the 
owners to visit for interviews of patrons. 
            The social landscape of the Brazilian immigrant community in 
Portugal, a more compact country, is quite complex.  One quarter of the 
entire Portuguese population live in the Lisbon metropolitan area, and 
the regional ecology of Greater Lisbon encompasses diverse settings -- 
inner core urban, suburban, coastal resort communities, and rural 
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areas.  Fieldwork in Lisbon thus involved work in the dense urban 
streets and apartments of Lisbon’s Arroios neighborhood, at important 
non-profits like Casa do Brasil in Lisbon’s Bairro Alto, in restaurants and 
bars in beachside resort communities just outside of Lisbon in places 
like Caparica and Cascais. I also stood surveying people while standing 
in long lines snaking around several Lisbon blocks surrounding the 
Brazilian Consulate next to Praça Camões in the Chiado neighborhood, 
and in the fields, churches, and houses of small rural villages high in the 
mountainous peri-urban fringe in Sintra just outside of Lisbon.   These 
are all places where Brazilian immigrants worked, lived, and 
relaxed.  Wherever I went, the people I interviewed were very hospitable 
and cooperative, warming up quickly to me, a new stranger in their midst, 
but one quickly accepted.  
 
Fieldwork in “Third Places”   
Many of my interviews took place in public places, the businesses 
and organizations that are part of the Brazilian community in both 
Boston and Lisbon.  These function as “third places” where the 
community comes together for important networking and exchange 
(Oldenburg and Brissett 1982, Oldenburg 1989). Sometimes this involved 
sitting in these places for many hours at a time and interacting with and 
formally administering my survey orally to members of the public who 
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came through, assuming they agreed to participate.  Within Brazilian 
communities everywhere, for example, beauty shops are such “third 
places.” They are community centers that spawn conversations among 
owners, workers, and patrons, including gossip about the neighborhood, 
and exchanges about current events in Brazil.  They are places where 
community members can drop by at any time looking for a friend or 
relative, ask those present for advice on job-finding, or scan through 
community bulletin boards.  
Photo 3: Interviewing the Pedicurist at a Lisbon Beauty Salon 
 
 
In photo 3 above, my pedicurist at this Lisbon salon was a 
respondent to my survey. This was the only way she said she would have 
time to give me an interview.  In the background is visible a common 
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example of the ever hard to reach ideal depictions of female beauty 
current in the immigrant community.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, salons like these were semi-public places, 
and so also were many of the interviews that I conducted in them.  Often 
other people in the establishment, including those who might be coming 
and going during the interview, would begin to listen to the conversation, 
and even join in with their own answers.  This especially took place in 
beauty salons, which I visited regularly both in the Boston and the 
Lisbon areas.  While I would be interviewing someone, other customers 
having hair work done would speak out from their own chairs, as would 
the beauticians working on them.  Many beauty salon interviews 
intended to be individual ones thus turned into impromptu focus groups, 
sometimes with as many as six or seven people participating!  This would 
often lead to discussions and sometimes disagreements.   
I learned quickly that issues I was studying like racism, or whether 
Boston or Lisbon really offered avenues for advancement, or whether 
family division of household labor had changed after migration, were too 
pressing for bystanders to ignore, and they often joined in by 
volunteering their own comments.  Beauty salons proved such a valuable 
site for learning what the immigrant community was thinking that I 
sometimes had my hair or nails done several times in a single day in 
different shops while conducting my research, usually taking notes while 
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being worked on and conversing with other patrons or the workers.  The 
beauty shop chair was a very comfortable location to use for getting 
inside the community and for conversing with subjects. 
 
Photo 4: Interviewing at a Brazilian owned Cafe in Lisbon. The Owner 
Gave me Permission to Come in the Morning and Spend the Day 
Doing Interviews.  
 
 
 
Assistance in The Field and with Data Processing 
I am deeply grateful to a number of people who gave assistance to 
me in the field research, and also in some cases afterward in the 
processing of information.  These individuals were all, at different times, 
research assistants, and in most cases, true collaborators.  Lenita Carmo 
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was a regular companion and collaborator in field research in the Boston 
area, and in Lisbon, Kika Albuquerque helped me much as a guide and 
assistant in interviewing within the Brazilian community there.  Like me, 
Kika is an immigrant in a new land, and an academic, who left Bahia ten 
years ago for Portugal, where she is a PhD student in Geography at the 
Faculdade das Letras at the University of Lisbon.  Sociologist Patricia 
Pereira of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa was helpful in identifying 
research subjects, and in other support of the research.  Other important 
sources of support in my research were David Outerbridge, Anselmo 
Oliveira, Alexandre Pereira, and Tim Sieber. 
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Chapter Three 
The Transnational Family among Brazilian Immigrants 
 
In this chapter I will explore how the Brazilian immigrants of my 
study sustained their family life in the face of the challenges of migration. 
Their experience was one, as with most international migrants, of 
attempting to reproduce prior family patterns in the new setting, but also 
adjusting to quite different living conditions, and in the process creating 
new, emerging Brazilian American family forms.   Above all, families for 
the Brazilian immigrants become transnational in scope, a shift that had 
profound implications for parenting practices, gender roles and relations 
within the family, and the relationship of the family to the wider 
community.   
These changes occurred mainly among the many Brazilian 
migrants from modest socio-economic origins in Brazil; for them 
especially, dramatic family changes are experienced in the course of 
migration and settlement in the United States.  This is especially due to 
the absence of extended kin who are no longer available for support, and 
the growth of companionate forms of marriage and more egalitarian 
gender roles stemming from the growth of women’s employment, making 
them significant family providers for the first time.  
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     For families from more privileged socioeconomic backgrounds, 
there is less change. As we will see, this is in part due to their pre-
migration immersion in a global cosmopolitan culture that is shared by 
upper middle-class persons in Brazil and the United States.  Also of 
relevance is the greater likelihood of secure immigration status for upper 
middle-class migrants, which allows them to make frequent visits to 
Brazil and thereby maintain close relations with family members 
remaining there. These class differentiated dimensions of the family life 
of Brazilian migrants are set into motion early on in the migration 
process, when working class and upper-middle class Brazilians face 
divergent opportunities for entry into the United States. As we will see, 
the possibilities for legal entry are not equally available to all. 
I begin the chapter by examining the field of “everyday 
transnationalism” in which families come to operate. I then turn to how 
transnational networks facilitate migration and resettlement, promote 
resource sharing through remittances sent back to Brazil, and facilitate 
the long-distance parenting of children left behind. Once resident in the 
United States, heads of households of immigrant families, however, hold 
different immigration statuses under U.S. laws, that reflect these 
immigrants’ varying class origins in the sending society. I will explain 
how these status differences have implications for the constitution of 
families in the immigrant community. The majority of Brazilian families 
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are headed by one or more undocumented parents. The modal Brazilian 
immigrant family in the U.S. today is that referred to as the “mixed 
status family,” with at least one undocumented parent and at least one 
U.S. born citizen child. 
 
Transnationalisms: Multiple Experiences for Different Kinds of 
Immigrant Families  
 Transnationalism is associated with the circular movements of 
people across international borders and the transmission of culture and 
material resources that accompany these movements. For Brazilian 
immigrants from upper middle-class backgrounds, these movements 
tend to be frequent, and with stays of short duration; some are literally 
living in two countries at the same time. But for most Brazilian 
immigrants in the U.S. today, circular movements are often not possible 
due to their unauthorized status; travel back and forth from Brazil is a 
risky matter. Because of the difficulty of obtaining a U.S. visa, many 
enter by covertly crossing the border, typically through Mexico. Others 
obtain a visa and then overstay it, thereby becoming undocumented  
(Margolis 2008). The following story told to me by a respondent describes 
the barriers she faced in obtaining a visa for authorized entry into the 
U.S., leading to her decision to cross the border through Mexico:   
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I finally had to come undocumented across Mexico, and it cost 
$15,000 for me and another $15,000 for my husband.  The whole trip took 
48 days, and we were with 21 other people from different countries being 
guided to the border.  Before I went to the U.S. Embassy four separate 
times and applied for a tourist visa, paid a $348 fee (which I didn’t get 
back), but each time I was denied.   Also we have to get a new passport 
each time, because if you take in an old passport with a denial stamp in it, 
you always get another immediate denial, and that costs $50 each time. I 
was unemployed for three years, and with my husband’s minimum wage, I 
just couldn’t qualify.  I finally gave up! 
 Circular migration is thus not possible for many Brazilian 
immigrants. The stays of most of the immigrant families who have 
arrived here in unauthorized fashion from Brazil are more permanent 
than not, typically quite long in duration. This pattern is common among 
other unauthorized immigrants as well, as described by Massey and 
Sanchez (2012) in their study of Mexican immigration. Despite how 
circumstances block them from frequent physical movements back and 
forth between the U.S. and Brazil, these individuals and their families 
remain attached to their homes, families and communities in Brazil.  
They develop hybrid social and cultural forms to adapt to their life in the 
U.S. These hybrid forms are then transmitted to Brazil through strong 
ties to family and friends remaining there.      
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This type of transnationalism that does not presume circular 
movement and direct, face-to-face interaction with family and friends in 
the home country, is what I will term here “everyday transnationalism”, a 
concept that draws on the work of Portes and his co-authors on “low 
transnationalism” (Portes et al. 1999) as well as Itzigsohn and his 
colleagues on  “broad transnationalism” (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). I see 
everyday transnationalism as a social pattern that is prevalent among 
immigrants from working-class backgrounds, and does not require 
movement back and forth between the countries of origin and destination.  
I turn next to describe everyday transnationalism in the family life of 
Brazilian immigrants in Boston. 
 
Everyday Transnationalism and Family Life 
 Family life is an important arena in the dynamics of 
transnationalism. Bryceson and Vuorela (2002:3) define “transnational 
families” as  “families that live some or most of the time separated from 
each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a 
feeling of collective welfare and unity, i.e. ‘familyhood’, even across 
national borders”. Is transnational family life predicated on circular 
movements that ensure some degree of face-to-face interaction?  My 
research suggests that it is not circular movement but the dynamics of 
exchange that play a critical role in sustaining transnational family forms.   
	 90 
Transnationalism Patterns in Upper-Middle Class Immigrant Families. 
My sample included a small but notable segment of Brazilian immigrants 
from upper middle-class background, estimated above at 10% of the total 
immigrant community. Such persons, it should be noted, despite their 
relatively small numbers, play a visible role in the community. They are 
likely to come on business, tourism and student visas that are often valid 
for 10 years. This allows regular travel back and forth to Brazil, so long 
as the U.S. stay does not go past six months at any one time. I turn now 
to the migration stories of some of the upper middle class immigrants in 
my sample.     
 Daniela came to the U.S. from middle class Brazilian origins 
bringing with her two teenaged children on a tourist visa. She had been a 
successful attorney with her own practice in Brazil. She met and married 
a U.S. citizen, becoming a permanent resident, and then applied for 
residency for her children. Under the family unification law, her son’s 
application was processed immediately but her daughter who was just 
over the age of 21 had her application approved in a different way.  While 
her minor son received his permanent resident card within 6 months, the 
daughter fell into an adult child category that required her to wait for 10-
15 years in order to gain permanent residency.  During this time, in 
order for the daughter not to fall out of status, she has been going to 
school and maintaining a student visa.  While her brother soon will 
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qualify to file for his U.S. naturalization application, his sister is still 
waiting for her green card. Each member of the family has a different 
immigration status. However, they are all able to travel back and forth to 
Brazil as they have valid visas as well as the financial means to pay for 
air tickets.   
 Angelica came to the U.S. to improve her English. She had been 
studying international relations in Brazil and was slated for a future 
assignment as a reporter in New York.  She eventually married a white 
American man, and they have two children.  She now has dual 
citizenship.   She goes with her family to Brazil two or three times every 
year, and her parents, brother, friends also visit the U.S. at least once a 
year. She commented on the large amount of goods that she has to take 
to Brazil for family members on the visits, but also noted that she brings 
things back, as well.  There is a fairly constant flow of food and other 
consumer goods between countries, such as telephones, perfumes, 
toiletries, brand-name clothes, purses, shoes, and electronics going from 
the U.S., and hair products and foods, such as cheese, pastries, and 
chocolates, coming from Brazil. 
 Fabio has a medical degree from Brazil. He came to the U.S. as a 
student, to earn a doctorate in health research. After finishing he 
remained in the U.S. and married a white American woman.  He now 
holds dual citizenship. At the U.S. university where he works, he creates 
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and manages academic exchanges between the U.S. and Brazil. He 
makes regular trips for work purposes to Brazilian partner universities, 
including his medical school alma mater, and also welcomes a regular 
stream of medical and academic visitors to his own university for 
conferences, consulting, and study.   
 Sonia arrived in the U.S. to participate in an international 
university-level running track competition, after which she stayed on. 
Married to a wealthy Brazilian immigrant businessman, she is very 
involved in Brazilian community politics in the U.S.  She makes regular 
trips to Brazil, some of them linked to her work with the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Brazil and their programs for the diaspora.  
 In all of these cases of upper-middle class Brazilians I described, 
they have married U.S. citizens and formed families located in the U.S. 
They identify with both Brazil and the U.S. and see themselves as 
bicultural. Their lives and social engagements span both nations and 
involve a great deal of traveling back and forth. Some of them are 
involved in institutionalized economic, political and wider cultural 
exchanges between the two countries.  Indeed, they derive considerable 
social status from these engagements and the professional, governmental 
and business institutions in which they are embedded.   In these ways, 
the type of transnationalism in evidence is “high” and “broad” in nature, 
in Portes et al.’s (1999) terms. Their ties with Brazil are celebrated and 
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their contributions are widely recognized in their professional worlds.  
They operate within highly institutionalized frameworks shaped by state 
and corporate orders. 
 
 Transnationalism Patterns in Working-Class Immigrant 
Families.  In contrast to the “high” and “broad” transnationalism evident 
among those from upper middle-class backgrounds, Brazilian 
immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds displayed a different 
pattern. Transnationalism that is “from below,” or “narrow” or “low,” has 
a grassroots quality and as Guarnizo et al. (1999) pointed out, it displays 
a relatively low level of institutionalization. Such “everyday 
transnationalism” operates within the private domain, and through 
mostly small-scale interpersonal relationships and social networks. Even 
if these more private, less “institutionalized” domains do not have visible 
direct impact on larger-scale political, economic, and cultural orders, 
they are very much part and parcel of everyday immigrant life in the 
Brazilian community.  
 Even working class people, in other words, whose careers do not 
further higher-level institutional transnational agendas, and who do not 
have the freedom routinely to travel across national boundaries, still 
have lives deeply embedded in transnational relations.  In these cases, 
the transnationalism that permeates their everyday lives takes shape 
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mostly in the domain of household and family.  Transnationalism 
emerges as different family members and segments, spread across the 
two countries, invest energy and resources in sustaining family solidarity 
and unity despite geographic separation. 
 Within these families, I found contact with members in Brazil to be 
a daily practice, mostly through the telephone and internet. Through 
these daily contacts, geographically separated family members converse 
and exchange information and ideas on all aspects of practical, everyday 
life, as well as political and entertainment news. Since most immigrants 
in Boston have the Brazilian O Globo television channel on their home 
cable, they see the same news as family members back home, and are 
aware of happenings in Brazil. These happenings, as well as news of 
events in the diaspora that are also covered by O Globo, in places like 
Boston, are also fodder for conversation on the telephone. In many 
respects, family members in Brazil and those in Boston are living in the 
same information environment due to global media forms. Family 
members also often watch the same wildly popular television soap operas 
(telenovelas) on O Globo. Even if their living rooms are far apart in space, 
after the soap opera episode ends, family members will call one another 
on the telephone to discuss what happened.   
 Beyond these preoccupations with media entertainment, the 
telephone allows people to gossip on family and neighborhood 
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happenings. Family members trade impressions on U.S.-Brazil 
differences in quality of life, and cultural differences between the 
countries. Telephone conversations routinely cover topics such as 
shopping, recipes, parenting strategies, the latest cell phones and other 
technology useful to the household, and even better cleaning techniques 
and products for the home. These topics often spark discussion on 
gender role expectations, and how they differ between the U.S. and Brazil.  
 
Key Adaptive Changes in the Immigrant Family when Compared to 
Home: Nuclearization 
My respondents observed several ways in which immigration had 
generated changes in their family life. The most common observation 
made was that their family had shrunk significantly in size. Additionally, 
they felt that the family unit become more isolated and fragmented at the 
same time. Due to the immigration process, the family units in the U.S. 
are smaller; the large extended families that Brazilians are used to 
having nearby are seldom present. In response to my questions about 
how family life had changed for them, immigrants gave the following 
answers: 
Yes, a change in location always affects family life. First 
because you go and remain far away and I am someone from a 
very large family. In my house there, we were 10 people, and when 
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I came to Boston I left my three daughters behind, and this affects 
family life a lot, especially the distance from your children. 
Yes, I suffered a lot having to adapt and learn how to get by 
here in the absence of my family.  
When I came, the physical space in the house seemed so 
empty. I was used to houses with food always cooking on the stove, 
people always talking, the sound of voices, doors opening and 
closing, neighbors coming and going. You feel the warmth of people.  
Here the house and the space around it seemed impersonal, lonely, 
even cold. 
Many respondents talked about how the quality of their social life 
had changed since there were so few relatives nearby to socialize with:    
I think in Brazil every weekend we would go out.  We would go 
visiting the houses of our parents, in-laws, brothers and sisters, 
have parties, do barbecues, have conversations.  We don’t do any 
of that now.  
We used to spend every weekend with our families.  Here we 
don’t have that.  
In Brazil, normal married life includes a great deal of engagement 
with wider, extended kin, especially for women who assist one another 
with household labor and childcare.  Men have their own active 
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engagements outside the household, as well.  The household operates 
within a much wider social field in which spouses are embedded.  
Getting married in Brazil means adding another person to both 
sides of the family that gives you support for caring for the house, 
lending and borrowing things, and especially taking care of the 
children. In Brazil the men also live a sheltered life. Instead of 
helping out around the house they enjoy time with their friends, and 
their mothers encourage that.  Here in the U.S. things are different. 
 Once in the host society, the immigrant family is thus more likely 
to take on many of the characteristics of the ideal of the typical U.S. 
nuclear family model – smaller in size, usually two-generation, and 
relatively socially isolated from nearby kin and neighbors. The absence of 
extended kin does not necessarily mean the smaller family in the U.S. 
ends up spending more time together, or feeling closer, however. In many 
ways, immigrant families take on the characteristics of the busy, 
overcommitted mainstream U.S. family household. One of the most 
common observations on the daily family routine was that family 
members seldom sit down to eat meals together in the U.S: 
Our schedule of meals changed. We don’t eat together here, 
but we did in Brazil. 
We used to eat together in Brazil, and talk more about our 
daily routine; we do less of that here. 
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It’s different. We don’t have much time for having meals 
together, except sometimes on the weekends. 
Overall, everyone in the family is busy outside the home, and the 
home is empty of people most of the time. 
Yes, it’s different. We don’t have a lot of activity together. The 
life of an immigrant is very rushed. 
Yes, the regular routine is very weighty and I don’t have much 
time for my family. 
Here it’s different. We don’t have that much contact as we did 
before. 
Sometimes we are able to eat together and talk about our day, 
but we don’t do a lot of visiting with friends, and we don’t take 
vacations together, but sometimes we do go to church together. 
There’s a lot fewer joint activities here than in Brazil. 
 As we see in the next section, immigration brings marked changes 
to the relations between spouses, moving them in a decidedly more 
egalitarian direction, with husbands and wives sharing most family and 
household tasks, from providing to cleaning, shopping, and caring for 
children. With few other available relatives to depend on, spouses mainly 
have each other to manage the challenges of maintaining a household.  
Two respondents tried to summarize the change they experienced: 
Here the women are more independent and the men help more. 
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Social life, social relationships, discipline of the children, early 
childhood education are all completely different. But my husband 
and I divide everything 50-50. 
 Everyone in the family, whether spouses or adults and teen-age 
children, works outside the home and often have different schedules, but 
nonetheless coordinate well with one another in doing household chores, 
taking care of their individual part at their own time. Children as well do 
their part. This does not mean, however, that family members who are so 
often not at home actually work together in completing these chores: 
  Everything is divided - each person does his own part. 
There is more respect for the space of the other, whether at 
home or just in everyday life 
 All in all, it is not a surprise that when asked if migration had 
changed their family life in terms of practices and relationships, 60% 
answered a resounding “yes”, and many others who were not so sure still 
went on to describe significant changes in their lives. For those 
immigrants who came as young single adults, their first ever experience 
of organizing their own families took place in the U.S., since they were 
either not married or did not have children in Brazil. They thus did not 
have a direct comparison point for measuring change, except in relation 
to their natal families in Brazil. For them, the experience of creating a 
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family of their own emerged in the U.S., within a hybrid Brazilian-
American cultural context. In later sections I will examine what 
respondents said about gender relations within the family, and about the 
challenges of raising 1.5 or second- generation children. 
 
Social Networks, Transnationalism, and Mutual Assistance 
How does the transnational family facilitate continuing migration 
between countries, promote communication among family members, and 
foster exchanges of financial resources and communication that sustain 
the family? How, in particular, do they accomplish these tasks in relation 
to geographic distance and limited visits with family back in Brazil?    
One strategy is to create a support network for continuing migration.      
Family and friends help pay travel costs to the U.S. and assist 
economically after arrival (c.f. Goza 2003: 274). The scope of “family” is 
wide, including extended family networks. Once in place, this family-
based support network is a durable social structure that over time 
replicates itself and becomes self-sustaining (Canales and Armas 
2009:222-223; Levitt 2008; Portes and De Wind 2007: 6-10). Friends and 
religious congregants who can play family-like roles toward would-be or 
actual migrants also augment family networks. 
Among the survey respondents, 83% had family or friends in 
Massachusetts before arriving, and one out of six came to join their 
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spouse already here. Only two came through labor contracts with 
employers. Once arrived, 93% said they received help in the transition 
from fellow Brazilians already here. Almost half (48%) reported receiving 
help from family, most often spouses, parents, children, and siblings and 
another 35% from hometown friends. Transnational social networks 
ensure that would-be migrants in Brazil know a great deal about life in 
the United States long before they ever set out to travel there, even about 
their specific city destination. They migrate with the support of the 
transnational networks within which they are already anchored. It does 
not take them long to receive help with housing, finding work, shopping, 
purchase of needed new clothes (e.g., winter coats), and general 
orientation. Once here, of course, there is an economy of scale that 
makes it cheaper to share housing family members and close friends.  
Such connections, as noted, also aid newcomers in finding jobs, so that 
within days of arriving, newcomers typically are working in the informal 
economy.  
Those who did not rely on these networks of family and friends 
were assisted in settlement by institutions such as churches and schools 
(for those coming to study) and in some cases by employers. Churches   
have long been important centers of social life in the Brazilian 
community. They provide support for finding work, and community 
building (Levitt 2009; Margolis 1998; Martes 2000: 18-19). Catholic 
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churches have been serving the Brazilian community spiritually and 
socially since the 1980s (Martes 2000:121). Protestant churches, growing 
in number, also help to preserve some traditional values by integrating 
them with new values appropriate to the host society, and giving 
guidance to their members for problem-solving in areas such as family 
life, consumption, and work (Margolis 1998a). Among the survey 
respondents, churches are the most common and often the only site of 
civic engagement. 
 Paradoxically, the presence of strong transnational networks does 
not prevent the development of important communication gaps between 
those in Brazil and the United States. As I will explain in the section on 
remittances, the flow of resources from the United States to Brazil is 
always so great that it creates the image that everyone in Massachusetts 
is wealthy and able to send these remittances easily. This of course is not 
true, as most immigrants labor in low-wage occupations and find it 
difficult to meet family expenses both in the United States and Brazil.    
Especially for those with irregular immigration status (most Brazilian 
immigrants) life is insecure, difficult, and full of struggles, as suggested 
by the following comments: 
In Brazil they always think that I am someone with money  
It’s clear that they always think that I have money, and that’s not 
always the reality.  
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I don’t like to telephone my uncles and other relatives because of the 
fact that they always think that all of us here have money to help them with 
something.  
 The difficulties were so overwhelming in fact that when asked if 
they would recommend migration to the United States to their relatives, a 
majority of the respondents (56%) answered they would not.  Almost half 
(46%), in addition, maintained they had never even volunteered to help 
any of their relatives or townspeople to resettle in the United States.   
However, newcomers usually find a friend, family member or 
acquaintances from hometown-based networks to assist them in 
migrating.  Every single respondent could name someone who helped 
him or her resettle in Massachusetts thus suggesting that many 
immigrants do help others to resettle, even if they do not want to do so. 
 
Sending Money Home:  Remittances for Many Purposes 
Most Brazilians who come to the U.S. are economic migrants, often  
“target earners,” or people with specific financial goals and time frames 
in mind when migrating (Margolis 1998), and this is evident in the 
constant flow of remittances they send home to Brazil for personal, 
family and investment purposes. Brazilians send money to build houses, 
develop communities, start businesses, and support their families (Lima 
and Siqueira 2008). In 2006, Brazilians living outside Brazil remitted 
	 104 
US$ 7.7 billion to the country (Sales 2008:258). From the U.S. New 
England region, research has reported they send an average of $875.00 a 
month per immigrant, mostly to parents, secondly to spouses, and 
thirdly to children themselves (Lima and Plastrik 2007). Money is also 
transferred from profits from businesses that Brazilians start in the U.S. 
at three or four times the rate of other immigrant groups (Lima and 
Siqueira 2008).   
The sending of remittances continues among long-term immigrant 
residents, even those who achieve legal status and eventually citizenship.  
The exception to this is among a select group of immigrants, usually of 
upper-middle class status, who have legal status and have established 
deep and extensive roots and family ties in the United States. In addition, 
because they are usually elites who come with cultural capital and 
wealth, many such migrants do not actually have families with economic 
needs at home. Unlike the vast majority of Brazilian immigrants who 
send money home in anticipation of retiring there, these economically 
established immigrants may plan to retire in the U.S.   
 Among the survey respondents, two-thirds (67%) regularly send 
money home, 25% don’t send any money, and 9% answered that they 
rarely send anything home.  Many of these transfers go to family 
members left behind. Some immigrants also indicated that they sent 
money for investment purposes. As far as family-directed transfers go, 
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parents, children, siblings, nieces and nephews are most frequently 
named as recipients. The money sent is often earmarked for very specific 
needs such as purchasing a house or buying building materials, medical 
procedures and care, as well as educational fees and expenses. These 
forms of financial support for family left behind can be seen as an 
investment in social networks at home. This is important given that 
many immigrants anticipate returning to Brazil, perhaps sooner than 
expected when they lack legal documentation for being in the United 
States.   
However, ironically, most immigrants are in no position financially 
to return home. Their employment prospects at home are poor, and they 
would never qualify for jobs that reach the remunerative level that their 
work does in the United States. Moreover, because of the lack of a work 
history, or a current employment verification card (a carteira 
assignada),12 they would only be eligible for temporary employment 
without benefits in Brazil. Thus they feel trapped, unable to return to 
Brazil but also unable to move out of the low-wage job sector in the 
United States due to their unauthorized status. They also feel a sense of 
responsibility to families in Brazil who often depend on the support sent 
from America. My respondents often spoke of how their families had 
                                       
12 This is a document formalizing an employment position after a probationary period of 
some months, and guaranteeing full coverage of benefits under labor law.  
	 106 
strong expectations of remittances from them, given the availability of 
jobs in the United States. Besides the expectations for cash from 
immigrant family members to meet basic needs like food and medical 
care, there were also requests for special expenses like buying a car, or 
making a down payment on a house. Immigrant parents who had 
children in Brazil spoke of how it was important for them to stay and 
work in the United States, despite the separation from children, as it was 
the only way they could meet their family’s needs.     
 The presence of a sojourner orientation among Brazilian 
immigrants is suggested by the fact that few are beyond their 50s. In my 
sample, for example, only 11% were older than 49. Many plan on 
eventually returning to Brazil, and some actually do return for retirement.  
With this plan in mind, many send remittances to trusted persons at 
home to manage on their behalf so as to ensure a comfortable retirement 
situation for themselves in Brazil when they decided to return. Such 
“retirement remittances” are directed towards the purchase of homes and 
businesses, as well as augmenting retirement or general savings 
accounts at banks in Brazil.  Some create businesses to manage when 
they return, including bakeries, pizzerias, rental properties, retail stores, 
and livestock farms.   
 The amount of money sent home varies a great deal, ranging from 
$200 to $1000 a month. Many respondents also indicated that the 
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amounts were different in any given month depending on the particular 
needs of their families or businesses at that time. When I was completing 
my survey, some middle class respondents admitted they received money 
from their families in Brazil, but I also sensed some reluctance among a 
few – through their body language and awkwardness – to admit that their 
families had needed money back home, and that they had sent it. The 
most consistent remitters tended to be single men who deliberately lived 
in frugal fashion in the United States in order to send most of their 
earnings back home. They often saw themselves as supporting the 
upward socioeconomic mobility of their children in Brazil by providing 
them with a middle-class standard of living, with luxuries that they 
themselves could not enjoy as immigrants.   
 The permutations of economic status and exchange evident across 
the immigrant community, no matter what their particulars, reveal again 
and again what Schiller et al. (1992) argued, that transnationalism 
emerges when global insecurity gives incentives for economic actors to 
assemble resources and opportunities from more than one country to 
meet their goals. As they phrase it, “By maintaining many different racial, 
national, and ethnic identities, transmigrants are able to express their 
resistance to the global political and economic situations that engulf 
them, even as they accommodate themselves to living conditions marked 
by vulnerability and insecurity” (Schiller et al. 1992: 11).  
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Transnational exchanges of goods among my respondents are not 
limited to financial transfers of money and goods that only go in one 
direction, from the United States to Brazil. Brazilian immigrants often 
request their family members at home to send them items from home 
that they are missing, such as particular kinds of food, clothing, music, 
medications not available in the U.S. as well as personal belongings left 
behind. Given that an unauthorized trip across the Mexican border must 
be done without any luggage, people can literally bring only the clothes 
on their back. There is then much that relatives can send the immigrant 
from home. Simultaneously, there are the many requests for immigrants 
in the U.S. to send back consumer products, such as electronic devices, 
brand name shoes and clothes, cosmetics, and toys for children, all of 
which are much more costly in Brazil than they are in the United States.   
 
Parenting from Afar: Caring for Children Transnationally 
Among my sample of 44 families, two thirds (84%) have lived in 
Massachusetts for more than 5 years, having migrated into the area in 
the early 2000s. Most migrate in their young adult years, in their 
twenties and thirties, prime years for marriage/partnerships   and 
childbearing.  Some have already had children and others give birth to 
them in the United States. Survey respondents in total had 45 children, 
15 (33%) of whom were in Brazil. The remaining 30 were living in the U.S. 
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and many of them were U.S.- born second-generation children. Most 
children in the community have thus been born in the United States, 
reflecting the fact that many immigrants arrive as single persons, and 
meet and marry, or cohabit, and have most of their children after they 
are settled in the U.S. Only about one out of five women (or 18%) came 
with their spouses. However, almost three quarters (73%) of the sample 
were married at the time of the survey, suggesting that many married 
after coming to the United States.   
Nonetheless, a significant number of Brazilian migrants come to 
the U.S. and leave their Brazilian-born children behind. This is more 
common in the case of fathers but it occurs quite frequently for mothers 
as well. In fact, in the study sample, 50% of the men who had children 
left them behind in Brazil, whereas only 33% of the women with children 
had done so.    
Those who do not face highly constrained economic circumstances 
often find it difficult to understand or even imagine how a mother would 
have the heart to leave home and go thousands of miles away from her 
family leaving her young children with someone else to care for them. 
Women, however, are increasingly becoming economic migrants for their 
families in the Global South. And women make up half or more of all 
migrants to the United States since the 1950s (Migration Policy Institute 
2015).  As I have described in Chapter Two, this was also the case in my 
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study sample. The concept of a “global care chain” has been proposed   
to describe the phenomenon of women from developing countries 
migrating abroad and working in jobs in developed countries that involve 
the care of children whose mothers are employed (Parrenas 2001; 
Hochschild 2000). When they go abroad to work, they leave the care of 
their own children in the hands of other women, thus creating a labor 
chain. Dreby defines these arrangements as ones “in which childrearing 
activities belonging to the realm of the production and reproduction of 
the family are scattered across national borders” (2010: 5).   
The Brazilian women immigrants I spoke to gave several reasons 
for migrating. Some were single mothers, desperate to find means of 
economically supporting their children. Others were in dysfunctional or 
abusive relationships they wished to escape. Some came with their 
husbands. Regardless of the circumstances, with the help of support 
networks, they found it relatively easy to get jobs as domestics, nannies, 
cleaners or caretakers for elderly, sick and disabled persons. The high 
demand for labor for these carework jobs means that women are likely to 
find jobs, albeit low-paid and unstable ones. Available research shows 
that in the U.S. and in other countries such as Canada, within three 
days most newly arrived Brazilian women can get some sort of work 
through their social networks (Mitchell 2003). Brazilian immigrant men, 
regardless of prior employment or educational history in Brazil, are 
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concentrated in working in small-scale construction firms. This work is 
markedly seasonal in a region like New England with long winters.  
Domestic work, however, takes place inside and does not have many 
seasonal fluctuations. Thus the employment opportunities available to 
women tend to be more stable than those for men.  
As I have mentioned, some of the women in my sample had left 
their children behind in Brazil.  Some of them spoke of hiring domestic 
workers back home to replace their labor, even when the child’s father 
was present in the household. Others leave their children to the care of 
their mothers or sisters. Women often leave newborns, mostly because 
once they have children, their need for income actually increases – just 
as it does here -- and there is no local avenue toward finding much 
opportunity for employment. When they spoke with me about the infants 
and children they had left, respondents’ eyes teared up and their voices 
cracked. Ana, for example, is haunted by the idea that her daughter will 
never know her, since she left her with her sister when she was a baby 
and has not been back since, even though she has been completely 
supporting her materially. Maria explained that, “My younger son is 13, 
and he has lived with my mother for six years now. We talk on the phone, 
and by internet. I wish I could visit, but if I do, I can’t come back. This is 
the only way I can provide him with the things that he needs. My mother 
takes good care of him for me.”   
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Respondents like Maria and Ana explained how they regularly sent 
clothes to their children, because in phone conversations they are told by 
their children or their caretakers of the need or desire for them. In fact, 
parents in the U.S. regularly send back boxes of clothes and electronic 
equipment through friends or acquaintances, whom they typically pay to 
carry the materials to Brazil. Normally the receiving family meets the 
traveler at the airport to receive the package.  For young people, it is very 
glamorous to get clothes from the United States, especially brand names 
such as Puma, Tommy-Hilfiger, Nautica, Lacoste, Nike, Reebok, and 
Abercrombie & Fitch, or electronic technology such as I-phones, X-Boxes, 
tablets, or laptops. These items can cost up to ten times more in Brazil 
than in the U.S., if they can even be found in the stores. They are simply 
not affordable in Brazil, or attainable, unless you have relatives in North 
America who can afford to buy them for you. 
Paulo, who has children in both the U.S. and in Brazil, explained 
that, “My children here are with my wife and me, and the children in 
Brazil are with my mother, and I try my best to be present in their 
[children in Brazil] lives, not physically present but present in the form of 
financial support, and support when they are needing anything, as I am 
trying to call and comfort them.”   
Another immigrant, Danielle, has spent ten years here, having left 
her son in Brazil when he was six. Over the years she has given him 
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many material advantages to compensate for her not being there to 
mother him directly, but unlike some children who are grateful, he has 
instead become angry with her. He is troubled and obsessed with moving 
to the U.S. to be with her, though she continues to tell him— realistically 
– that things here are not easy for her, and even that he lives better in 
Brazil than he ever would if he were in the U.S.    
Generally, the immigrants in Massachusetts who send money to 
support their children back home live here under much worse conditions 
than their offspring, than their children enjoy in Brazil, or that they 
themselves knew when growing up. This is the great sacrifice of 
supporting children transnationally through remittances and it is one of 
the sacrifices immigrants routinely make. Furthermore, they also have to 
live with the decision of leaving their children under the care of relatives. 
The women, and sometimes the men, make the decision to leave because 
that is the only way they can provide for their children and meet their 
basic needs. As Amarildo explained, “It hurts more to be home with my 
family and seeing them suffering, than to be away from them knowing 
that they are cared for.”  
From conversations with male respondents, the majority of them 
feel they are fulfilling their parental role by providing resources, and take 
a great deal of pride in that.  Most of them count on their children’s 
mothers, whom they also support, to care for their children. Thus they 
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feel less guilt about leaving behind the children than the women, a 
finding that has also been reported by Dreby (2015) and Parrenas (2005).  
This is true even if they develop new families in the U.S. through 
marriage and having children. Often this happens because of the long 
separations, which can place strains on marriages. But as in the case of 
Amarildo, they may continue to support their family remaining at home 
with remittances. 
Another way that parents rationalize leaving their children behind 
is by telling themselves that they are target earners, and that their stay 
will be short-term and temporary.  They are not ready to accept how 
circumstances might, in fact, cause them to be away from home and 
their children for many years, five or ten, or in some cases longer. Once 
they arrive in the U.S. and have jobs that can pay five to ten times more 
than what they would be making at home, and their children and other 
family members become dependent on that income, it is hard for them to 
leave.  Of course, since the majority are undocumented, the only way 
they might return to the U.S. after a temporary visit back home is to  
once again undertake the dangerous border crossing through 
intermediate countries, and ultimately through Mexico.   
Many of the mothers worry about becoming a stranger to their 
children, and based on some of the stories that emerged during the 
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interviews, in some cases that can happen. One mother complained, for 
example, that:  
My relationship with my oldest daughter changed a lot. 
When I came here my youngest of three daughters was five years 
old. I was able to maintain a good relationship with my older 
daughters, but not with the younger, who I am trying now to win 
over.  They always had their grandparents as parents, and I now 
have to go to Brazil to be more present in their lives.  
Mothers especially talk about how grateful they are for having cell 
telephone technology and low cost of calling plans such as T-Mobile: “The 
connection sometimes is not great, and it doesn’t work everywhere you 
might want to call, but with $50.00 you can call Brazil unlimited, 
anytime you need too.”  Another mother told me, “I call my son twice a 
day, in the morning on my way to work and late in the day. I know 
everything about his life and we have a great relationship. He is going to 
a good school, and has everything he needs.”    
Parents also use the telephone to help problem-solve everyday life 
problems with their children, and this happens as much among 
Brazilians in Massachusetts as it does with the migrant Filipinas that 
Parreñas (2005) describes.   Sometimes these kinds of calls are initiated 
by the at-home caretaker, often a grandmother or aunt, who appeals for 
intervention from the parent when she cannot solve a problem or 
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effectively discipline the child.  Sometimes it is a matter of the child 
staying out too late at night, talking back to the caretaker, not doing 
homework for school, or socializing with the wrong kinds of peers.  Often 
it is simply the parent and the child sharing news about their activities 
here and there.  Sometimes it is help with homework for that night. A 
frequent topic of conversation is that of when the parent might be able to 
bring the child from Brazil to the United States. It is quite common for 
these calls to take place daily, or even twice a day. 
While in the U.S. many of these mothers, just as with Parrenãs’ 
(2005) research informants, ended up in jobs requiring them to care for 
employers’ homes, children or elderly parents, while someone else is 
taking care of their own children left behind. The first job experience in 
the U.S. that almost all Brazilian women migrants have – regardless of 
whether they were professionals at home – is doing domestic work. For 
many, because of immigration status, language barriers, lack of 
recognition of their professional work history and academic 
accomplishments, they have few options except for domestic work, a 
flexible category of employment that can involve either housecleaning, 
elder care, housekeeping, or nannying.   
Domestic work is still an occupation that is mostly unregulated, 
lies firmly within the informal economy, and is mostly low wage as a 
result.  The immigrant women who do it, however, treat it as a profession 
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and have pride in the quality of the work that they do. They become 
emotionally and socially attached to those they take care of, and 
genuinely take joy in playing a supportive role in their families.  
 As noted, men are also often involved in long-distance parenting.  
They talk proudly of their contributions and their children, as Edilson 
does, for example:  “I have been here for 17 years. I bought a house for 
my family in Brazil. I pay for my girls’ schools, and they are going to 
university now. I could never do that if I was in Brazil. What I pay for 
only one year of college tuition is more than what my entire yearly 
income would be if I were in Brazil!”  Edilson’s remarks make clear that 
emigration from Brazil is often a means of upward class mobility, works 
to raise the social class trajectory, if not for the immigrant here, then 
definitely for their children left behind.    
 In his wallet Edilson has photos of his children at different ages, 
and an envelope in his car with some larger portrait photographs. He has 
a relationship with a Brazilian woman here, and he and his wife in Brazil 
decided to divorce, recognizing their marriage did not make sense any 
more since Edilson was planning on staying in the U.S. indefinitely, and 
she in Brazil. He still supports her, as well as his children, and gave her 
the house because she takes care of his daughters.   
 Sometimes men play a more active parenting role than what 
Edilson describes. Jose and his wife, both Brazilian, gave birth to two 
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children in the U.S. 20 years ago. His marriage fell apart when the 
children were toddlers, and his wife took the two children to Brazil and 
raised them with her mother, while Jose stayed here and provided 
financial support for them and sustained a good relationship with them 
over the years. Jose sent money regularly for the children’s basic needs, 
and also paid for their visits with him. His son and daughter, who were 
U.S. citizens, did not need visas for that reason, and visited him every 
three years. When they reached the ages of twelve and fourteen, they 
decided that they wanted to return to the U.S. to attend high school and 
college.  At this time they came back to live with their father after being 
away in Brazil for over a decade.   
 Some of those engaged in transnational parenting offered 
accounts of caregivers of their children in Brazil telling them in phone 
conversations about how much their children idolized them. Kids may 
view their parents as heroes, boasting to others: “She/he sends me 
things from the United States.”  Being in the U.S. in general gives people 
celebrity status in the view of their children and friends back home.  For 
that reason, many children want to come to the U.S. to be with their 
parents. However, many parents report trying to convince their children 
that life here is too hard, and they should stay in Brazil where they are 
well cared for.  Others spend years trying to bring their children to the 
U.S., because the children want to come.  
	 119 
Some children, however, begin to act out after being away from 
their parents for many years. Some children have told their parents that 
the material things don’t make up for the loneliness of the separation. 
For example: Tatiana’s son is 18 now. When he was two she left him in 
Brazil with her mother and did not see him for 14 years.  She was 
sending him everything he needed, and he was living well and attending 
private school, but when he came to the U.S. finally, he told her almost 
the entire time he had felt homeless without her.  After his grandmother 
died when he was four, he was passed around for years among family 
members.    
Luisa and her husband Julio, both from poor economic 
backgrounds in Espirito Santo in Brazil, came to the U.S. through 
Mexico about ten years ago. Julio worked in construction, and a few 
years later he opened his own business.  Luisa worked as a house-
cleaner for a while, until they saved enough to buy a store in Quincy. She 
had left her six-year old son in Brazil with her mother. He was now, at 
the time of the interview, sixteen years old.  Luisa has no other children 
in the U.S.   
When he was still in Brazil, Luisa spoke with her son every day on 
the telephone. At age 13, the child began to be troublesome to the family 
in Brazil, and Julio had many angry sessions with him over the 
telephone about his behavior. The son kept pushing to come to join his 
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parents. They punished him by refusing to send him an X-Box and other 
fancy computer games he asked for, items that his Brazilian friends 
could only dream of, and he remained unhappy and misbehaved towards 
his grandmother. Under these circumstances, Luisa began to try to get 
him papers to bring him.  After two years of trying, she was able to get 
him a tourist visa and brought him for a visit. Because the family is 
doing fairly well here, they had the money to enroll him in a private high 
school so that he could obtain a student visa.  
 Despite their unauthorized immigration status, Brazilian 
immigrants often raise their families’ standard of living at home through 
remittances.  By opening bank accounts and buying property in Brazil, 
they can help remaining family members, such as their children, qualify 
for visas allowing legal entry to the U.S.  In Louisa’s case, a travel agency 
and her family made the travel and visa arrangements for her son.  This 
pattern is very common. Since parents who leave their children behind 
usually give legal guardianship to their caretaker relatives in Brazil, the 
family there never has to disclose that the child’s parents are living 
without authorization in the United States.     
However, some parents who leave children behind have started 
new families and thus have children in both places.  This situation tends 
to leave the involved parents more financially stressed than others. 
Raising children in the U.S. is expensive and does not tend to leave 
	 121 
enough resources to bring children from Brazil should they want to have 
the children live with them along with their American-born offspring. In 
my sample, three families also expressed concern about ever wanting to 
return to Brazil on account of their U.S. citizen children; their children 
enjoy good health care, much safer neighborhoods, and better schools 
than in Brazil, and so it was probably better to remain in the U.S. for 
their children’s benefit.  
 
General Impacts of Transnationalism on Family Structure 
How are traditional social hierarchies, structures, and relations 
within the family called into question by migration?  The literature tells 
us that transnational migration often leads to the creation of “fractured 
families” (McGuire and Martin 2007). Family members are left behind, 
supposedly for their own economic good, to allow emigration for others 
(McGuire and Martin 2007: 186; also see Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007:24-25). 
Stress is placed on the parent-child relationship, for children especially, 
when separated due to immigration (Parreñas 2005; Suarez-Orozco and 
Suarez-Orozco 2007).  Even when families or family segments immigrate 
intact, family relations are often challenged. Kibria’s study of Vietnamese 
immigration, for example, suggests that, “In addition to altering family 
boundaries, migration to the United States…also challenged the 
traditional gender and generational hierarchy of family life” (Kibria 1993: 
	 122 
8).  This seems to be a common dynamic with many groups arriving on 
U.S. shores. 
Almost all immigrants, whether or not they live in family groups in 
the United States, have family members that they left behind in Brazil.  
Immigrants maintain a very strong bond with those family members in 
the home country through communication, and material exchanges, 
including   remittances. Social contact and conversation with those in 
Brazil is a regular feature of immigrant life, and this does not require 
regular traveling back and forth. Indeed, there is frequent and regular 
communication, through telephone calls, and internet-mediated forms of 
communication, including instant messaging, web cams, Facebook, 
Skype, Instagram, email and social networking sites popular with 
Brazilians, such as Google’s Orkut.  Many people send videos back and 
forth, as well as photographs.     
Technology has become more accessible and telephone 
communication has become inexpensive. In addition to phone cards that 
cost $2.00 and can give someone three hours of talking time, there are 
telephone plans available that are quite cheap:  a person can get a 
telephone plan for $50.00 per month that allows for unlimited 
international calls. Furthermore, new computer hardware accessories, 
such as Magic-Jack, allow telephone calls that are registered as a local 
call in the U.S. to be made to Brazil. Thus even if it is not possible to 
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travel back and forth, as is the case for much of the Brazilian immigrant 
community, there is regular contact with family left behind. Parents may 
continue to play important roles in the lives of their children with the use 
of the telephone, or by Skype through the internet. The downside of this 
long distance parenting, of course, is that it is still difficult to share 
interpersonal warmth, or calor humano, with children in Brazil. 
 
Changing Gender Roles inside and outside of the Family 
 Transnational migration has repercussions for gender roles and 
relations. Males and females are both almost equally present today in the 
migrant stream. The International Labor Organization estimates that in 
2005, “175 million migrant workers, permanent immigrants, refugees 
and their dependents were living outside their country of origin or 
citizenship,” of which 49 percent are women (Thuy 2005:87). More 
women are making the decision to migrate on their own for different 
reasons. Currently in the Brazilian community in Massachusetts, 50% of 
the population is female and the majority of women in my sample (60%) 
arrived in the United States as single and with no children. The fact that 
women are migrating on their own creates opportunities for them to 
enter into relationships in the U.S. in circumstances of financial 
independence.     
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The changes that are happening in the Brazilian community in the 
U.S. are similar to those widely reported in scholarly literature 
confirming that women’s gender roles and status often undergo 
significant changes upon migration. Studies by DeBiaggi on Brazilians 
(2001), Kim on Koreans (2006), and Helgren and Hobson on Kurds (2008) 
show that even before leaving home, women migrants learn about and 
anticipate changed gender roles in the immigrant setting. Robert Smith’s 
Mexicans in New York  (2005) also maintains that first and second 
generation female migrants gain power and freedom. Women have new 
choices for female identity and role behavior that Smith identifies as 
verguenza, pionera, ranchera, each of which carries a new kind of 
conjugal role that requires male adjustments (Smith 2005:  96-103).  
Kibria’s work on early Vietnamese migration to the United States also 
observes that, “Migration…generated changes in the balance of power in 
families; men…lost some of their power over women…” (1993: 168).  
 Moving away from a traditional patriarchal family model, 
Brazilians in the United States come to construct egalitarian gender 
relations in all aspects of family life, in areas such as child discipline, 
household chores, financial management, and even sexuality. In my 
survey one of the questions was, have the ways you handle household 
chores changed or stayed the same?  Please explain how.  Results were 
evenly divided:  about 50% of the respondents answered that they did 
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not experience any significant changes in their daily routine, and 50% 
answered yes that much had changed. Six of the respondents went on 
even to say, “Everything changed.”  Overall, the key assertion of the 
women was they had to work harder in the paid labor force, but they get 
more respect and have more independence.   
Many men and women alike had the following types of 
observations to make about the changes that have occurred with their 
migration, many of which involve taking on new duties, and sharing 
more household responsibilities. Women tend to take on new 
responsibilities financially – as both providers and decision-makers -- 
and men to take on more with housework and childcare:  
A little changed.  I cook and do laundry, but I have a 
domestic worker to clean. My husband and I do the finances    
Everything is divided; each of us does his own part. 
Husband and I do everything together. 
Our children were born here and we both do everything for 
them.  
Wife cooks, everyone cleans and helps with laundry. 
We work more here and we both do everything. 
I had a lot of family help in Brazil, but not here.  
I clean the house less frequently, I learned to cook, and I 
have come to take care of finances 
	 126 
  As we see from the above, some of the respondents were very 
aware of the changes that have taken place in their lifestyle as a result of 
migrating to the U.S.; some of them however did not believe that 
significant changes happened. Many others, the majority really, could 
not make meaningful comparisons between old and new, and speak to 
changes in older patterns, because they arrived in the U.S. as single, and 
were only beginning their own families in the U.S. 
No, I continue doing the same thing in the same way.  
We tried to do discipline the way we would have done it in 
Brazil. 
I was single. In Brazil, I only studied, and I didn’t know yet 
that there were family routines. 
 Two people said they had extended family around them in the U.S.; 
they were not willing to concede that there were changes. Nonetheless, 
the statement below suggest that there were new adaptations in the 
division of household labor:  
Yes, my father takes out the garbage and does shopping. My 
husband has no time, but when he does find some time, he cleans 
the yard and kitchen. When we are home, we all eat together and 
go to church three times a week. 
The most extensive study of gender role changes among contemporary 
Brazilian immigrants, by DeBiaggi (2001), finds significant changes when 
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looking at family units both in the U.S. as immigrants and as return 
migrants to Brazil (2001). Exactly what these changes are however, 
depend a great deal on social class, according to DeBiaggi (2001) and 
Goldani (1999).      
  According to Goldani (1999), in Brazil, groups at different levels of 
the social hierarchy, which she terms “racial groups,” demonstrate 
different family patterns. The use of different strategies by these groups 
in the process of family formation assumes particular importance when 
viewed across the life course of women. An example is the relationship 
that this has with the dimension of work in a woman’s life: a woman’s 
economic participation in the labor force varies markedly when she 
becomes a mother and even more when she has more than one child, but 
exactly how varies a great deal by class.   
As Goldani explains, in Brazil the level of female workforce 
participation goes up as women’s level of education increases (Goldani 
1999: 192).  For upper and upper-middle class families, women who 
migrate to the United States continue operating with more or less the 
same gendered arrangements, vis-à-vis male partners that they had in 
Brazil. For them, hired domestic labor takes over most of their household 
duties, and they are free to pursue professions outside the home, 
whether they are here or there. 
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For working-class and lower-middle class women in Brazil, 
opportunities for decent paid employment outside the home tend to be 
fewer in number, and women are confined to a low-wage market, where 
incomes may not even be enough to cover daycare costs for their children.  
It is these less affluent women in particular who in the U.S. setting are 
confronted with many more worthwhile job opportunities, at least in 
terms of wages, than they ever had available to them in Brazil. All of my 
female survey respondents, most of them from lower social origins in 
Brazil were, in fact, working outside the home for wages. In Brazil, the 
comparable figure would have likely been around 60%, and of course, 
they would be making much less money than in the U.S., with two-fifths 
staying out of the labor force and at home with their children. 
 At the same time, most of the immigrants in my sample, and in the 
population at large, are young adults in their twenties and thirties, prime 
childbearing years. Goldani states that, “In most societies, becoming a 
father or a mother is one of the most important social roles for 
individuals in the young adult phase” (1999:184), and this is no less the 
case in Brazil. Most of the children that the immigrants have (60%), in 
fact, are born in the United States. Thus once this young cohort of 
immigrants are in the U.S. they continue the common pattern found in 
Brazil, as described by Goldani:  “The normative course of domestic life 
between the age of 15 and 50 follows a pattern of marriage at about 22 
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years of age, with reproduction between 20 and 29 years of age, resulting 
in a family of two to four children” (Goldani 1999: 183).  In the U.S., 
moreover, the families with children usually have both parents working 
long hours, and they make use of family day care settings, and sharing 
the labor between family members, including husbands and wives, to 
manage care for their children. 
 Mostly because of the increased paid work that lower middle class 
and poorer women migrants find in the United States, they experience 
substantial changes in family roles, and the traditional patterns are 
disrupted (c.f. Goldani 1999). Less affluent women in the U.S. immigrant 
setting are confronted with many more worthwhile job opportunities, at 
least in terms of wages, than they ever had in Brazil, and are less likely 
to stay home with children. Transformations in gender roles are thus 
more substantial for the poorer classes of immigrants, as they take 
advantage of new income opportunities that were not available to them 
before migration (Goldani 1999). 
 At the same time, women of varied class backgrounds from Brazil, 
once in the U.S. immigrant setting, converge in their economic 
opportunities despite their different employment histories in Brazil; all 
end up doing mostly low-wage, nonprofessional work.  For lower status 
women this promotes upward mobility economically as well as socially.  
For higher status women, downward social class mobility results, 
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although the relative financial gains are still substantial.  These women 
who even have university degrees can still earn five times as much 
money as they would at home, despite downward career mobility. For 
example, my respondents included women who used to make $1,000 
dollars monthly in Brazil working as a dentist, teacher, college professor, 
nurse, or therapist but in the U.S. they make three to five times as much 
working as domestic workers cleaning American homes. As one of the 
respondents noted, 
There’s a reason everyone works hard here! It’s to make 
money. The cost of living is higher, but they can still save more, and 
send more home, for themselves and others, and afford better 
things here… everyone says how much easier it is here to make 
money. 
 For lower-status women, this represents an enormous step up 
economically. As one observed, “With what we earn, we can afford the 
same things that our bosses can afford here!” This amazes the Brazilian 
women who clean homes, and would never be possible in Brazil, where 
class lines are drawn much more sharply. They thus evaluate the U.S. 
positively, in terms of opportunities to work and contribute to the family 
income. They also find themselves increasingly playing a greater 
decision-making role in the financial affairs of their families, including 
taking responsibility for paying family bills, thereby gaining a sense of 
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economic independence and freedom to make their own decisions. They 
spoke of how before they were more likely to be told what to do by their 
men, in addition to being left with all the domestic duties.    
 
Absent Kin and the Transition to a More Nuclear Family Model 
 With migration to the U.S., Brazilian families often transition to a 
nuclear family model in which the household consists of husband and 
wife and the children, with both parents working outside the home full 
time or even more. The housework needs doing, of course, and without a 
lot of discussion spouses start to share it, and it is the same with the 
care of the children. This is in marked contrast with most family 
situations in Brazil, where men take almost no responsibility for 
domestic duties, and women have other helping hands to share it with – 
typically extended kin who live in the household or nearby, or for the 
more affluent, hired domestic workers.   
In the U.S. immigrant setting, families of all classes come to 
resemble the new pattern, and for the same reason:  all the adults are 
working outside the home, and need to collaborate more in completing 
the household work.  A common response to the survey question 
regarding the distribution and the burden of household chores, in fact, 
was that families have less help available to them here. As one 
respondent who had help from domestic workers in Brazil but couldn’t 
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afford it here put it this way: “Life is fast paced. It is harder here than in 
Brazil. Change is difficult to manage.” Given the difficulties of obtaining 
household help in the U.S., spouses need to rely more on one another for 
cooperation in completing the necessary tasks   
 There are exceptions to these patterns, as in the case of devout 
religious families that operate under strong church influence. Whether 
Catholic or Evangelical, Brazilian immigrant churches offer support to 
those in the community who resist changes in gender roles, by 
continuing to promote the older idea that wives should obey their 
husbands. Themes of wifely duties are frequently the subject of church 
sermons and marriage ceremonies. Female respondents complained to 
me that pastors simply encourage them to “love, obey and pray,” as one 
put it, to handle problems with their husbands. This patriarchal 
conception of spousal relations translates into the prescription that the 
wife is responsible for all household labor, including asking for the 
husband’s permission to go anywhere or do anything outside the home.  
These women are expected to do the classic “double duty” of working for 
pay outside the home, but also assuming all household labor once home.   
However, even in these church-oriented families, women frequently 
resist the traditional ideas, and this creates conflict in the family.  The 
women say they are working as many hours as the men and sometimes 
even longer shifts. They are paying for the bills as much as the men, and 
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when the men are unemployed they are responsible for paying for all the 
family’s bills. As I have mentioned earlier, job opportunities are more 
plentiful for women for a variety of reasons, such as the non-seasonal 
character of the jobs that women perform in contrast to the seasonal 
construction industry in which many Brazilian immigrant men work. 
Both types of jobs are in the informal sector and do not require work 
permits for either men or women, but flexible opportunities to work for 
pay are more plentiful for women than for men. 
 
Figure 10:  Copy of Facebook Posting about gender roles in the Brazilian 
community  (circulating in 2013 among Brazilian immigrant women (“um 
luoco”/”CRAZY One” refers to a man) 
 
 
  
A	WOMAN	IS:	Mother,	friend,	daughter,	wife,	employee,	or	the	boss…		
OFTEN	SHE	FILLS:	The	roles	of	the	father,	teacher,	psychologist,	and	many	other	things…		
Then	comes	a	CRAZY	One	that	says	the	
place	of	the	woman	is	in	the	kitchen…		
THE	PLACE	OF	THE	WOMAN	IS	
ANYWHERE	SHE	DECIDES	SHE	
WANTS	TO	BE!	
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Brazilian Popular Cultural Debates among Immigrants over Changing 
Gender Roles   
 Following is a recent popular song that is referred to in everyday 
discussion among Brazilians about changing gender roles.  This song 
reminisces about what a “good woman” used to be like in the days when  
more traditional patriarchal gender norms were accepted.   Amelia, the 
figure in the song, is the one who never complains, does everything she is 
told, never questions her husband’s authority, and never asks for 
anything such as nice clothes, jewelry, or a comfortable home.  
 
Oh, I Miss Amélia So Much 
 
I never saw such a demanding person 
And you don’t do nice things for me 
You don’t have any conscience 
Don’t you see I’m a poor boy? 
All you think about is luxury and wealth 
 
Everything you see you want 
 
Oh my God, I miss Amelia 
 
Yes she really was a woman! 
Sometimes we went hungry together 
And she never made a fuss about it 
And when she saw me upset 
She said, “Oh well, it’s ok, Honey.” 
 
Amelia had no vanity 
Amelia was a woman of truth 
Amelia had no vanity 
Amelia was a woman of truth 
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My conversations with women respondents prompted me to look 
for the song because in several of them, I heard women make remarks 
such as,  “You do not have to be an Amelia,” or “I’m not Amelia and my 
husband has to help.”  “We don’t even have to talk about it,” one woman 
remarked. “I work late, and I have to go to school and so he owns his 
business, and can get the kids from the daycare center and care for 
them.”    
 There is a general understanding among Brazilian Americans that 
the success of migration to the U.S. depends on everyone in the family, 
regardless of gender, working hard together. The cost of living in the U.S. 
is higher than in Brazil, but people also understand that they will make 
money. Even if they must spend a lot of their earnings, they can still save 
more, and send more home, for themselves and others. Although it 
requires them to work long hours, even on the weekends, it is still easier 
to make money in the U.S. Because the typical immigrant lifestyle 
involves women working long hours away from home, and being 
independent, there is also an understanding that women are less willing 
to accept dependence and compliance toward men. The song, “Oh How I 
Miss Amelia So Much!” whose Portuguese and English language lyrics 
are below, is still quite popular in Brazil today.  For some traditional men 
it is a genuine lament over a lost gender order, but for many women it is 
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understood as a satire of outmoded male expectations of women.13 
In many ways the fast pace of life in the U.S. that consumes the 
family, without their having much support from nearby extended family, 
normalizes the expediency of men’s doing a lot of housework. We see this 
in the case of Wilson, who came here as a single man from a middle class 
family in Brazil, where everything had been done for him by the women 
in his family and by domestic servants.  He decided to prove to his family 
at home that he could adapt and survive without them. He eventually 
found himself in Boston with a family, including two children, and also 
running a business. I went to Wilson’s house on a Sunday afternoon to 
interview him and two other families who were visiting. The three men, 
including Wilson, deferred to their wives for answers to my questions, 
though sometimes they answered together with their wives. It was very 
evident during my time with them that the women had a great deal of 
power in how they conducted their family lives.   
                                       
13 This song is popular and well known all over Brazil, as well as in immigrant 
communities in the United States.  The song is played in clubs and restaurants 
routinely. People recite parts of the lyrics of the song commonly in everyday 
conversation, when commenting on female gender roles, typically on women’s either not 
wanting to be submissive, or someone who accepts submission. For example, some 
women tell men, “There is no Amelia here,” or “Amelia is dead,” or “My name is not 
Amelia,” when resisting demands for submission.  Women among themselves in 
gossiping about others will often say things, such as, “She is such an Amelia!” or advise 
their women friends, “Don’t be an Amelia!” A Brazilian sung version of the song, by 
Fundo de Quintal e Gabriel Pensador, can be heard on You Tube  (accessed February 7, 
2016 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2R8Af2nJKc).  This version has an 
ironic feminist critique of the lyrics, and a counter-narrative, in the displayed visual 
slides.  Lyrics for this song were transcribed and translated into English by the author. 
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That Sunday afternoon the collection of people spending the 
afternoon together included three families with four children, who were 8 
months, 3 years, 4 years, and 7 years old, both boys and girls. They had 
set up a grill and a kiddie pool in the yard, and were sitting in outside 
lounge chairs. When I arrived, I saw the wives sitting. The baby was in a 
bouncing chair, placed in between the husband and the wife, and they 
both were watching the baby. The other two wives were talking as part of 
the circle, and one of the husbands was tending the grill, with the other 
sitting by the kiddie pool watching two children in the water.  All the 
families, good friends, seemed to feel very comfortable about the way they 
were spending the afternoon. During the interview, the husband at the 
grill called to his wife, “Hey can you get me a beer?”  She replied with a 
laugh, joined by the other wives’ laughter, and said: ”You know where 
the refrigerator is!”  The husband replied, “I know, but the meat will 
burn.”  The wife responded, “I guess you have to wait then!” 
 When I asked one of the husbands to share his feelings about his 
family, and these new gender norms, he explained the following to me: “I 
appreciate living here (in the U.S.) because I would never have spent as 
much time with my children, or gotten to know them there (i.e., in 
Brazil). They would spend all their time with the females in my family -- 
my mother, my aunts, and my cousins -- while I would be out with my 
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male friends watching games, and hanging out in bars.  Here I spend my 
time playing video games with Geraldo [his son] and watching the baby”. 
 Beyond my interviews, every day I see men coming into my 
workplace at the Brazilian Immigrant Center on their own with toddlers 
or carrying a baby and diaper bag.  When they call in on the phone 
asking for information, and you can also tell that they are home with the 
children, or they volunteer that information by saying that they need an 
appointment with an attorney but it has to be during the time that their 
wife can come along or stay home to watch their children. Many of them 
have service jobs, or are small-scale entrepreneurs, and thus have some 
flexibility in their work schedules to coordinate childcare with their 
wives.  In addition, I have observed that many of the immigrant men stay 
home in the evenings to care for their children while their wives attend 
evening ESOL classes or community meetings.  
 
The Mixed-Status Transnational Family 
Mixed status families take on different patterns. These include a 
sibling dimension where brothers or sisters – both adults and children -- 
are here and documented, but their other brothers or sisters are not. 
There is also a parent-child dimension in which children are born here 
and are thus U.S. citizens but their parents are undocumented. Finally, 
there is a mixed status conjugal dimension involving married or 
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cohabiting partners, such that men or women who are undocumented 
are in relationships with partners who are documented. 
While the anti-immigrant rhetoric in the U.S. draws a sharp 
distinction between the undocumented and documented, these 
distinctions thus do not have much significance for relations among 
members of the Brazilian immigrant community. The documented and 
undocumented live, work and socialize side by side and indeed, and in 
most cases they are part of the same families. In his research on Mexican 
and Central American immigrants, Leo Chavez (1992) notes the 
prevalence of mixed-status families, especially those in which U.S.-born 
children have undocumented parents. He states: “This fact alone points 
to the problem of calling this [kind of] family “illegal alien family,” or an 
“undocumented family….all members of the family are not 
undocumented immigrants”  (1992:129). 
The family situation of U.S. citizen children with undocumented 
parents has gotten the most attention, because of the high number of 
arrests and deportations of undocumented parents of these American 
children, that has led to many “shattered families” (Wessler 2011).  In 
fact, according to the Pew Research Center’s (2005) analysis, of the 6.6 
million “unauthorized families” (i.e., those headed by an unauthorized 
immigrant) present in the United States in 2005, 64% of their children (a 
total of 5.1 million children) were U.S. citizens: “Out of a total of 6.6 
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million unauthorized families, a significant share can be classified as 
‘mixed status.’ In other words, families in which at least one parent is 
unauthorized and at least one child was born in the United States” (Pew 
Research Center 2005: 8). These statistics suggest that: 1) over one third 
of the children of these families also lack documentation, differentiating 
them from their U.S. born citizen brothers and sisters; and, that 2) the 
numbers of undocumented children living in these families is also large, 
at 1.8 million.  
It is not only child siblings who can sometimes have varying 
immigration status, but also adult siblings. Sibling relationships are an 
important aspect of Brazilian family culture, as many immigrants wish 
their extended family members also to relocate to become part of their 
family networks in the U.S. It often turns out, though, that there are 
pressures that cause later arriving siblings to be undocumented.   
As Chavez (1992: 129) notes for Mexicans and Central Americans 
in California, and this is true for many Brazilian families as well, 
migration occurs through family chains in which a U.S. presence is 
established by a first immigrant who has legal status. That established 
immigrant then uses his or her position to serve as a support person for 
more relatives, often siblings, who typically arrive later unauthorized 
(Chavez 1992:129).  Especially for siblings, current U.S. laws do not 
define siblings as close relatives, making it virtually impossible to 
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sponsor them legally: there is an average 20-25 year waiting period for 
the entry of siblings sponsored by legal immigrants.  This situation thus 
usually requires that later siblings enter unauthorized in order to join 
their brothers or sisters here (Menjívar 2006), and mixed status families 
are the result.  
Finally, there is the issue of conjugal relations, in cases where one 
is documented and the other not.  In many cases through Immigration 
family unification laws, a spouse who is documented can file an I-130 
petition (Petition for Alien Relative14) to sponsor his or her undocumented 
spouse.  The problem is that even though this application might be 
accepted and approved, the person who entered without inspection, and 
is here undocumented, has to file an additional application to receive a 
pardon before they can receive any type of work permit or temporary 
permanent resident card.  Until very recently, this required them to 
return to their country of origin, and to wait three to ten years to return 
legally.  Leaving the country for so long, however, is not possible for most, 
who need to remain in the U.S. working to support their families here.  
This is why thousands of people actually qualify for converting their 
status, and actually have an approved application, but they cannot 
                                       
14 Form I-130 Alien Petition’s purpose is to facilitate: “A citizen or Lawful permanent 
resident of the United States may file Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative with U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to establish the existence of relationship 
to certain alien relatives who wish to immigrate to the United States” (U.S. Customs and 
Immigration Service 2016). 
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complete the process because of the requirement of leaving for many 
years.  Just recently this law has been liberalized by the Obama 
administration, allowing the undocumented spouse to pay a fine and 
adjust status without leaving the United States. 
 
Documented, Undocumented and In between  
 The line between being in and out of documented and 
undocumented status is also fluid and unstable. This reflects in part the 
varied and shifting solutions devised by families to cope with immigration 
policy and its fractious effects on family relations. It seems that almost 
everyone is undocumented at some point, and there is a lot of switching 
back and forth between being documented and being undocumented, 
often by the same person in the same family. A good example is Geraldo, 
34 years old, who grew up here with his brothers and sisters in the 
Bronx.  His mother became documented by marrying an American, and 
eventually became a naturalized citizen. She then was able to apply for a 
change of status for her children, and all received green cards for their 
permanent residency. Geraldo was a rebel, however, and he decided to 
return to Brazil to live with his grandparents when he was 15. He thus 
missed the window of opportunity his mother had to regularize his status 
before he turned 19.  He returned to the U.S., lived with his legally 
established family, but had to do it on a Student Visa.  He completed his 
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bachelor’s degree at a New York university, and while doing his one year 
of “Practical Training” after graduating, he received a work permit for one 
year, along with a drivers’ license and a social security number, with 
which he has been working ever since.   
 Geraldo is now living in the Boston area, and is married to a U.S. 
citizen of Italian origins. He is the father of two U.S.-born citizen sons. 
With the exception of himself, every person in both his natal family and 
his own current family are U.S. citizens or permanent residents.  For the 
past 14 years, however, he has been undocumented. As he explained, 
“This is so frustrating, I tried so many ways to adjust my immigration 
status, but I haven’t encountered a solution. I even tried to adjust my 
status through voluntary removal with ICE, but they refused me.”  His 
employment prospects have been somewhat limited because of this 
situation.  He does many types of free-lance jobs, in information 
technology, real estate, music instruction, community organizing, and 
sales.  He is a talented professional-level musician, as is his wife. He is 
civically very active and is a principal organizer of a nonprofit 
organization promoting voter registration.  Nonetheless, he is tormented 
by his undocumented status situation and his lack of ability to change it.   
Geraldo’s story is not unique in displaying how fragile and 
arbitrary the line is between being documented and being undocumented 
within the Brazilian community. Since most people are enmeshed in 
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mixed status family networks, Geraldo’s frustration is widely felt as part 
of a general condition of the Brazilian immigrant community. As I have 
described before, they feel trapped. They work hard to earn a living to 
support their families here and their families in Brazil.  They are 
consigned to living in fear. They do not want to go home because they 
have been in the U.S. long enough to put down roots, and it is home here 
to their children, who put down their own roots.   
Immigration statuses do change and thus the mix of statuses 
within a family also changes over time. Some people get married and 
become documented, and sometimes they fall out of documentation 
again, if the marriage dissolves before all the documents are in place. 
Sometimes, of course, even if you get married – as explained above -- you 
cannot adjust your status, even if you become part of an all-American 
family (except for yourself). Many immigrants stay long enough so that 
for some when their children come of age (21 years old), their children 
can and do petition for their parents to come to the U.S. as authorized 
family members. This requires the parents – often with more than two 
decades of life in the U.S. – to return to Brazil in order to receive 
authorization from the U.S. Embassy there to enter the U.S. legally.  
Immigration status is thus a thread that runs through every aspect 
of the Brazilian immigrant community. Immigration status plays a large 
role in defining how and where you are going to live, what kinds of work 
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you will be able to find, whether you will be able to receive training or 
education, and will be explained later in Chapter Four, the kinds of 
associations and political activities you will become part of.  Ultimately, 
Brazilian immigrants do not let this stunning array of obstacles defeat 
them in their attempts to create families that work well here in the 
United States, as well as across transnational space. 
 
The Transnational Family in Portugal, a Brief Comparison 
 For Brazilians in Lisbon, the Safe Haven agreement between Brazil 
and Portugal gives them easy and automatic access to Portugal and 
European space, and thus the issue of unauthorized versus authorized 
status is not a relevant one, in contrast to the U.S. All that is needed is 
airplane fare and some friends or family available to assist in 
resettlement. If family emergencies back home or problems in Portugal 
require a quick return to Brazil that is also within reach.  But what is not 
so much within reach is having the financial means to make such trips.  
Most migrant workers in Portugal cannot afford the transportation 
costs of much, if any, of this back and forth movement. Brazilians in 
Portugal tend to stay in close touch with family members in Brazil, but 
as in the case of their U.S. counterparts, this was largely through social 
media, internet, and telephone. Echoing my U.S. findings, these 
communications with family and friends in Brazil occur  “daily,” “every 
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day,” “always calling,” or just “always.” As one respondent reported:  
I am always talking to family members by telephone, 
Facebook, email, letter and videos. 
 It is interesting to note that Brazilians in Lisbon do not just keep 
up with family members back in Brazil, but around the world, thus 
reminding that a genuine Brazilian global diaspora has begun to exist.    
At least a third of my respondents in Portugal had family members living 
in at least two other countries outside Brazil, particularly the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland, and Portugal.  
Respondents spoke of keeping up, through the telephone and internet 
with family members in all of these places. This was almost never true 
among Brazilians in Boston. A respondent in Lisbon, a small 
businessman, explained these with reference to the cultural emphasis on 
family among Brazilians:   
Brazilians are not like Americans. It’s not hard for us to 
maintain the family, because we are very sentimental and have 
close relations with our families, not like Americans. 
 As a decidedly less attractive destination for migrants compared to 
the United States, Lisbon’s available job opportunities pay migrants 
wages that are about one-third or one-quarter of what is current in 
Boston [see Figure 11 below], but this is still two or three times what 
they are in Brazil typically, as I explain later when comparing minimum 
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wages among the countries. The migrant stream to Portugal since the 
1990s, moreover, is drawn from the lesser educated, more rural, and 
more working-class segments of Brazilian society – who still find 
comparative advantage economically by migrating to Lisbon. Many would 
prefer to migrate to the U.S., but are attracted to Portugal by the ease of 
entry, and similarities in language and culture, and in order to avoid the 
risk and expense of a trip across the Mexican border. 
Many also confided that they came to Portugal because it is a 
gateway to the rest of the European Union. Most Brazilians try to gain 
residency in Portugal, a process that typically takes five years. If 
successful they are able to move on to the UK, or Germany where wages 
are much higher, as is shown in Figure 11 below. As proprietor of a small 
bar told me: 
I really want to be in London. My friends are there and make 
more money, but I don’t want to be illegal. So I’m going to stay put 
here in Portugal until I get my residency, and then I’ll go.  
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Figure 11: 2015 Monthly Minimum Wage: Comparison in 5 Countries 
 
 
Most migrants since the 1990s, however, are from more vulnerable 
social circumstances. In my sample, for example, almost one third of the 
respondents were in Portugal as single mothers, very often women who 
were escaping situations of domestic abuse at home in Brazil. Fewer 
mothers brought their children with them to Lisbon than to Boston, 
because they would often remain better off at home, living with relatives 
and supported by remittances.   
Recent Brazilians arriving in Lisbon are mostly channeled into 
lower level, poorly paid service jobs, or farm work. As the story of 
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Raquel’s son revealed in Chapter One, after he was newly arrived from 
Brazil he was tracked into hospitality training in high school, channeling 
him and other children considered talented in Brazil into vocational 
programs linked to low-wage Portuguese work.   
Portugal has the highest income inequality15 in all of Europe 
(Portuguese-American Journal 2011), and the jobs reserved for Brazilian 
migrants are at the bottom, mostly in services, typically ones that pay 
minimum wage. Brazilians are confined often to living in rented rooms in 
houses in the poorer and more working class sections of Lisbon or its 
metropolitan region.  Once remittances are sent home to support family 
members in Brazil – and the majority of respondents in my sample did 
send regular remittances – little is left for travel home or any luxuries in 
Lisbon. Airfare for one adult in the off-season from Lisbon to Brazil 
typically costs between US$ 677 and US$ 871, depending on how far 
from Lisbon one is traveling. This amounts to about one full month’s pay 
for most people, and this price does not account for travel expenses 
within Brazil once they arrive, or the costs of gifts that must be carried 
there when visiting family.  
All in all, economic opportunities are better in Portugal than at 
home, but still very limited. As a respondent in Lisbon explained: 
                                       
15 Ironically, Boston in 2016 has the highest income inequality of any major city in the 
United States.  In this kind of setting, regardless of which side of the Atlantic, the 
presence of a strong economic elite creates a market for the service jobs that Brazilians 
(and other immigrants) in both settings tend to fill.  
	 150 
The Brazilians here that are lucky to get two or three jobs can 
make some money – enough to pay their expenses, support family 
members in Brazil, and save a little for themselves; but, it’s very 
hard to get two or three jobs! One job means working 11 hours a 
day, six days a week. The money’s only good if you want to live 
here and become part of Portugal, and integrate here, but not to 
save money and go back home.  There are many people stuck here!  
They thought they were going to make money and go home, but 
they can barely keep up with their daily expenses! 
All in all, they understand that Portugal is a low-wage country compared 
to the rest of Western Europe, and some called it the “little shanty town,” 
or favela pequena, of Europe. 
Despite these difficult circumstances, the migrants make more 
money than they can in Brazil, assuming they were able to find work at 
home before leaving.  Many small business owners, such as Sonia 
mentioned in Chapter One, also had businesses in Brazil – such as hair 
or nail salons, cafés, restaurants, printing and design shops, grocery 
stores. They liquidate their businesses and bring their capital to    
Portugal where they know they can make more profit. 
Job and business opportunities for women are greater in Portugal 
than in Brazil, and here too, as in the U.S. case, women gain some 
economic and social independence from migrating. Many Brazilian 
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women also end up marrying Portuguese men, who some Brazilian 
women say they prefer because they are more egalitarian toward women.  
As a Brazilian hairdresser reported to me,  
The men fall in love with us, and their family hates us. I have been 
married for a while now, and it’s been three months since my 
mother-in-law spoke with me, because I am black and I am 
Brazilian. 
When husband and wife are living together as immigrants in 
Portugal, many of the same change processes evident in family life in 
Boston are also visible here, especially a trend towards a nuclear family 
household, as well as more egalitarianism and flexibility in gender roles 
and relations in the family. As in the U.S., a wider kin network is simply 
not present in the way it was in Brazil. Now this network   extends across 
transnational space instead and depends on communication through the 
internet, social media, and telephone.   
All but two respondents indicated that marital and family relations 
changed significantly for Brazilians after the move to Portugal. Their 
remarks echoed the U.S. respondents, referring to the absence of family 
support networks and time pressures:     
Here I really feel the absence of my family and friends. 
  It’s very different here. In Brazil we have more time and don’t 
get as stressed out.  Here the [domestic and financial] 
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responsibilities are really much heavier. 
The demands of work are more pressing as well, and leave little 
time for anything else. 
Our life changed a lot here.  It changed because life is more 
rushed, and everything centers on work.  In Brazil I had time for 
other things, but here I don’t. 
The difference between Brazil and here is that we work more, 
and have less of a relationship with people. 
Regarding gender roles in the household, male and female 
respondents reported that men – just as in Boston – did more household 
labor than they ever had in Brazil: 
Here I help a lot more with household tasks (from a man). 
In Brazil, my wife did everything. Now we divide all the 
household duties. 
All of us in the family do chores. 
My husband is the one who gets my daughter up, and cares 
for her in the morning. 
My home life has changed a lot. I have to do a lot more 
housework here than in Brazil (from a husband). 
It is not only in the division of household chores, but in other ways 
that marital relations become more egalitarian. As women gain 
independence in the migrant setting, they typically stop asking 
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permission of their husbands – common in Brazil – each time they leave 
the house for any purpose other than work. These shifts in gender roles, 
as in the United States, however, can put stress on marriages: 
The Brazilian man is really very sexist.  Many marriages here 
break up because the women who arrive here come to see that they 
have the same rights as anyone else, and they don’t have to 
maintain all those old duties and obligations any more to their 
husbands. 
Most respondents reported that the manner of disciplining children 
did not change much when they migrated to Lisbon, and this is likely 
due to the fact that the child-rearing norms they bring very much 
resemble the environing Portuguese ones. Brazilians in Lisbon never 
complained about their children’s becoming estranged from their family, 
taking on excessive independence and individualism, or presenting 
discipline problems, as parents were more likely to complain about in 
Boston. Family time, especially around meals and spending leisure time 
together, as with the Portuguese, was an unquestioned part of their 
family routine, which almost every respondent reported did not change 
after moving from Brazil to Lisbon. 
 As regards long-distance parenting, partly because my research 
sample in Portugal was older on average by about ten years from those in 
Massachusetts, their children at home were older and required less daily 
	 154 
care.  In Lisbon, most men and women I encountered were in their 30s 
and 40s, whereas in Boston migrants in their 20s were more common.  
More Brazilian immigrants in my Lisbon sample already had children 
and had left them in Brazil when migrating.  In fact, a majority of all 
children [51%) stayed in Brazil, whereas in Boston, only a third of the 
respondents’ children were living in Brazil (33%).  Parents in Lisbon 
engaged in the same dynamics of long-distance parenting as they did in 
Boston, especially involving heavy, daily use of the telephone. 
We might ask why in Lisbon more parents left children in Brazil 
than parents did in Boston, given that it was much easier to bring 
children legally to Portugal, or simply have them come for a temporary 
visit, or in fact for the immigrant parents to make a return visit to Brazil 
to see their children. A small to modest amount of this kind of back and 
forth visiting, however, took place since immigration rules permitted it.  
The main impediment was the cost of travel to and from Brazil, as noted 
above, which was difficult for Brazilians in Lisbon to manage.  In some 
cases, there was another factor that inhibited visiting.  Some of the 
women who left Brazil due to domestic violence there felt that they could 
not return for a visit without putting their lives in jeopardy. 
There were many variations in family patterns and arrangements 
for the care of children.  It was common, for example, that once 
becoming established in Lisbon, parents would work toward saving to 
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bring their children to Portugal to join them. In some cases, however, as 
with Raquel’s daughter, the children did not like being there, could not 
adjust, and returned to Brazil.  It was also the case that other parents 
had Portugal-born children, as well as children left behind in Brazil, 
whether or not the children had ever tried to reunite with parents in 
Lisbon, and having children in different places was the arrangement that 
worked out best for everyone. In other cases, parents in Portugal – 
though both they and their spouse at home in Brazil had moved on to 
other partners – still collaborated in co-parenting of children in Brazil, 
either through remittances, visiting, and/or more direct contact.  
Another factor that caused many Brazilians to leave their children 
in Brazil was that they could live and expect an easier, middle class style 
of life in Brazil, supported by migrant remittances, and have better 
educational opportunity on their parents’ remittances, than they ever 
could as members of low-income working class families in Portugal.  If 
the children were older when they came to Lisbon, moreover, they 
usually had to do low-wage work while studying in school, much as 
adolescents do in Boston.  For all these reasons, in Lisbon many parents 
accustomed themselves, as they do in Boston, to living apart from their 
offspring. 
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Conclusions  
 The Brazilian immigrant community is diverse, and its forms of 
family adaptation and change are themselves multiple, highly dependent 
on immigration status.  Immigration status shapes the kind of 
transnationalism that families display, the type of parenting practices 
they exercise, and the sorts of remittances and other material and social 
exchanges that flow within their transnational family networks. Changes 
toward dominant North American family patterns, including the growing 
importance of the nuclear family, more egalitarian gender roles, and 
more democratic styles of childrearing, are evident throughout, but these 
shifts are more pronounced for working class respondents than for the 
middle and upper classes where they have already existed to a great 
extent in Brazil.   
Most of what happens to Brazilians in the context of migrant 
adaptation is thus profoundly affected by their earlier positions in the 
Brazilian social order, with regard to racial and class stratification.  Do 
these community social divisions imported from Brazil break down, or 
are they exacerbated in the new immigrant setting?  How do racial and 
class relations among Brazilians change through their confrontation with 
the new US social order they encounter after arriving?  These are the 
questions I turn to in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Changing Regimes of Race and Class in the Immigrant Setting   
 
Introduction 
When Brazilians arrive in the United States, they have left behind 
a nation with considerable ethnic and racial diversity and inequity, and 
entered another equally complex social environment, though the terms of 
stratification are different. This chapter examines some of the practices 
and beliefs Brazilians bring with them, including pervasive and largely 
unexamined racism embedded in the Brazilian popular culture.  
The U.S. class and racial order poses new challenges and 
opportunities for Brazilians that promote upward mobility for some, but 
downward mobility for others, leading to a social leveling that mixes 
people of disparate Brazilian statuses and introduces new tensions and 
even conflict into social relations within immigrant communities. The 
extended case studies of Vinicius and Amanda illustrate how the new 
status arrangements, both within the Brazilian community and in the 
wider U.S. society, introduce new barriers and require new types of 
learning about the meaning of race and class. 
Identity is a complex, ambiguous, and fluid which them see as an 
unwarranted xx designation for Brazilians. They attempt to avoid 
classification as Latinos, have not yet developed a hyphenated Brazilian-
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American (or Brazuca) self-designation, and attempt to resist new 
racialization by Americans on account of color as well as culture.  
As you see the position of migrants of middle and upper class 
origin, suggesting the more rapid whitening and assimilation of this 
group into mainstream American culture and communities, which leaves 
the community divided along class and racial lines.  For different reasons, 
though, both elite and working class segments seek to keep a low social 
profile and not call attention to themselves as Brazilians. Church 
participation is the key node of civic participation, which fragments the 
Boston community into over 100 congregations. These divisions by race, 
class, and associational participation foster disunity among Brazilians 
and retard ethnic group formation and the development of leaders 
capable of speaking on behalf of the immigrant community. 
 
Race, Culture and Identity among Brazilians 
The discourse of national identity in Brazil for some time has 
acknowledged the country’s multi-racial and multi-ethnic character. 
Over 500 years, the Brazilian people have been forged from the mixing of 
millions of mostly Tupi-Guarani indigenous people, Portuguese and other 
European colonialists, five million captive Africans imported as slaves, 
and, in the 19th and 20th centuries, successive waves of European 
immigrants, especially from Italy, Germany, and Portugal, with smaller 
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influxes from Japan, China, and Lebanon. Strong regional differences 
through the country’s vast geography, as well as rural-urban cleavages,  
introduce even more diversity among contemporary Brazilians, diversity 
that is usually celebrated as part of a national melting pot. For a long 
time the country has embraced a sense of itself as a “racial democracy,” 
where all colors and ethnic backgrounds have long mixed in harmony.   
At the same time, Brazil is one of the most economically unequal 
countries in the world, as measured by its GINI Coefficient of 50.9 in 
2012, making it 16th in income inequality among the 140 countries 
measured in the CIA’s The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 
2015). Moreover, this inequality is quite racialized, though it is not 
understood to be a racial issue in Brazil, for reasons that will be 
explained shortly. The Data Popular Institute in 2011 released a report 
indicating that wealth disparities heavily follow racial lines, comparing 
whites with “African-Brazilians,” the composite group made up of blacks 
and mixed race people:  “The wealthiest group of Brazilians – known as 
"Class A" – was made up of 82.3% white people and just 17.7% African-
Brazilians.  In contrast "Class E" – the poorest section of society – was 
76.3% African-Brazilian and 23.7% white” (Phillips 2011). 
Once in the United States, Brazilians undergo a fairly normal type 
of unifying ethnic group formation. In my survey, in fact, “Just Brazilian” 
was the choice of almost one of ten respondents when asked to describe 
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their racial or ethnic identification. Choosing the ethnic Brazilian 
designation in the U.S. context is a way of subsuming all class, racial, 
regional, and ethnic differences under one national label. This label was 
also a frequent response to the question of how the respondent racially 
identified. 
  The work of establishing a public identity is imperative in the 
immigrant context, especially given the felt need for Brazilians to 
distinguish themselves as much as possible from the broader Latino, 
Hispanic, or “Black” ethnicities with which they are often confused.  
Life in the community, as will be explained below, also often 
throws diverse Brazilians together as peers in work situations, where 
they have to achieve a kind of unity and collaboration never possible in a 
more class and racially segregated Brazil, though there are centrifugal 
tendencies in the U.S. around race that in other ways are beginning to 
divide the community along new lines of cleavage. 
 Some literature identifies a new emerging identity for Brazilians in 
the United States, that of “Brazuca.”   Tosta’s definition of Brazuca 
focuses on the transnational character of the population. He says a 
Brazuca is “a true Brazilian who cannot manage to live in Brazil but who 
remains in a back-and-forth (vat-e-vem) existence between there and 
America without end” (Tosta 2004: 580). In Jouet-Pastre’s and Braga’s 
recent anthology, Becoming Brazuca: Brazilian Immigration to the United 
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States, Margolis defines that identity in a more general way:  “Brazuca is 
a colloquialism for Brazilian immigrant in this country that first 
appeared in…the late 1980s” (Margolis 2008: 342).  Margolis and others 
argue that the identity label is an attempt to distinguish Brazilians as 
unique and not part of the Latino category. For my purposes, in keeping 
with the usual understandings of the term among my study population, I 
define it as just another example of hyphenated ethnic identity so 
common in American history, akin in this case to “Brazilian-American.” 
My survey asked whether this new term, “Brazuca” is becoming 
more robust as a source of identification for those in the migrant 
community. All survey respondents were asked what they thought of this 
label, and whether any identified in terms of it, which might have been 
likely given that 84% had been residing in the United States for five or 
more years. In a sample of 41, however, only six respondents viewed the 
term favorably, noting as these two respondents did, for example: 
 Yes, we are all half Americans, after living here for a long time. 
 
Yes, we are naturalized (U.S. citizen) Brazilians. 
 
Others in the sample did not understand what the term meant, were 
completely unfamiliar with it, or believed that it was a derogatory label.   
Perhaps in a few years another survey among U.S.-born Brazilian-
American children in their teens might yield a more favorable result. 
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Figure 12: Racial Identifications of Survey Sample Brazilians in Boston 
 
If there are no new identity constructs available or attractive to 
them, such as Brazuca, how do immigrants in the sample see themselves 
racially and ethnically in terms of identity?  For reasons that shortly will 
be explained, it is uncommon for Brazilians to use race – in terms of 
phenotype -- as a primary identifier. The sample of Brazilians in my 
survey identify as moderately less white and more black than the U.S. 
Census indicates for the Brazilian population as a whole. A little under 
one-third (32.43%) identify as white, 18.92% as black, with 40.54% being 
“mixed,” with 8.1% defining Brazilian as their race.16 The comparable 
                                       
16 The “Brazilian” racial identification is not an option in the U.S. census, though in the 
Boston area during the 2010 Census, the Portuguese-Speaking Complete Count 
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2010 census figures from Brazil as a whole are 47.4% white, 7.6% black, 
and 43.1% mixed (IBGE 2015).  These figures are skewed somewhat by 
the generally poor or lower income class origins of my sample and by the 
immigrant community’s first encounter with the U.S. “One Drop” rule 
that excludes from the “white” designation anyone with any visible 
African phenotypical traits whatever – whether it be hair, body type, 
facial structure, or skin color. 
As we will see in survey results, it is common for Brazilians to be 
mistaken as members of other ethnic groups, and to be racialized on 
account of phenotype or culture. This is a great frustration since so 
many do not wish to define themselves as changing through their time 
spent in the United States, seeing themselves instead as temporary, 
target earners.  They especially struggle to resist ethnic stigmatization as 
racial minorities, whether black or Latino, who they plainly see suffering 
from discrimination in the U.S. context. Of course, Brazilian women in 
                                                                                                                  
Committee, made up of political leaders in the Portuguese, Cape Verdean, and Brazilian 
immigrant communities, advised immigrants to record their nationality in place of racial 
identification, in order to facilitate a complete count of Portuguese-speakers: 
“In order to get a better picture of our communities, the PSCCC is asking Portuguese 
speakers to answer the race and ethnicity questions as follows: 
Question 8 (or Question 5 for persons 2 and beyond in the household): Check “No-not of 
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin.” 
Question 9 (or Question 6 for persons 2 and beyond in the household): Check ONLY 
“Some Other Race” and write in your ethnic/ancestral background, such as Brazilian, 
Cape Verdean, Portuguese, etc. in the boxes below.”   
(MAPS 2015) 
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particular – more than men – are subjected to objectification and 
exoticization as ethno-racially different, and are more keenly aware of 
discrimination toward the community. The interest of American men in 
them as Brazilians in this case is not entirely welcome, accompanied as 
it is with sexual objectification, a common complaint from many female 
respondents. 
 
Race, Class and Racism in Brazil and in the United States 
 Similar to their compatriots at home, Brazilians in the United 
States generally think – despite social science evidence to the contrary -- 
that race is not an important factor in social stratification in their home 
country. They believe that social inequalities are mainly rooted in income 
or class, which is most commonly understood to be a function of values 
and behavior. Some typical responses to the survey question on this 
point included these two comments from two respondents: 
In Brazil discrimination is only by class not color.  If you have 
money you can enter in certain places or if you don’t, you can’t 
enter.   Here I suffer more on account of color  
I never really paid much attention to this thing of race, or color, 
because I grew up in an environment where we did not make a 
difference out of color, whether you were black, white, yellow, or 
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whatever. The only suffering we felt was not because of our skin 
but because of class.  It was the barrier that we had to live with. 
The typical Brazilian family is racially mixed, where different colors 
and racial categorizations apply to members of the same family. 
Respondents were asked if their own family were mixed and, if so, how 
they addressed issues of color or racial differences among themselves, 
either in Brazil or the United States.  Sixty-five percent (65%) of the 
respondents replied that yes, their families were racially mixed, but not a 
single respondent indicated that this ever was a subject for discussion. 
The following three responses were typical: 
Yes, my mother is black, my father is white with blue eyes.  
They never talked about color or any racial question. 
No, we never speak about this…There at home we had 
some more white, and others more mixed (morenos). But we never 
spoke about this. Yes, but we do not talk about the issue. 
Yes [my family is mixed], but we don’t talk about it because 
we don’t have a reason to. We are all equal. 
There are deep historical and cultural reasons that race – 
especially color-based race – has been so submerged in conventional 
Brazilian thinking. 
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1) First there is the encompassing notion of Lusotropicalism17 
(Castelo 1998), that posited that Brazil has been a true racial democracy 
where extensive miscegenation erased any real differences among the 
races, such that no real color discrimination has ever taken place, even 
during the slavery era, which lasted from 1500 to 1888, almost four 
centuries.  As a result, Brazil has never collected official statistics in the 
census of their population on the racial categories of their population.  
Color-blindness has long been the official state policy, shaped national 
identity, and has permeated popular cultural understandings of race in a 
hegemonic manner as well. 
 
2) Traditionally in Brazil few people were ever informally classified 
as negro or preto, that is, “black,” though the majority of the population 
is mixed. Because of the lack of any U.S.-style binary racial classification 
system based on the “one-drop rule,” these morenos or pardos are not 
considered black, leaving that classification only for the very dark in 
complexion (2015). However, as the U.S.-style racial classification affects 
Brazil, and as the Black Consciousness Movement and affirmative action 
have become more important since 2000, the newer, wider term of Afro-
                                       
17 The term Lusotropicalism refers to the historical, some would say markedly racist 
discourse interpreting miscegenation of Portuguese with their African slaves in the 
tropics as a harmonious, democratic mixing of races whose legacy even today is claimed 
to be inter-racial equality and acceptance.    
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descendente (person with some degree of African ancestry) has gained 
some currency.  
3) The strength of the Brazilian national identity is such that all 
Brazilians, of whatever skin color, can term their primary ethno-racial 
identity as “Brazilian.”  This was true in the survey sample where 8% of 
the respondents always replied that their national identity was primary 
in their self-identification, not race or color. In response to other 
questions, they also asserted their Brazilianness unequivocally. 
4) Class distinctions, despite the ideology that they are all that 
matter, so closely parallel or are consistent with color differences, that 
class ends up obscuring both the salience of race and the recognition of 
a causality between color and class outcomes (Sheriff 2001, Beserra 
2003). 
5) Few within the immigrant community can be categorized as 
Afro-Descendent or “Black” in any Brazilian sense of the terms. Fewer 
darker Brazilians have historically made it to the United States as 
immigrants, because the earliest 1980s migration wave was traditionally 
middle-class and therefore mostly white (Margolis 1990, 1994). Since the 
1990s and 2000s, however, more working class Brazilians have entered 
the migrant flow to the United States, but few of these as well have been 
black, and few have come from the more Afro-descendent states of 
Brazil’s northeast region, especially Bahia, as my own sample shows. 
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So few are the numbers of Afro-Brazilians among the immigrant 
community that they are almost never recognized by other Brazilians as 
being Brazilian. Although I am Afro-Brazilian, unless I am known in the 
setting, I am almost never recognized to be Brazilian, even when I am 
speaking Brazilian Portuguese with a native accent. The combination of 
African descent with achievement in higher education, or with being an 
authoritative speaker on any subject in public, are pairings many people 
seem to find unimaginable. I am constantly questioned if I am really 
Brazilian in such settings, especially by Brazilians. The casual Brazilian 
observer always considers me African American or from another country, 
such as Cape Verde or the Dominican Republic. A physical appearance 
marked by African features is simply so uncommon within the Brazilian 
immigrant community that it is seldom recognized as part of the normal 
Brazilian spectrum, unless the person in question is filling a subservient 
work role of some kind. 
 
Racial Stigmatization of Afro-Brazilians in Popular Brazilian Culture 
Brazilian immigrants bring with them to the United States a 
popular culture that is infused with traditional racial stereotypes, 
especially those that stigmatize darker skinned, African-featured people. 
Typically women are the focus of most of these stereotypes. This is ironic 
and cruel since in Brazil, most black women are required to be strong 
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individuals, quite often struggling with low incomes and marrying less 
often than their lighter peers. They frequently have to be heads of 
households in spite of facing income and educational discrimination 
(Caldwell 2006). Despite these facts, the Brazilian popular culture 
marginalizes black women as lacking in intelligence, oversexed, good for 
performing samba, and well adapted for work as servants, as many of my 
respondents told me (see also: Caldwell 2006). These are somewhat 
parallel to historically common U.S. stereotypes of black women as 
Mammies, Jezebels, and Sapphires (Collins 2000).  
Caricatures of black women’s bodies with huge posteriors, 
oversized breasts, gigantic mouths, thick enormous red lips, bulging eyes, 
and kinky, bushy hair are quite present in Brazilian popular culture as it 
is practiced in Boston and other U.S. locations today. To many residents 
of the United States, these caricatures resemble what has been 
commonly referred to in North America as racially-coded “Coon Art,”18 
traditionally used here as a tool of culture to demean, ridicule, and 
subordinate African-Americans and to reaffirm White prejudices. The 
classic trait of Black or “bad” hair is especially singled out as a factor in 
the perceived ugly appearance of women and carries with it connotations 
of subordination and a lack of virtue. This is, of course, the imposition of 
                                       
18 “Coon Art” is a genre of racist caricatures of African-Americans prominent in visual 
art and song that was common during the Jim Crow era, but still existing in 2016, that 
typically portrays its subjects as animal-like, abnormal, or primitive through presenting 
their speech, bodies, or behavior in exaggerated or grotesque ways. 
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White standards of beauty in negatively evaluating the worth of Black 
women. 
During my fieldwork in a Brazilian restaurant in Somerville, for 
example, I heard the Brazilian DJ spinning the recording of a popular 
dance song called “Nigger with Black Hair,” by the famous Brazilian pop 
trio, “Pedro, Henrique and Fernando.”  The song is full of double-
entendres and uses black hair and dark skin to define the woman who is 
the focus of the song as a sexualized object not deserving of respect or 
courtesy, and good for little more than aggressive sexual use.  
LYRICS TO “NIGGER WITH BLACK HAIR”19 
Nigger with black hair 
That can’t ever be brushed to look neat 
When she walks down by the plaza 
Some big Nigger starts yelling 
Grab her!  Grab her! 
What for? 
Rub lipstick [ejaculate] on her 
What color? 
Violet 
In her mouth and on her cheek [vagina] 
What for? 
                                       
19 English translation of lyrics by author. 
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To press lipstick [ejaculate] on her 
What color? 
Blue! 
On her mouth 
and on her Gateway to Heaven [vagina] 
Get out of my way, woman 
Today I’m just in a bad mood! 
Get out of my face, woman, 
Today I’m just in a bad mood! 
 This kind of imagery appears again and again in many popular 
immigrant settings. To cite one observed example, at a recent celebration 
of a Brazilian public health project at a local university, for 
entertainment a supposedly “folkloric” dance troupe put on a dramatic 
racist parody of a Black female Brazilian walking like a duck. This walk 
was performed, to the laughter of forty Brazilian professionals present, 
by a white Brazilian male actor dressed in a rubber mask with 
exaggerated “black” features, such as long, bright red, fat lips (protruding 
about 4 inches), and wearing grotesquely large breasts and a posterior 
that was as large as a bushel basket protruding from the back of his 
body 18 inches.  
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Photo 5:  Coon art poking fun at Afro-Brazilians on a bathroom door in a 
Brazilian café in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015 
 
Visual representations of these stigmatizing images are also evident in 
public places, such as at a popular Cambridge Brazilian restaurant 
where I conducted interviews. This restaurant had changed hands three 
times since I began my research, and underwent interior renovation each 
time, but without any of the owners’ removing the applique figurines 
from the doors to the rest rooms. 
A prominent Brazilian organization in Framingham, a heavily 
Brazilian city on the edge of Boston in the Metrowest area, placed the 
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following photo – without comment – on their Facebook page in 2013 as 
a joke: 
 
Photo 6:  Racially derogatory Facebook posting 
 
 
In one of the area’s most important Brazilian community 
newspapers, a 2012 crossword puzzle included a gratuitous graphic 
displaying the same stereotypical imagery of the simple minded, large 
lipped, kinky-haired Negro. 
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Photo 7:  Coon art with stereotypical African features in crossword  
       puzzle, Brazilian community newspaper 
 
 
 Other figurines that an observer can see placed about restaurants 
and cafes portray Afro-Brazilians with stereotypical physical 
characteristics, with oversized mouths or lips, prominent breasts, or 
primitive dress. No other similar figurines exist for other racially coded 
Brazilians. 
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Photo 8: Coon art in Brazilian public establishment 
  
 
Photo 9:  More coon art in the same Brazilian establishment 
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The United States Perceived as a more Racist location than Brazil 
With Brazilians displaying stereotypes of African-descent people 
such as these, it is no surprise that the U.S. “One-Drop Rule,” that 
defines even mixed race people as Black, appears as a violent form of 
racist discrimination imposed on them in U.S. communities. It is 
something they are not used to at home.  Despite their best efforts not to 
be associated with African Americans and Latinos in U.S. society, who 
they believe to be racially subordinate groups subject to systematic 
discrimination, many Brazilians still feel racialized and lumped with 
these minority groups by Americans.   
A majority of the respondents (57%) indicated they found the U.S. 
a more racist place than Brazil, because of the society’s calling more 
attention to color or race differences in making judgments of people’s 
worth. Only 24% believed Brazil was more racist than the United States. 
Here are some representative comments: 
It’s more racist in here than in Brazil. 
There’s less racism in Brazil. 
Here people are more racist. 
Here in the U.S. people are always talking about race! 
Everyone’s always calling attention to the issue, and that 
makes it worse. 
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Some of those who report significant racism in Brazil made it clear 
that their realization of that racism came to light through their U.S.-
based experiences that sensitized them to the issue in new ways, such as 
in this comment. 
I think there is more racism in Brazil, but I never heard anyone 
there talking about it. It’s the same in Brazil and the U.S., though 
the law protects you more here. 
First, there is the issue of color-based racialization.  Many who in 
Brazil are not considered black, but instead mixed-race (pardo, or 
moreno), or even light enough to be on the Brazilian white end of the 
spectrum, once in the U.S. are considered black.  Of course, this is 
mostly due to the “One-drop Rule” in U.S. racial classifications, as 
Tiffany Joseph (2015) and many others have pointed out. Some of the 
research subjects addressed this in comments when answering questions 
about how they would classify themselves racially: 
When I discuss this with my [American] husband he always says 
that I am black, but I say that I am morena! 
Of course, once inside the different racial order of U.S. society, 
identity can change as to which groups immigrants identify with, as 
different elements of the community feel blackened in that context. 
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My ethnicity is described as indigenous (in Brazil) and since 
here whoever is not white is black, I identify myself more with 
blacks.   
It’s complicated, I see myself as mixed, I am not black enough 
for blacks, and not white enough for whites. 
I identify more with blacks than with whites. 
Being largely invisible in U.S. society, for reasons we will discuss 
later, Brazilians are commonly perceived as members of other mixed race, 
creole, or racially intermediate groups, especially “Latinos” or “Hispanics,” 
as in the following responses: 
Yes, they think I am Middle Eastern or Latino. I just say I am 
Brazilian. 
Yes, they ask me if I am Cape Verdean.   
They think I am Portuguese or Hispanic. 
   They think that I am Hispanic 
They think I am Hispanic when I have curly hair  
They confuse me with Indians and Hispanics 
 The propensity for Brazilians to avoid identification with Latinos 
does, however, vary according to the ethnic mix of the host community 
and region.  De Oliveira (2003) and Resende (2003) both report that in 
Florida, with a politically strong, even dominant Latino political and 
social presence in some areas, it has proved expedient for Brazilians to 
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define themselves socially and politically as Latinos and to ally with 
Spanish-speaking immigrants. Martes (2000) also suggests that Latino 
identification is more common among the second generation.   
In New England, however, Brazilians are fairly adamant about not 
identifying as Latino. As lusophone rather than hispanophone in 
language and cultural background, they in fact do not fit the standard 
U.S. Census definition of Hispanic/Latino in any case.20 Most New 
England Brazilians, moreover, perceive that Latinos are a stigmatized 
minority to which they do not wish to be socially classified. 
I have the impression that at times we are discriminated against 
because of having the appearance of being Latino. 
It is not uncommon today for many Brazilian community leaders in 
New England to advocate political alliances with Latino immigrants to 
gain strength in fighting for common policy changes that benefit 
immigrants (e.g., Siqueira 2008).  However, even making this 
identification at times with the broader Latino pan-ethnicity for political 
purposes does not preclude maintenance of a firm ethno-racial identity 
based on Brazilian national culture. 
In the question of the census it’s important for me to identify 
myself as Brazilian, but in political matters it’s important to 
                                       
20 According to the Census Bureau (2015), a “Hispanic or Latino” is, “A person of 
Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or 
origin regardless of race.” 
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identify as Latino. They think I’m Latino, but I explain that I’m 
Brazilian. 
When asked about whether they are comfortable being considered 
Latinos in general, 59% of the respondents indicated that they thought 
themselves Latino, but their responses made clear that this was in a 
general cultural sense connoting a Spanish-speaking pan-ethnic category 
of people with immigrant roots in Latin America, not in terms of the 
particular North American usage. Most of these respondents did not see 
any contradiction between being Latinos in this broader sense and being 
Brazilian. 
In Brazil since I was small, we learned that we are Latinos, 
because we live in a Latin country and our language descends 
from Latin.  
 
Racialization on Grounds of Cultural Difference 
Partly because they are not used to a racial analysis of social 
stratification and discrimination, many Brazilians tend to attribute the 
discrimination they experience in U.S. society to the general cultural and 
language differences they have with mainstream Americans, and thereby 
for being immigrants.   
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Our problem here has more to do with being immigrant and with 
the language we speak than with color. In the U.S. there is racism 
based on color but also on national origin too.  
The perception is even that Americans can use color as an excuse 
sometimes for discriminating on cultural grounds.   
The Americans always see me as black just because I’m not 
American!  
Few of the respondents, however, had any understanding that the 
stereotyping and the discrimination they were experiencing on such an 
account itself promotes the process of their group becoming racialized.  
Brazilians are, in fact, subjected in the U.S. to a number of character 
and cultural attributions and stereotypes that position them for group 
exclusion and exploitation as an inferior race. As Aranda et al. have 
indicated, typical markers of racialization found within a broader “color-
blind” racial discourse are having undocumented immigration status, 
being lower class in income, and lacking the ability to fit in and become 
“invisible” within the dominant culture, all of which “deem them to be 
exploitable and thereby submissive, helpless, and lacking dignity” (2009: 
158). 
It’s easy to see that this exploitation and exclusion of Brazilians 
results from their vulnerable immigration status, with the vast majority 
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being undocumented (an estimated 70% of my sample appeared to be21, 
the same as reported by Fritz 2011). They are routinely confined to 
informal sectors of the economy, such as domestic work, cleaning, 
landscaping, restaurant work, and construction, where they are regularly 
subjected to wage theft and other labor law violations, as well as 
violations of consumer and landlord-tenant laws (Lima and Siqueira 
2008).  
The racialization and exoticization they are subjected to on account 
of their putative cultural differences are complementary, in that they 
support their exclusion, exploitation, and distance from mainstream 
American culture.  This is true even though some of these stereotypical 
traits attributed to Brazilians on the surface have positive features. As 
discussed during my field work both in conversation and as seen in the 
mainstream media, chief among these stereotypes are that: (1) Brazilians 
are hard workers who do their jobs with a cheerful smile even in the face 
of low pay and bad working conditions; this is seen as a normal part of 
their culture, as reflected in the fact that, for example, workers excuse 
shortcomings in their situation by reciting the famous proverb, Pouco e 
                                       
21 None of the survey questions specifically asked about immigration status, in terms of 
whether the respondent was documented or not, but respondents often volunteered this 
information in answering a question about their citizenship:  “What country or 
countries area you a citizen of?”  Another question that sometimes resulted in 
respondents’ volunteering this information was when they were asked, “As an 
immigrant, what are the barriers and difficulties you have encountered while in pursuit 
of your goals?” 
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melhor que nada, that is,  “[To have a] Little is better than nothing.”   (2) 
Brazilians are naturally happy and are party animals who take every 
excuse to hold noisy collective celebrations. (3) Brazilians – especially 
women -- are sexually loose.22 (4) Brazilians are dirty and messy in their 
living conditions.  Clearly all these traits are fairly transparent imputed 
qualities of lower-class living that stigmatize Brazilian immigrants, 
reduce respect for them in the eyes of mainstream Americans, and many 
other immigrants – some even Brazilian of more elite status - and 
rationalize the status quo of their economic and social marginalization.  
 
What Happens to Immigrant Elites, Segregated from More Common 
Sectors? 
Virtually none of these lower class traits apply to Brazilian elites of 
middle and upper class backgrounds who within my sample constitute 
approximately 45% of the Brazilian community.  They are mostly 
documented, as their status in Brazil generally permitted them to attain 
visas for visits, were already likely to be English speakers due to their 
educations in Brazil, and more likely to be integrated into the 
                                       
22 A quote illustrating this attribution comes from a 40-year old single mother’s 
complaint about stereotypes against Brazilian women:  “This is frustrating. I see the 
American women wearing mini-skirts, mini-shorts, mini-dresses, low-cut blouses, but 
we the Brazilians are the sluts.”  Another receptionist at a dental office noted, “I hide 
from people that I’m Brazilian as much as I can. I even fake my accent to disguise it.  As 
soon as people know, they feel they have the right to make unpleasant jokes, and in 
some way be disrespectful.  Every delivery guy that comes in feels like they have the 
right to think I’m available.” 
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professional or managerial echelons of the New England job market.  
Many children of elite classes in Brazil also have attended American 
schools even while in Brazil, and often arrive in command of very good 
English. Very frequently, as well, they accumulated extra university 
degrees in the U.S., and many intermarried with Americans.  During my 
interviews, I noticed that all the middle and upper class Brazilians I 
encountered were married to white Americans and living in affluent white 
American communities. 
Elites seldom mix with lower-class Brazilians and avoid engaging 
in the stereotypically public behaviors that Americans often attribute to 
Brazilians. They are also more likely to be well integrated into U.S. 
secondary and primary social networks, and they further maintain a 
great number of voluntary associations for immigrant Brazilians whose 
membership is limited to business owners or professionals in various 
fields.  
In the Brazilian community we see today much the same process 
of bifurcation that is visible in the wider Latino community discussed by 
Aranda et al. (2009) in their analysis of Miami. The whiter, more affluent 
and culturally integrated segments of the immigrant community are 
assimilating more and becoming ever more “invisible” as a separate 
ethnic presence, while the larger more popular segments of the 
community are increasingly being racialized as undeserving and 
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problematic immigrants who create a burden on the system and require 
public social services. 
 
Migration as a Challenge to the Brazilian Class and Racial Order 
In the immigrant experience, elites from Brazil tend to lose status 
within the local community, and the bottom of the Brazilian social 
pyramid – the working class, the rural, and the darker in skin tone – 
tend to gain status both here and in Brazil because of the substantial 
transfer of wealth back home. Those in Brazil also know that a Boston 
income allows immigrants to live a middle class lifestyle when one had 
not been available to them previously. On arriving, it is sometimes 
shocking to immigrants to observe people from working class or even 
impoverished backgrounds with hardly any formal education occupying 
positions of authority in businesses and non-profit organizations (see 
Sales 2006). Elites, too, despite often taking lower-status jobs in Boston, 
also gain status in Brazil from the glamor associated with being in the 
United States and earning enough to retain their old class culture and 
consumer tastes. 
Though respondents show a great deal of downward class mobility, 
they have greater labor force participation and greater remuneration from 
work, even in lower status jobs, than what they had in Brazil. Taking 
occupation as a proxy for class, demographic data on their previous jobs 
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in Brazil and their current ones in Boston show clear downward mobility.  
Most dramatic is the evidence of how many women of all classes and 
backgrounds are channeled into domestic work in the U.S., setting a 
strong ethnic employment niche for Brazilians in New England.  
Domestic workers in Boston are sometimes women of very modest 
education levels but also include many with high school, college, and 
even advanced degrees, who had worked as professionals in Brazil.  
Whereas only 2.27% of the sample worked as domestic workers in Brazil, 
once in Boston 38.74% did. 
Another sign of downward mobility is evident among the 18.14% of 
the sample who were university students in Brazil but did not continue 
their university education after arriving in the United States. The 
likelihood is that they were mostly middle class individuals with 
sufficient family wealth to qualify for a visa, probably a student F-visa to 
study English, most of whom likely overstayed their visas and took up 
blue- or pink-collar jobs. 
While still in Brazil two out of five respondents (45.5%) were 
engaged in middle class occupations that ranged from business manager, 
administrator, lawyer, teacher, physician, to university student.  In 
Boston, by contrast, the number working in professional and managerial 
jobs was less than half as many, 21.9%, and even most of that figure 
reflected a higher engagement in entrepreneurialism and business 
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ownership rather than inclusion in higher-level positions in Boston area 
organizations and businesses. 
In a repeat of the old immigrant story, the population is better 
skilled and educated than their employment profile in Boston would 
suggest. The educational profile of the Boston migrants shows higher 
levels of educational attainment than is normal in the Brazilian 
population as a whole at home. More than 90% had finished high school, 
and almost a third (31.8%) came with higher education degrees.   
In spite of the downward mobility this fairly well educated group 
experiences, the migrants when arriving lose no time in entering the job 
market. They quickly take advantage of the greater availability of paid 
work in Boston, and – compared to Brazil – the higher wages they can 
receive, even in jobs that are considered low status.  Fully 26.25% of the 
sample was not working while in Brazil, and if you add the university 
students, most of whom are not in the workforce either, the total comes 
to 44.43%. In Boston, in contrast, only four individuals out of the same 
41, or 9.09%, did not have a job to report. This conforms to the widely 
understood expectation that within three days after arriving in Boston, 
most Brazilians have found a job and are working.   
When the minimum wage in Brazil is $218.75 monthly23, even if 
most workers in Brazil earn twice the minimum wage, Boston jobs are 
                                       
23 This is according to the Dollar-Real exchange rate current on April 17, 2015. 
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seen as paying well – even ones that are locally viewed as “low wage.”  In 
fact, 85.7% of the Brazilians in my sample reported family incomes below 
$70,000, which is close to the median household income for the Boston 
metropolitan area as a whole, which was $71,738. Quite a few in my 
sample, as well as in the wider community, remain low income in U.S. 
terms. In any case, there is a great deal of income differentiation within 
the immigrant community in Boston, in large part reflecting class 
differences imported from home. 
 
Figure 13:  U.S. Yearly Household Incomes of Respondents 
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Class and Race Relations in the Local Social Order 
Becoming an immigrant to the United States is also a challenge to 
all Brazilians’ previous notions of race and racism, although the types of 
challenges vary a great deal depending on the social characteristics of 
the immigrant, their immigration status, and their racial identity. For all 
Brazilians, not only in relation to U.S. society and mainstream 
Americans, but also in relation to one another inside the immigrant 
community, the immigrant experience involves being fundamentally 
relocated in a new and different racial and social order than they had 
experienced in Brazil (DeBiaggi 2002, Martes 2000, Fritz 2011). While all 
Brazilians are often racialized as a single group by Americans, new kinds 
of social leveling are evident among Brazilians who would never before 
have met or worked so closely together, but who in Brazilian institutions 
and groupings in the United States are challenged to work out new ways 
of relating to one another. This of course is an old story in the immigrant 
experience in America, as well as in other migrant destinations, and an 
important process that promotes ethnic group formation. 
In Brazil, the myth of Lusotropicalism conceals status lines 
between colors and classes, but in the U.S. the leveling of immigrants 
happens through their common incorporation into a mostly common set 
of lower-status service occupations. Doing domestic work, construction, 
landscaping, or restaurant work can involve descending “from mistress 
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to servant” for the middle class, in Margolis’ phrase (1990). Brazilians of 
radically different class and racial backgrounds often find themselves 
living, working, shopping and worshiping in the same social circles here 
for the first time. Those with more cultural capital brought from Brazil 
tend to become entrepreneurs within the ethnic economy, owning 
construction companies, housecleaning schedules, restaurants, or 
beauty shops, even if they work alongside their employees. By being 
owners, they can maintain their status even if they are doing concrete 
work – cleaning houses, or cutting hair – that they would never have 
done in Brazil.   
There is the familiar pattern of the “ethnic economy” that tends to 
welcome new immigrants early on, as newcomers find their first jobs with 
co-ethnics (Portes and Jensen 1987). Frequently within these ethnic 
enterprises, which operate largely within the informal economy, patterns 
of wages, benefits and hours tend to follow older, imported Brazilian 
models that are more exploitative of workers. As Portes has noted, for 
entrepreneurs the ethnic economy is a sure means of advancement 
socially and economically, but not for the workers trapped as employees, 
who typically face substandard (by U.S. measures) wage and benefit 
packages.   
Entrepreneurs, especially those with many co-ethnic employees, 
also often engage in labor practices with their workers that bring them 
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into conflict with U.S. laws. In Brazil, most unskilled and semi-skilled 
jobs pay monthly salaries, and there is no maximum work week, leaving 
a typical weekly shift to cover six days and up to 60-70 hours; in the U.S., 
in contrast, the workweek is limited by law to 40 hours, and there is a 
minimum hourly wage, and standard provisions for overtime for hours 
that exceed the regular workweek. Wage theft, not paying employees for 
their time worked, is widespread as well, and came up in the survey 
encounters and is widely spoken about throughout the community.  
Many Brazilian employers, as a result, run afoul of U.S. labor laws and 
come to the attention of the authorities for that reason.  As one of my 
respondents indicated, “They get in trouble because they just repeat 
what they have experienced themselves as workers and employers in 
Brazil, but it’s not legal to do that here.” 
In Brazilian organizations within the community, as well, 
interlinked racial and class tensions alter the relationships of people at 
work. Frequent interpersonal clashes occur when older-status 
hierarchies that immigrants are familiar with are subverted by new work 
roles and relationships. When elites’ educational advantages from Brazil 
are equalized by opportunities found in the U.S., they find themselves 
equalized with lower-status co-ethnics as peers.  Sometimes supervision 
must even be taken from those who would have only been able to enter 
the servants’ entry in their former apartment buildings in Brazil.  This 
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can lead to interpersonal tensions, blow-ups, and ugly name calling in 
the midst of offices, and that can end up in spats on social media for 
even more people to see.  
Some respondents gave in examples of these kinds of encounters.  
In one case, a real estate office manager related:  
My color means a lot to the world, and the way I get treated, or 
whether they want to even listen to me or not. It’s especially clear 
in the Brazilian community, whenever some arrogant Brazilians 
just ignore me like I was invisible, and this happens a lot.  They 
always make an assumption that I don’t know anything.   
This respondent also related that when she lived in Brazil, 
 I never saw the racism that was in Brazil when I grew up there. 
Everyone was treated the same, so I never questioned it. It’s 
normalized, and no one questions it.  
It was in coming to the U.S., with its more open climate of critical 
discussion about race, that she came to understand this better. 
 In a Brazilian restaurant, another respondent related, the 
owner attacked him one day over a mistake he had made in reporting an 
order, and yelled at him, “I’m completely disgusted that I even have to 
deal with someone so low-class, ghetto, and trashy like you.  I can’t even 
stand to look at you!!”    In yet another case, it was reported that in an 
ESOL class at St. Anthony’s church, a low-literate working class man 
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offended a middle class woman by putting his hand on her shoulder and 
taking an interest in speaking to her, and she complained to the teacher 
saying she was “disgusted” being in the same class with the man, did not 
want to know him, and demanded he be expelled or she would leave the 
program. 
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Figure 14: New Class and Racial Encounters in the Immigrant Setting 
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Evaluations of class often infuse these status rejections that people 
demonstrate in their thinking and behavior. For example, a middle class 
Brazilian immigrant and a Permanent Resident had been a business 
owner but is now working as a nanny for a wealthy American family. She 
explained her sometimes difficult efforts to maintain familiar class 
boundaries:    
My ex-husband that I met and married here is a good 
example of the kind of person I always avoided in Brazil, and sure 
enough it did not work out because he cheated on me, and we got 
divorced.  “Those people” are an embarrassment for some of us 
that have etiquette that know how to behave in certain places.  
When you are in a fine restaurant or somewhere else where 
everyone is talking softly, and you hear someone really loud and 
disruptive, you can be sure it’s going to be some of those 
Brazilians. I just try not to mix with any of them. In Brazil I had 
never even talked to people like this man that I married here. I 
cannot believe I married him and wasted my youth! 
 
Learning to see Race as a Process of Adaptation:  The Cases of 
Vinicius and Amanda 
 In the U.S., talking about race is hard to avoid, even if immigrants 
are used to not doing it in their home country. As we have seen, 
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immigrants bring racist ideas, sensibilities, and ideologies with them to 
the United States. They then attempt to bring them into play in the way 
they conduct organizational (including workplace) and community 
activities, and in the way they interpret their own experiences as 
immigrants. Of course, there are different views on all these, often 
depending on a person’s color and class. White Brazilians, in particular, 
are more likely to assert that the concern with race is a peculiarly 
American preoccupation that does not really apply to Brazil.   
Oh, that’s an American thing to be thinking and talking about race 
all the time! We don’t do that in Brazil.   
They tend to understand that U.S. people of color are more 
targeted, profiled as potential criminals, stopped while walking or driving, 
and generally have more problems. They see this discrimination, however, 
as mainly directed at U.S.-based blacks and Latinos, who they see as 
less educated, more likely actually to be criminal, poor, and sometimes 
dirty.  Both the lighter and the darker Brazilians also admit this kind of 
discrimination happens to darker Brazilians, but only because they are 
so often mistaken as Latinos, or even as blacks. Very few white, middle-
class Brazilians had a critical perspective on racism in Brazil, however, 
or were even willing to recognize or talk about it openly.     
Two cases from among my respondents are instructive. One 
concerns Vinicius, who despite discrimination, still has trouble 
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recognizing his racialization in his community, especially by the school 
personnel where his American born son attends first grade.  Amanda’s 
case profiles a Brazilian immigrant who is of African descent and how 
her experiences with discrimination in Boston have made racism more 
evident to her, not only in the immigrant community but through 
retrospective re-examination of her experiences as a younger person at 
home in Minas Gerais.  
 Vinicius lives in a mostly white American suburb of Boston that 
has recently experienced an influx of immigrants from Brazil and other 
Latin countries. He has a college degree in Mathematics, and his mother 
is a university dean and his father a successful businessman in his 
home state of Goias. Through family links, he is also an Italian citizen, 
and entered the U.S. as an Italian on a visa waiver, but overstayed his 
visa. Now, 11 years later he has been undocumented for over 10 years, 
runs his own successful printing business, and is married to a 1.5 
generation Brazilian who recently gained protection under the U.S. 
program for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).  They have a 
six-year old American born, U.S.-citizen child, Marcony. Vinicius tells of 
his difficulties as a school parent in his town:   
Our families are well educated at home in Brazil, and of 
course we care a lot about our son’s education.  We go to every 
parent conference they have at Marcony’s school. It’s very 
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frustrating, though, because they are very arrogant and always 
treat me like I am stupid. I end up feeling humiliated by them 
almost every time! It must be because I’m an immigrant and I have 
an accent!  
Once traffic was bad and I was 10 minutes late for a 
meeting with the principal, and when I walked into the room full of 
parents, he called out to me in an unfriendly, loud voice that I had 
to be more responsible about being on time. It really embarrassed 
me! And incredibly, right after that, I saw many [white] American 
parents who came late, but he didn’t say anything to them like 
that, and just welcomed them!  
While Vinicius understands the history of racism in America, and is 
insulted and annoyed at the way he is treated, he still does not connect 
these experiences with any kind of racialization, even though he is mixed 
race and looks Latino, and regularly has strangers in his town who do 
not know him speak to him in Spanish. 
Even darker Brazilians who see themselves as Black in the U.S. 
context are conditioned by their previous experience in Brazil not to see 
experiences of U.S. discrimination as due to their color, or “race,” and to 
be surprised when it becomes obvious. This can be seen in the case of 
Amanda, who is Afro-Brazilian. When growing up in Brazil where she 
was a racial minority, Amanda said she was never aware that she was 
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the object of prejudice and discrimination on that account. While a child 
she heard many jokes that targeted and ridiculed black people, but she 
never really understood them at the time. As she explained:  
Once when I was in high school, right before graduation, 
another student told a joke one day:   ‘Do you know what the only 
time is when a Black is considered somebody?  It’s when someone 
wants to use the toilet, and she says, ’Wait, there’s somebody in 
here!’  
In high school she always perceived that her white classmates were 
treated as special by the teacher and got better grades than she did even 
when they did worse work. Though a very good student, she was not 
encouraged to think about any further education at the college level.  
Eventually, with help from her brother living in the United States, she 
completed a training program to become an airline flight attendant, but 
could never get a placement in a job and eventually gave up.  She never 
attributed any of these things to racial discrimination, and said later that 
it was because she was never educated in any way about race or how 
discrimination worked. She came to the United States with her husband 
unauthorized over the Mexican border, joined her brother and his family 
in Somerville, and began work as a domestic worker. She cared for a 
disabled elderly man, who treated her as if she were ignorant, and 
sexually harassed her.  
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She eventually moved into an office job for a Brazilian insurance 
agency, and explained:   
I was happy as the Office Manager, but I began to notice 
that no one ever gave me much credit for any of the good work I 
was doing. Once a happy customer even wrote the boss a letter to 
thank us for all the help we gave their family after a fire destroyed 
their home, but the only person she mentioned was Heloisa – she 
has her desk right next to mine and is blonde and white – even 
though I did all the work for that family, not her! 
Amanda has a dark skinned daughter in preschool. When she 
finds that Gisele is treated with especially harsh discipline compared to 
other children, she spoke with her teachers about it several times.  One 
day Gisele came home and asked her, “Mommy, what’s a nigger?”  
Amanda found out that she was called that by another child, and the 
next day she went to speak to the teacher about it and asked why they 
allowed this to happen.  “The teacher told me, ‘Oh, I didn’t hear anything 
like that!’   Another day, when she was walking home with her daughter 
in the stroller, a group of white teenagers drove by and while laughing 
threw a bucket of cold water on them.  Amanda told me,  
After being in the United States all this time [seven years], and 
seeing how the racism works here against people like me, I’ve 
begun to think differently about what was going on when I lived in 
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Minas [Gerais in Brazil].  I remember my dad always used to tell 
me not to date white boys, because they wouldn’t treat me right! 
As Amanda’s case illustrates, initially darker Brazilians do not 
understand that the U.S. discrimination they experience can be racial. 
Not having race in mind in explaining their chances in life, they are more 
likely to attribute any victimization in Brazil to their low class standing 
and in the U.S. to their being an immigrant.   
Based on my own observations, this is also the kind of 
discrimination and visibility that elite, whiter Brazilians seek to avoid, as 
they try to blend in with mainstream, middle-class white neighborhoods 
and workplaces. If racially mixed or black, however, the longer these 
immigrants reside here, their vision of race usually changes as they start 
to understand the social structure and the influence of color, race and 
ethnicity on one’s opportunity for upward mobility. People then start to 
connect things that happen to them to what they look like, an 
understanding that Vinicius has not yet reached.  
Sometimes making this connection produces great pain and 
suffering for the victims. The respondent José related his story through 
distraught sobbing that overtook him while remembering it. He had been 
a lower-middle class technician before migration, and a technical school 
graduate, but was now doing housecleaning in Boston. One day he tried 
to enter the elevator of an apartment building where he had been 
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working, and an elderly woman in the elevator put out her hand in an 
aggressive way to block him, saying, “Oh, No! You’re not going to be in 
the same elevator as me!” This remark was accompanied by loud 
laughter by other people in the elevator, all of whom seemed to 
understand her reticence. “She looked at me like I was dirty and 
disgusting. I can’t ever forget the look of her treating me like I was 
diseased and dirty!” 
There are also differences in residential patterns. Overall the 
community manifests the broad pattern of “Heterolocalism” (Zelinsky and 
Lee 1998) that is widely reported for many of the groupings within the 
post-1965 New Immigration. Brazilians avoid living in enclaves and are 
quite dispersed, mostly living mixed in with other ethnic groups. In 
Massachusetts, in fact, there are 356 towns and cities, and the Cobweb 
Project’s study of records from Boston’s Brazilian Consulate (Siqueira 
2005), indicate that Brazilians live in 250 (70%) of these. My survey 
asked questions specifically about the location and the social 
composition of the towns and neighborhoods where respondents lived. 
Elite Brazilians – especially if they are white -- tend to live in more 
upper middle class communities, and do their best to blend in socially. 
They are the immigrants more likely to be documented, of course, well 
educated – often with Brazilian degrees -- and working as professionals. 
Among the more elite respondents were an attorney, a researcher, a U.S. 
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government employee, and a person trained as a physician in Brazil but 
doing health education here. Their already knowing English from their 
educations in Brazil facilitated their integration into American 
communities and social networks. Theirs, of course, are also 
communities where there are few if any Brazilian ethnic businesses.  
Elite Brazilians also avoid contact with other classes within the 
community, as they do not primarily identify as ethnics. They seldom 
patronize Brazilian groceries, restaurants, or cafes, or attend community 
wide festivals or events. They do not involve their children in such 
activities either. They also have different tastes with regard to the mass 
ethnic media that other Brazilians are likely to enjoy, such as following 
the Brazilian television soap operas on television that are themes for wide 
discussion within the community. All in all, they are more likely to be 
integrated into middle class American circles and taste cultures. 
Being mostly professionals, as well, they form associations to 
validate their status for one another and within the wider community. In 
Boston, such organizations include the Brazilian Professionals 
Association, whose purpose is stated as: “A networking group for 
Brazilian Professionals in Massachusetts, to help expand our reach, as 
well as to develop growth within our community. We want to bring 
together the top Brazilian Professionals in the state, in order to advance 
our careers even further.” Other such groups include the U.S.-Brazil 
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Business Chamber, and the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce. 
Brazilians tend not to cluster near one another in their 
neighborhoods of residence. Of the almost two dozen respondents (n=23) 
who characterized their neighborhoods ethnically, over a third (n=8, or 
35%) noted they lived in mostly “American” neighborhoods, 13 (57%) said 
they lived in mixed neighborhoods mostly with other immigrants. Only 
two (or 8%) noted they lived in a Brazilian neighborhood. More working 
class Brazilians tend to live in working class neighborhoods that are 
either ethnically mixed immigrant neighborhoods, or mixed American 
and immigrant neighborhoods.   
A good example is Boston’s most Brazilian neighborhood, Allston-
Brighton, locale for clusters of Brazilian owned businesses, non-profit 
organizations, and “third places,” such as bakeries, restaurants, and 
cafes. The largest Brazilian congregation within the Archdiocese of 
Boston is also located in the neighborhood, at St. Anthony’s Roman 
Catholic church.  In Allston-Brighton, however, Brazilians make up less 
than 21% the foreign-born community (Boston Redevelopment Authority 
2009, 2011), and are smaller in numbers than the Chinese, Korean or 
Russian immigrants also populate the neighborhood, along with students 
from several nearby universities.  Brazilians are well integrated into the 
general working-class, multi-ethnic, family neighborhoods found here. 
Another important cluster of Brazilians in Boston can be found in the 
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East Boston area, an historically immigrant receiving neighborhood that 
is more than 40% Latino, mostly Salvadoran, Mexican, Peruvian, and 
Colombian, where the same conditions obtain. In East Boston, only 3.5% 
of the households speak Portuguese, though many, many more speak 
Spanish. 
 
Brazilian Immigrants: a Community Invisible and in Hiding 
 In New England, many are puzzled over how “invisible” the 
Brazilian community is, especially given that it is so large. In 
Massachusetts, for example, they constitute the largest and fastest 
growing of all foreign-born ethnic groups. Regardless of their collective 
numbers, Brazilian immigrants in different ways often seek to keep a low 
profile culturally wherever they are, and for different reasons depending 
on their class, race, and immigration status. Often this invisibility is 
aided by their social ascription by Americans to other ethnic categories, 
and their own low likelihood to frequent and patronize the same public 
settings (Margolis 1994). In Massachusetts in particular, in places where 
enclaves have emerged, even ones that are only commercial in nature 
rather than residential, Brazilians’ presence has come under severe 
public criticism and harassment by local government, police, and media 
(Martes 2000).  For a community with such a larger number of 
undocumented, this kind of attention is unwanted. 
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Middle class and white elite segments of the community, as noted 
earlier, seldom mix with the more working-class members of the 
community, and do not patronize ethnic bars, restaurants, and cafés. If 
they eat out, they dine at more elegant Brazilian restaurants whose 
clienteles are mostly made up of Americans and tourists.  They also live 
in neighborhoods that are mostly American, and often intermarry with 
Americans. They seldom engage with popular Brazilian culture, such as 
subscribing to the primary Brazilian cable channel, O Globo, or following 
televised telenovelas there. They also do not attend, and do not involve 
their children, in many ethnic community events. Elites, in short, try to 
stay invisible so as not to attract attention to themselves as ethnics, or 
even as immigrants, and wish to blend in. As one suburban Brazilian 
professional and mother explained: 
My kids are involved in a lot of activities with the American kids 
that live in our [suburban] cul de sac.  Their nanny also takes them 
to hockey, music lessons, and soccer. We don’t do a lot with the 
Brazilians here. When we miss Brazil, we just visit. 
Despite firmly identifying privately as “Brazilian” above all, the 
mostly undocumented working class, in their own way, are not eager to 
be visible either.  They do not have any escape in terms of visiting Brazil, 
however, since once leaving the country, it is almost impossible to return 
except by coming over the border from Mexico, an experience most have 
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no desire to repeat. Trying to keep a low profile as Brazilians in the 
Boston area, many even try to avoid living among concentrations of other 
Brazilians, so as not to attract the attention of immigration authorities.  
Often, though, economic and ethnic segregation does lead them into 
residing in mixed immigrant neighborhoods, frequently amongst Latinos, 
where the Brazilian presence also is more overshadowed and muted. 
Added, then, to the wider set of internal differences that observers 
have long noted divide and reduce cooperation within Brazilian 
immigrant communities in the United States – racially, and in terms of 
class, culture, and religion (Margolis 1993) – the multiple invisibilities 
just discussed clearly combine to weaken community solidarity.  Leaders 
of Portuguese speaking communities in the Boston area, such as 
Massachusetts Alliance of Portuguese Speakers Executive Director Paulo 
Pinto, have repeatedly asked why Brazilians and other Portuguese 
speakers do not work together collectively to exert more political clout, as 
Spanish speakers do under their own Latino pan-ethnicity.    
The disparate pressures on the different segments of the 
community give them incentives, as we have seen, to maintain a low 
public profile. In relation to civic engagement, moreover, the high 
number of the undocumented also hampers full-scale political 
participation and unity within the community, and its gaining of any real 
political power. There are few countervailing structures of collaboration, 
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as well, that could offer a foundation for building political unity at a more 
grassroots level.  This situation has led many of the elite members of the 
community to see promise in allying with Latinos to gain political 
influence, only submerging their own identities as Brazilians even more. 
 Associational involvement of Brazilians within their own community 
does not occur at a high level, except for church participation. In the 
Boston area alone, the community is divided into approximately 90 
Evangelical Protestant churches (according to the Brazilian pastor who is 
the head of the pastors’ association for these churches), and 16 Catholic 
parishes in the Brazilian Apostolate of the Archdiocese of Boston that 
have strong Brazilian ministries. Church membership thus divides the 
Brazilian community in greater Boston into over 100 congregations with 
tightly knit communities built around them. While church involvements 
are the major type of civic or community participation for almost two-
thirds of the respondents, ironically this involvement works to fragment 
the community. 
 The second most common civic engagement listed by respondents 
was participation in social media networking groups, especially Orkut, 
operated by Google, now defunct but for many years the major social 
networking internet site that linked U.S.-based Brazilians with their 
families and friends at home in Brazil. Today Orkut’s former users have 
migrated en masse to Facebook. More than two out of five respondents 
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indicated social networking as their primary, or an otherwise important, 
community engagement. Many members of the community, in fact, today 
use Facebook and other social media for organizing, community-building, 
and event-planning and -promotion. A much smaller number of 
respondents – only one of four -- connect with community-based non-
profit membership organizations serving the Brazilian community. There 
are only a handful of such organizations, but their activities are widely 
publicized in the ethnic media and their reach in terms of service-
delivery and constituencies is usually metropolitan-wide.   
 
Table 1:  Civic Involvements of Boston-area Brazilian Immigrants 
 
Civic Involvements of Brazilian Community Members 
Civic Involvement Number % People % of Activities 
Church 17 61% 41% 
Social Media 12  29% 
Community Action 
Groups 
7 25% 17% 
 
 Some community members volunteer to assist these organizations 
in support of others in the immigrant community. These organizations, 
moreover, typically enlist community members in broader forms of civic 
engagement involving interactions with the U.S. political system, through 
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training and enlisting community members in lobbying, legislative 
campaigns, and electoral politics.  Such involvements can give 
immigrants a vision of the circumstances of, and a sense of unity with, 
the broader Brazilian immigrant community in the region. 
 
Race and Class in Portugal, a Brief Comparison 
 Like in Boston and the United States, Lisbon and Portugal 
experienced the same two waves of Brazilians, the first a more middle 
class professional group in the 1980s escaping hyper-inflation, and later 
in the 1990s and 2000s, a more rural, racially darker, less educated 
working class migration. Most of those coming more recently to Lisbon 
have been encouraged by the relative openness of Lisbon to them, as 
opposed to the United States, where many tried but could not obtain 
visas.  Salaries for the manual and service jobs they take in Portugal, in 
fact, are less desirable and only about one third of the usual incomes 
immigrants earn in Boston.   
Many Brazilians consider Portugal the “armpit of Europe,” as one 
respondent put it, and often use the country as a portal to move within 
Schengen space to other European countries where salaries are vastly 
higher.  In recent decades, in fact, salaries in low-wage Portugal have 
been about one-third of the European Union average (Sieber 2001).   
Brazilians in the Lisbon area typically work in hospitality (food service, 
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hotels), cleaning and janitorial work, and farm labor in Lisbon’s peri-
urban fringe. Approximately $1000 U.S. a month is a typical wage for 
these workers. Middle class professional Brazilians who have been in 
Lisbon now for more than a generation are well integrated into the 
Portuguese middle class as dentists, administrators, managers, and 
business owners. 
While Brazilians are fairly uniform in describing Portugal as a 
place where their lives improve in some fundamental economic ways 
compared to Brazil, they experience a great deal of discrimination, and 
this is shocking to them. The shock comes from the immigrants having 
the misconception that since they speak the language and know much of 
the culture, their adaptation should afford a smooth transition.  
Most Brazilians, who self-identify in my sample as more racially 
mixed and less white than my U.S. sample, particularly report 
discriminatory attitudes from the Portuguese, but elites as well share 
these perceptions.  Among the typical comments of respondents were 
statements such as these: 
The Portuguese discriminate so much 
I think there’s more prejudice here than in Brazil. 
In Portugal racism is much worse. 
In Portugal it’s much worse; they are racists. 
Even the earlier 1970s and 1980s wave of middle class, mostly 
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professional Brazilians have their issues with discrimination, but these 
intensified in the 1990s and 2000s with the second major wave of 
Brazilians of lower economic status. For this reason, the earlier more 
established, higher status stratum are resentful of the impact that the 
later immigrant wave has had on Portuguese perceptions of Brazilians as 
whole as a lower-class, somewhat uncultured group, with whom earlier 
elites are increasingly lumped as co-ethnics.   
The comments of Jorge, a computer professional, are typical: 
How Brazilians are received here depends. It’s complicated 
because there are two types of Brazilians – some are respected, 
but others of poor quality.  When I arrived here I saw that it wasn’t 
a good thing to be involved with Brazilians.  When I was looking 
for work, I had a lot of difficulty because I was Brazilian and from 
Rio, and I only found a job in the end because I knew somebody 
here. 
More recently arrived Brazilians also feel the sting of the condescension 
from earlier arrived elites, and the two groups rarely mingle or reside in 
common areas. 
I usually think the discrimination from other Brazilians is worse 
than from the Portuguese.   
The reputation of the Portuguese as “rude,” “prejudiced,” or “racist” 
is even more sullied, however, by what Brazilians observe in Portuguese 
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conduct toward generally darker African immigrants. 
It isn’t completely horrible for us, but it’s much worse for the 
Africans. I think that people are very discriminated against here, 
mainly the Africans and Brazilians, because they are very racist 
here. The Africans are discriminated more because of their color. 
 Similar to how Brazilian immigrants understand their obstacles to 
acceptance in the United States, Lisbon Brazilians usually see 
discrimination toward them as arising from prejudice against their 
culture, rather than their color. It’s commonly asserted that, for example, 
that: 
We are discriminated against on account of our culture. 
The Brazilian culture is, moreover, quite stereotyped in a form of 
what cultural studies scholars have referred as “tropicalization,” a new 
kind of “orientalism” toward Latin Americans, that strongly exoticizes, 
sexualizes, and objectifies the culture as an alien and somewhat inferior 
Other.  In fact, Portuguese notions about Brazilian culture do emphasize 
the sexual, ludic, joyful, celebratory side of Brazilian life.   
How do they think of us? Samba!! They think that just because I’m 
Brazilian. I know how to dance, do Brazilian Carnival, and have 
lots of parties! They think about us Brazilians only in terms of 
prostitution, samba and soccer! 
Occasionally the lack of control attributed to the culture is linked to the 
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supposed high level of violence it displays, in Brazil especially, but also 
in Portugal, where Brazilian public celebrations attract frequent 
complaints and provoke police interventions. 
Everything that you see on television about Brazil makes them 
think that’s the way it really is there. The Portuguese have a 
horrible view of Brazil because whenever they go to anything 
involving Brazilians there’s violence.    
Women bear a special burden, as in most tropicalizing visions of 
Latin American cultures. Brazilian women in Portugal are seen as 
oversexed, provocative, and seductive, and are typically stereotyped as 
prostitutes, or at least “easy” sexually. This has much to do, many 
Brazilians explain, with a strong history of Portuguese male sex tourism 
to Brazil that has fed these images of women into Portuguese popular 
culture. In Lisbon and other Portuguese cities, Brazilian women are also 
frequently accused of “stealing” Portuguese women’s husbands, many of 
whom are perceived to leave their wives for their Brazilian mistresses. In 
2008, in fact, a famous large demonstration took place in Braga in 
northern Portugal of Portuguese wives against the Brazilian women living 
in that town for stealing their husbands. 
Images of Brazil as a sensual tourist destination, with a 
particularly deep history of Portuguese sex tourism, work to create these 
stereotypes of the sexualized Brazilian female immigrants when they 
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arrive in Lisbon. Few are actually sex workers, but most are assumed to 
be.  Moreover they are prominent in the occupational niche, as they have 
been recently in New York City, in work as “exotic dancers” in clubs. 
 The result is that many Brazilian women in Portugal do their 
best to conceal their nationality so as to avoid unpleasant encounters 
with Portuguese men, even in professional situations. One of my 
Brazilian colleagues in Lisbon, a doctoral student in Geography at the 
University of Lisbon, for example, related a story common to more elite 
women who are disrespected once men discover they are Brazilian. She 
was working in an office that received package deliveries, and it 
happened several times that deliverymen, in learning she was Brazilian, 
would proposition her and otherwise behave inappropriately.  Her usual 
defense against such unpleasant encounters was to avoid speaking, so 
as not to give away her accent. Otherwise, flirting or more invasive 
approaches by men often take place. 
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Photo 10:  Typical tourism billboard advertisement for Brazil travel on a 
Lisbon Street: “Brazil is calling for you. Celebrate your life here!” 
 
 
 
Speaking of the culture overall, the supposed good, positive virtues 
of Brazilians are similar to what Americans cite in Boston when speaking 
of Brazilians – that they are friendly, exceptionally good in service jobs 
that involve interacting with and taking care of people, that they are 
cheerful in doing their jobs and in their manner of living, and happy 
doing their jobs regardless of the working conditions or compensation 
involved.  They also already speak the language! Many Portuguese 
themselves point out, as did a colleague at a Lisbon university: 
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They are really nice, and friendly. They have excellent 
interpersonal skills, and are always cheerful.  They are much 
better service personnel than the Portuguese!  I’d rather deal with 
them any day! 
Some respondents experienced the resulting attitudes toward them, 
on the basis of such attitudes toward their culture, as patronizing at best 
and arrogant at worst. Brazilians are keenly aware of the narrow 
stereotypes that are maintained by the Portuguese about them, do not 
take them as complimentary, and often joke about them among 
themselves, as they did with me during survey interviews.     
Whether we want to or not, we suffer a lot of discrimination here, 
because they look at us like people who don’t have anything, and 
depending on the situation, often treat us arrogantly. 
As immigrants prolong their stays in the United States, they learn 
from hearing and participating in the wider cultural dialogue about the 
U.S. preoccupation with race relations in the media and in public life. 
This new knowledge gives Boston’s Brazilians more of a basis over time 
for understanding their own racialization in a manner they never did 
while in Brazil, where dialogue on such issues is non-existent. Portugal 
is more like Brazil in this respect, in maintaining an official “color-blind” 
approach to racial difference, and denying it is relevant to social life. In 
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Portugal, racial statistics for the population are still not collected by the 
governmental census, and there are no general ethnic counts either.   
The only ethnic diversity tracked by the authorities is the numbers 
of foreign-born immigrants who are present and their countries of origin.  
In the second generation, once the young are eligible for Portuguese 
citizenship at age six (if one parent is Portuguese) or eighteen (if both 
parents are Brazilian), they are counted only as Portuguese, and 
expected to assimilate culturally. No ethno-racial groups are thus 
recognized within the body of the Portuguese citizenry, and the average 
person as well as the government insists that making these kinds of 
distinctions is divisive and shows discriminatory intent.  Even “ethnic 
businesses,” business zones, or residential enclaves do not exist. 
Proprietors do not by custom display ethnic symbols on their commercial 
establishments.  It is only establishments serving tourists who place 
images of foreign flags, including the Brazilian one, on their shops to 
welcome travelers.   
Maintaining this ethnic-blind attitude is at times challenging for 
the Portuguese, especially as second-generation youth develop their own, 
often oppositional subcultures within Portuguese society. Older 
Portuguese people complain the youth are not like their parents, that is, 
they are surprisingly disrespectful and not always seek to keep a low 
profile publicly. 
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The irony is that in Lisbon, Brazilians – though their presence is 
mostly concealed publicly – are more strongly noticed and stereotyped by 
Portuguese than they are in Boston, where their presence is more boldly 
marked by ethnic symbols in businesses and homes. 
 
Conclusions 
Importing many class and racial conceptions, practices, and 
inequalities from Brazil, most immigrants are locked into attempts to 
replicate these older patterns in the United States, but these patterns are 
not easily transferrable to the immigrant setting, where there are new 
forms of class mobility, upward and downward, and new experiences of 
racialization and passing that affect members of the community 
differently. Brazilians appear, like Latinos, to be bifurcating into a more 
affluent whiter segment assimilating into American communities, and 
another segment racialized on grounds of both color and culture who are 
in danger of being increasingly criminalized. 
The U.S. context of the consumer society, and differing conceptions 
of race, such as the One Drop Rule, reshape race and class relations 
inside the community.  In the common ground of the immigrant 
community, in a strange country, new types of leveling and social 
encounters also occur and require renegotiating these older patterns.  
Community divisions persist, however, and this fragmentation slows 
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ethnic group formation, the emergence of leadership, and the 
development of political unity.   
Divisions in the community and slowness in the development of 
political leadership hamper Brazilians’ ability to influence policy 
formation, the creation of needed new laws and programs, and even 
Brazilians’ ability to ally with wider immigrant movements working for 
change, which are strongly Latino-led in the contemporary New England 
region as well as nationally.  It is to the policy implications of the 
preceding analysis that we will now turn in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five – Conclusion 
 
 
Immigration Policy: Race, Class, Family, and Community  
 
Photo 11: Protest sign at a vigil in front of ICE Detention Center, Boston 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been my goal in doing this study to contribute to our 
understanding of Brazilian migration, and to the literature on 
transnationalism from below, or what has been called the “low” or “broad” 
variety. That form of transnationalism characterizes the migrant 
experience of the vast majority of immigrants who leave Brazil for the 
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United States, as well as for Portugal.  In the U.S., most Brazilians of 
modest or lower-level economic standing have been effectively shut out of 
the more dramatic, visible forms of transnationalism that have 
characteristically been seen as proto-typical of the phenomenon.  Even 
elite Brazilians themselves, whose frequent travel between the U.S. and 
Brazil is seldom slowed due to immigration status or money concerns, 
believe they are the only true exemplars of transnational exchange. 
However, the lower-income immigrants, often with insecure 
immigration status, are fully enmeshed in transnational relations. They 
are in touch with their families left behind in Brazil, communicating 
regularly, maintaining transnational families including parenting at a 
distance, sending home remittances for kin’s support, and also building 
their own resources to soften their eventual return, if and when that 
happens.  Moreover, they are creating in their private lives some 
genuinely hybrid social and cultural forms, experimenting with new 
mixes of Brazilian and American ways, in food, religion, social values, 
forms of family collaboration, gender roles, and child-rearing practices.   
They are creative and courageous in their persistence in creating 
what I termed above “everyday transnationalism” as a part of their daily 
life practices, particularly in the face of legal insecurity around 
immigration status, and a hostile, anti-immigrant climate in much of the 
country, unfortunately including Massachusetts.  Their children, now in 
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place as the rising second generation, will probably carry this 
hybridization even further as they age and eventually lead Brazilians 
toward a more conventional ethnic group identity formation.  
It is a mischaracterization to say that their transnationalism only 
arises because it is “reactive,” a response to discrimination, exploitation, 
and racialization, even if these all do occur to some degree.  “Reactive 
transnationalism” is understood to result from incomplete integration 
and from social and economic exclusions of these kinds, prompting 
retention of more ties with home, making more visits if they are possible, 
and perpetuating a kind of “compensatory” identification with the 
sending society (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo 2002).  This construction, 
if explanation stops here, under-assesses the deep economic integration 
that these immigrants already display in sustaining the low-wage service 
economy.  As Kibria, Bowman and O’Leary have persuasively suggested, 
the maintenance of the United States’ growing, polarized “dual labor 
market,” that is so linked with the nation’s deepening inequality, is 
dependent upon a ready and welcome supply of “good immigrant 
workers,” (2014:83-86) which includes the bulk of Brazilian immigrants. 
Schmalzbauer (2005) also underscores the importance of available, easily 
exploitable immigrant labor for sustaining the low-wage stratum of the 
“bifurcated” and “dual” economy in the contemporary United States 
(2005:22-30).   
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Like Schmalzbauer’s Hondurans, and Chavez’ Central Americans, 
the Brazilian low-wage immigrant workers in my study sample are deeply 
integrated into the social and economic life of the host society (Chavez 
1992).  Labor market integration is the most dramatic, of course, within 
the service sector of the U.S. economy where low-wage labor – often by 
undocumented workers – sustains so many industries, including 
hospitality, food service, agriculture, meatpacking, cleaning, domestic 
service, construction, and landscaping (Kochhar 2005).    
Many service jobs also bring low-wage, undocumented workers 
into supportive relationships with American families, homes, property, 
and businesses.  They are thus quite integrated, even into Americans’ 
most private lives and spaces. The exclusion from citizenship of 
undocumented workers, and the ethno-racial discrimination that is 
usually closely associated with it, also creates and sustains this 
subordinated labor force by disciplining the ranks of low-wage workers 
with the threat of deportation (DeGenova and Peutz 2010), in the end 
maximizing business profits and minimizing consumer costs for citizens 
(DeGenova 2002:439-440). 
The construction of their transnationalism as only “reactive” also 
depreciates the hope and the optimism immigrants show in their daily 
lives, particularly in mediating between the demands of their older 
Brazilian and their adopted American ways of life.  They embrace 
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American ways and are generally happy to be in the host society because 
of the opportunities for work, for good health care, for more available 
education, for their children’s economic possibilities, and for their being 
able to live in safe, relatively crime-free neighborhoods.   
Their emerging identities and their goals for their children are all 
constructed in reference to transnational space, to where they have come 
from and where they are now. They try to assemble life resources from 
both cultures and countries, as they stay economically engaged on both 
sides.  The “reactive” label also does not take into account the integration 
their U.S.-born children experience while growing up American, nor the 
ties that keep many adult migrants connected to their children left 
behind in Brazil. As Schmalzbauer notes, “It is only by employing a 
transnational division of labor that family survival is insured” (2005:49).  
Their embrace of transnationalism, therefore, is not just compensatory, 
but is a positive means of parenting their offspring. 
Their situation will remain precarious, and their ability to sustain 
families across transnational space uncertain so long as the U.S. 
remains politically paralyzed over immigration reform. It is truly their 
inability to obtain legal status that gives most Brazilian immigrants their 
single most serious barrier to a secure, economically stable life, and that 
for many constitutes an impregnable barrier to class mobility.   
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As David Griffith argues for Latinos in general, “Unequal class 
relations among immigrants derive from the unequal access to resources, 
including credit, capital, land and housing, education and business 
opportunities. Among immigrants, however, one of the most important 
resources has been legal status…[that] underlies much of the inequality” 
(Griffith 2005:104).  In investigating my fundamental research question, 
about the impact of immigration policy on the Brazilian community and 
its families, my findings certainly validate Griffith’s claim that, “the state 
and state policy have become instrumental in fostering unequal class 
relations within the…immigrant community in the United States” 
(2005:96).  
This chapter will examine some of these policy issues and their 
impact on the immigrant community. It will address in particular how 
US immigration policy reinforces existing class and racial stratification in 
Brazil in a way that shapes the relations among different status groups 
once they arrive in the United States.  
The chapter will also engage in a modest effort at anticipatory 
sociology, at an educated forecasting as to how continuing change in 
immigration policy will likely affect the functioning and fortunes of the 
Brazilian immigrant community and how they influence the structure of 
the immigrant family, immigrants’ transnational relationships, and 
ethnic group formation in the host society. In other words, based on my 
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understandings of the community, I will try to predict the quite different 
society we might see emerging in the years to come with regard to 
immigrant integration, assuming, of course, that substantial immigration 
reform takes place. Also, looking across the Atlantic, I will discuss how 
immigration policy in Portugal is both different and similar to U.S. policy, 
and how immigrants’ lives in Portugal differ as a result. Finally, I will 
consider the unique pressures on Brazilian and other immigrants in 
Portugal in an era marked by austerity and economic decline.   	
Immigration Policy Debates in the United States at Present 
 
In 2016 we are living in an era of transformations in immigration 
policy and experiencing ever more contentious political debate,  
especially about how to handle the more than 11 million immigrants 
living in the United States without documentation. Since the beginning of 
my dissertation fieldwork in 2010, changes in official immigration policy 
have impacted immigrant families in my study, and promised changes 
portend a very different future for them. 
The Obama administration’s plan to create tougher immigration 
and customs enforcement with the objective of gaining bipartisan 
Congressional support for comprehensive immigration reform backfired,  
spreading waves of anti-immigrant sentiment across the nation. Over two 
million undocumented immigrants have been deported during the past 
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five years, with 1100 being ejected from the country every day and 
34,000 in detention daily. This is a rate greater than any other President 
in U.S. history.  
The deportation machine has grown stronger and more erratic in 
its operation, spreading fear through immigrant communities and all too 
often separating families through the random deportation of kin.  The 
widely noted policy report on Shattered Families by the Applied Research 
Center (Wessler 2011) indicated that in the first six months of 2011 
alone, 46,000 mothers and fathers of US-citizen children were deported. 
Most had to leave their children behind to be rescued and cared for by 
other relatives and friends. More than 5,100 were placed in foster care 
with little prospect of being reunited with their deported parents, while 
foster care authorities were even moving to terminate the parental rights 
of the deported (Wessler 2011: 4). 
 
Immigration Status, Race, and Class as a Pervasive Concern: 
Reasons Why There are Many Undocumented Brazilians 
 
In my survey interviews and participant observations there was 
constant talk about immigration status, almost always touching on 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondents talked about  
policing activities at local subway stations; the Secure Communities 
Program; someone getting caught driving without a license being 
detained and facing deportation; or, mothers, fathers, or teenaged 
	 229 
dreamers being deported. Virtually everyone knew someone who had 
been detained and deported, often from their own family and friendship 
networks.  Even though my survey instrument had not one question that 
directly asked about respondents’ immigration status, every conversation, 
no matter what it was about, ended in a discussion about it. The few 
questions that did give an opening to discuss the topic were the 
following:  
1- Please name countries of which you and members of your family 
are citizens? About 67% of the respondents answered that they were 
citizens of Brazil; another 27% answered that they had dual citizenship, 
Brazilian and U.S.; only 2% reported to be citizens of Brazil but also to 
have an U.S. Permanent Resident Card.   
2- Do you travel and take vacations as a family? “No, of course not,” 
was the modal response, from about 70% of the respondents.  The 
undocumented cannot easily travel in this sense, because of the need to 
present “government issued photo IDs” on boarding many forms of 
transportation and the risks of driving long distances without a license. 
3- Do you have someone here that you can count on? This often led 
to a discussion of family members and their immigration statuses. 
4- As an immigrant, what have been the greatest barriers or 
difficulties you have encountered while in pursuit of your goals? Not 
having “papers,” a Massachusetts driver’s license, a social security 
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number, and not speaking English were the most often cited, in that 
order.  Many sad stories emerged about respondents’ longing to visit 
Brazil, so that they could see and spend time with their children, parents, 
and spouses. Most expressed longing and frustration over this separation, 
but many also took consolation in being proud that they were able to 
provide a better life for their families even if it meant they were sacrificing 
their own personal happiness by now being able to see them. I 
encountered several respondents who spoke about losing loved ones in 
Brazil, the hurt and sadness they had, and their falling into depression 
due to their inability to visit them at home when they were still alive, or 
even to attend their funerals.  There were many for whom the greatest 
fear while an immigrant in the United States was that something tragic 
would happen to their families during their absence. 
Their immigration status, whether they arrived with a visa or 
entered without inspection over the border, is directly connected with 
their skin color, their class, and level of education, before even leaving 
South America to go north.  Brazil is no different from many other 
countries where one’s wealth and economic opportunity is highly 
correlated with one’s skin color.  The whiter you are, the more 
opportunities you will have for social and economic mobility, and for 
accumulating social capital that can propel you toward prosperity and 
fulfillment (Marger 2000; Telles 2004). 
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Through various ways, the U.S. consulates make it much more 
difficult for the black and poor to get visas, reinforcing the racialized 
economic inequality of the country. They effectively select who will go and 
who will stay in Brazil. The three U.S. Consulates in Brazil are in Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo and Brasilia.  The visa application fees are quite 
expensive for the average Brazilian; the DS–160: Non-Immigrant Visa 
application (known as the Tourist Visa) costs US$160.00, (at an 
exchange rate of $160 [U.S. dollars] X R$3.75 [Brazilian reais] = 
R$600.00) which is equivalent to one month of salary at minimum wage 
for the working poor. In addition, most people will have to travel long 
distances, sometimes thousands of miles, to one of these main cities, and 
incur the costs for travel, hotel, and food. One respondent explained that 
he applied for a Visa three times and all three times it was denied:  
Each time the consular officials asked for something different, and 
then at the end they gave a different excuse to deny me.  The first 
time that I came, they asked me if I owned property. The second 
time, they asked if I owned a car, and the third time they asked if I 
was married with children. Every time I was told that the denial 
was based on the fact that I couldn’t demonstrate strong roots in 
Brazil, and therefore I presented a risk of overstaying my Visa and 
not returning to Brazil.  
The Visa applicants learned very quickly that they needed to get a 
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new passport every time they tried to gain approval. As many explained, 
One look at a passport with huge red denial stamp on it, and you 
will never get approved.  So very quickly, you get another clean, 
fresh one to present.     
Just to obtain a Brazilian passport may cost a person as much as 
R$1,200 (US$360.36), depending on the person’s residence in Brazil in 
relation to the three main cities where the U.S. Consulates are situated.  
There are many individuals in Brazil who provide brokerage 
services that are designed to help people deal with the Consulates. The 
quote above is based on a phone call that I made to a few such services 
in Governador Valadares, in the state of Minas Gerais. I chose that city 
and State because it is the state that sends the greatest number of 
immigrants to the United States, and to New England in particular (Lima 
and Siqueira 2011; Martes 2000, 2008). These services explained they 
would be able to help with the entire process, such as filing applications 
for a passport, booking the trip to the Consulate city, getting all the 
additional documents ready, scheduling the interview, coaching people 
for the interview, and assisting with the travel arrangements, food and 
lodging. Many people borrow money from friends and family members, 
and sometimes sell everything they own – including their houses – in 
order to raise enough money just to travel to the U.S.   
Many applying for a Visitor Visa do so with the intention of 
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overstaying it or, before their six-month visa expires, changing their 
status to a student visa in order to maintain legal standing for an 
indefinite period so long as they are in school. A tourist visa is valid for 
ten years, but it has to be renewed through an exit after six months and 
another re-entry to the United States. A student visa, so long as you stay 
in school, does not require an exit and re-entry for renewal. One 
respondent explained to me that she has been on a Student Visa for nine 
years:  
I am tired of going to school. It is so expensive, but I have no 
other choice. I don’t want to become undocumented but I just can’t 
imagine myself living in Brazil again. The system is so unfair.   
As you will see in the following table, just getting ready to visit U.S. is an 
expensive process and is simply not affordable for most Brazilians.  
Just to put it into perspective, the total cost for the poor or 
working class person to travel legally to the U.S. is around R$12,751, 
where a year’s salary at monthly minimum wage is R$9360.00 (R$720.00 
x 13 months). In other words, for lower-income workers it costs more than 
an entire year of earnings to pay for a single trip to the United States.  In 
almost all cases, those who are at the lower income levels are never 
granted this opportunity to travel north with an approved tourist visa. 
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Table 2: Costs of migration from Brazil to the United States 
Getting ready to travel to the United 
States of America in Brazilian Reais 
converted to US Dollars 
Cost in 
Reais24  
Cost in 
Dollars 
Brazilian Passport application fee 
(including cost of pictures) 
R$360.28 US$90.07 
Travel costs of the nearest Passport 
Processing Center to file the passport 
application 
R$480.00 US$120.00 
Travel back to the nearest Passport 
Processing Center to sign & pick up the 
new passport  
R$480.00 US$120.00 
Cost of Additional documents to support 
Visa application 
R$4000.00 US$1,000.00 
Non-Immigrant Visa Application Fee R$640.00 US$160.00 
Travel costs to the US embassy to apply 
for a Visa 
R$800.00 US$200.00 
Travel costs to the embassy for a Visa 
interview 
R$800.00 US$200.00 
Roundtrip airfare and hotel cost (bought 
one month in advance to travel in 
September, not including hotel cost) from 
Belo Horizonte MG Brazil to Miami 
Florida U.S. 
R$4864.00 US$1,216.00 
Consultant to coach you on what you 
need and how you get it done 
R$1200.00 US$300.00 
It is recommended that you carry with 
you a minimum US$1,000 in cash during 
passage through U.S. Customs 
R$4000.00 US$1,000.00 
Total cost of one person’s travel 
arrangement to the U.S.  
R$17624.28 US$4,400.23 
 
Lower income people who wish to emigrate must go to Portugal, 
where entry does not require a visa, or travel over the Mexican border to 
                                       
24 The Brazilian currency was worth .25 of the US dollar on the day that I created the 
table above. 
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the U.S. uninspected, a trip that together with coyote fees during my 
fieldwork cost $15,000 US per person. Now, in 2016, the cost has risen 
to $20,000.   In large cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa 
Catarina, and Belo Horizonte, average earnings are two to three 
minimum wage salaries per month. Even being paid at this rate leaves it 
difficult if not impossible to come to the United States, either legally or 
uninspected.   
Brazil’s formal unemployment rate is 7.2% as of July 2015. 
However, according to ILO, 42.2% of all non-agricultural employment 
falls within the informal sector (ILO 2012: 4). This means that there is a 
very high percentage of underemployment and hidden and disguised25 
unemployment, leaving real unemployment much higher, perhaps more 
than 20%. As Domingues and Lemos say, Brazil has a “high level of 
disguised unemployment in most of the areas in the country; excess 
supply of labor has been a distinct feature of the Brazilian economy” 
(2004: 7).  With widespread low incomes and underemployment, the 
majority of the population simply do not have the resources available to 
spend one third to a full year’s income on arranging a trip to the U.S., 
unless they sell everything they own, which some do. 
                                       
25 Definition of 'Disguised Unemployment': “Disguised unemployment exists where part 
of the labor force is either left without work or is working in a redundant manner where 
worker productivity is essentially zero. An economy demonstrates disguised 
unemployment where productivity is low and where too many workers are filling too few 
jobs. 
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After spending all their savings and borrowing money to secure a 
Visa and failing, many people are pushed further into an even more 
desperate economic situation and feel forced into seeking unauthorized 
border crossing into the U.S. from Mexico. Four respondents told me that 
at that point, after trying so many times for a visa and spending money 
they didn’t have or could borrow, they were getting desperate.  
I didn’t know how I was going to pay the money I had 
already borrowed. I knew that if I made it here (the U.S.) I would 
have no problem paying my friends back.  
My husband and I left my son with my mother, and we came 
here through Mexico. It took us four weeks and US$13,000 each, 
but we could pay after we got here.   
One respondent explained to me that when she stood in line waiting to 
get in for her interview at the Consulate, she saw so many people leaving 
in tears.   
Now that I think back, I would have lost everything if they had 
denied me a Visa. I was able to get one in my first try, thank God.  
She went on to tell me that she had two children, a boy and a girl. 
Because of an abusive marriage, she had to leave her baby girl with her 
mother almost from birth. So at that point she felt it was possible to 
leave her son with her mother as well and move to the U.S. to be able to 
provide for them.  
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The deeply class biased immigration system helps, in turn, to 
shape and reinforce the class system among immigrants residing in the 
U.S. The flow chart below shows how class, race, and social network all 
work together to determine migrants’ immigration status once they arrive 
in the United States. If they are white, middle or upper class and have a 
higher degree such as MD, PhD, or MBA, they have social capital within 
their social network that facilitates a positive Visa approval outcome. 
Even if they decide to stay in the U.S., they tend to have resources to 
petition for change of their non-Immigrant Tourist B2 Visa to a student 
J1or F Visa.  As long as they are in school, even in an English language 
school with a class schedule of only 18-20 hours per week, they are able 
to keep their student immigration status, obtain a driver’s license to 
drive legally, and travel back and forth to Brazil.   
By looking at one’s level of education and occupation before 
migrating, it seems that the Brazilians with less education, who were 
from a working or lower class stratum and lacking in social capital, were 
more likely to be denied a B2 Visa. In order to obtain a Visa, lower or 
working class individuals have to create a false profile that makes them 
appear wealthy, or they have to pay thousands of dollars to get a false 
passport and documents under someone else’s name. As for creating the 
illusion of wealth, this is what one respondent shared with me:   
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I knew that I would be denied a Visa if I didn’t own property 
and a nice house, or demonstrate that I had a good job. A family 
member who had money helped me by passing all his assets to 
my name to produce documents that we knew the immigration 
officer would ask for.   
Some of my respondents said that after hearing about all the denial 
stories of their friends and family members, they did not want to waste 
money trying to obtain a visa. They would rather spend their energy and 
resources to enter uninspected through crossing the border from Mexico 
or Canada into the U.S..   
Once in the U.S., of course, immigration status is another great 
divider in the Brazilian community, parallel to older race and class lines 
in their home country. Just as with race and class at home, in New 
England they continue a similar social hierarchy and control of the job 
market, with implications for variations in economic opportunities, and 
reinforcing pre-existing feelings of social superiority and inferiority 
among class segments. The community is divided by the closely 
interconnected dimensions of class, race, and immigration status. With 
the exception of a few, the majority of respondents (about 70%) who were 
middle to upper class, highly educated, and white were documented, 
compared to the majority (about 70%) of the less well educated coming 
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from the Brazilian working or lower classes who instead were 
undocumented. 
Figure 15:  Pathways to Migration 
  
 
 
 
The lack of immigration status in the community works as a factor 
in the social and economic marginalization of many immigrants, 
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subjecting them to labor exploitation and housing discrimination. Other 
barriers arise from their need to maintain a low social profile and not 
socialize with Americans, unless they know them very well, and to limit 
their participation in cultural and social activities and institutions 
promoted by the host society. As mentioned earlier, the undocumented 
typically confined themselves to small social circles, mostly other 
immigrants whom they can trust. Associational involvement, if any 
occurs, is usually limited to participation in churches. 
 
 
U.S. Immigration History: a Long, Continuing History of Exclusion 
of Less Favored Ethnic and Racial Minorities   
 
Not all immigrants are created equal in the U.S., and the system 
marks minorities for failure. The nation has done this by structuring 
differing treatment, processing, and statuses among different immigrant 
segments. Those whose social or economic attributes are positively 
valued by the host society and who conform to the predominant sense of 
“peoplehood,” that is of the desired cultural, ethnic, and racial mix, are 
favored.  Historically, immigration policy has attempted to create a 
system that has been inclusive and exclusive at the same time, that is to 
say, open but also very selective about whom to welcome. This policy is 
based on the country’s economic needs and prevailing views of the 
cultural acceptability of countries of origin and their people.  
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One must examine the history of U.S. immigration policy and its 
exclusions and history of race relations to fully understand how racially 
charged the immigration debate is today. Of course immigrants of color 
and people of color overall were never fully welcome. They are tolerated, 
and the proof is in how African Americans are treated after 150 years of 
freedom from slavery, and 50 years after the Civil Rights Act, when a new 
movement referred to as “Black Lives Matter” has had to emerge to shed 
media light on the continuation of unjust and widespread killings of 
African Americans through police brutality.  
U.S. immigration policy has systematically favored European 
groups over others (Ngai 2003). Not until the mid-twentieth century were 
national origin quotas lifted from Latin America, Asia and Africa, and the 
“New Immigration” has since then given rise to resurgent racial fears. In 
the U.S. today, current debates over immigration reform are heavily 
racially charged, in relation to the increasing Latinization of the United 
States, stoking new expressions of long-standing racialization and 
exclusion of Mexicans as dangerous “others” (DeGenova, 2002; 2003). 
Velez-Ibañez (1996) argues that stigmatization of undocumented 
Mexicans has even led to the racialization if not criminalization of all 
Latinos, irrespective of immigration status. By often being swept into the 
broader Latino category themselves, Brazilians often have these same 
negative stereotypes attributed to them.   
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As the U.S. continues to struggle to treat its African American 
citizens as full members of the nation, it doesn’t take a very complex 
analysis to see that many in the U.S. – including many prominent 
national political leaders — flinch at the thought of officially regularizing 
undocumented immigrants of color, even those who are already in so 
many ways part of the fabric of U.S. life. Of course, there are economic 
incentives. The current “broken” immigration system that offers no 
pathway to regularization for the 11 million undocumented, the largest 
number of any country in the world, fosters greater control of low-wage 
immigrant laborers, with the least amount of employer accountability 
(Massey et al. 1998, Hing 2003). 
Immigration debates today are as contentious as ever, as visible 
Presidential candidate Donald Trump continues to use terms such as 
“criminals,” “bad people,” and “rapists” to describe mostly humble, hard-
working, law-abiding Mexicans. During the run-up to the 2016 national 
elections, we are experiencing an explosion of rightwing, conservative, 
xenophobic, and racist ideologies that scapegoat immigrants for all that 
is wrong with America.   
Federal programs such as Secure Communities have further 
criminalized undocumented immigrants. This program rolled out by the 
George W. Bush administration (2000-08) continues in new, reduced 
form under President Obama’s Administration. Initially it was meant to 
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be voluntary for states to participate in it, and in 2007 under Mayor 
Thomas Menino Boston chose to mount one of the earliest demonstration 
projects for the new program. By 2013 it became federally mandated, but 
during the time of my field research in Boston, it was already fully 
enforced.  
The goal of Secure Communities (“S-Comm”) Program was to enlist 
local police to find, arrest, and transfer undocumented criminals with 
felony records to ICE for detention and deportation.   Every time an 
officer came into contact with an undocumented person, they were 
expected to contact Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE).  
According to the ACLU, the program racially profiled immigrants of color, 
and the majority of those who were detained (56%) and deported had 
either no criminal record, or only minor offenses, such as traffic 
violations.  Different analyses have found that 87% (TRAC-Immigration 
2014), 79% (Center for Constitutional Rights 2010), and 52% (Waslin 
2011) fell into this non-criminal category.  
 For Massachusetts few statistics are available, but the Boston 
Globe reported in 2013 that the number of those deported through S-
Comm in Massachusetts between 2008 and early 2013, who actually had 
criminal records, was less than half, at 45.6%, and in the wider 13-
county metropolitan area outside of Boston, only 29% (Sacchetti 2013).  
The average S-Comm deportee, in other words, was simply an 
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undocumented worker without any criminal record, who was probably 
torn from his or her family and minor children in the process.  The S-
Comm Program terrorized immigrant communities nation-wide and 
created widespread distrust between those communities and their local 
police and civil authorities. Because of the contradictions in the program, 
it was replaced in 2014 by the less severe Priority Enforcement Program 
(PEP), though many of the core faults of the program remain.  
Brazilian immigrants in my sample are fearful, and often feel 
trapped and in some cases desperate, because they have constructed 
their lives in the U.S., gotten married, often had children here, and 
believe that this is the best place for their U.S. born children to grow up.  
At the same time, the possibility of being suddenly detained and deported 
is very frightening and very real. Several respondents in my survey told 
me that when they leave for work in the morning, they are never sure if 
they will return in the evening. If they have one encounter with police in 
a traffic stop, that could be the end of their life in the U.S. and their 
families – both their U.S. based and their Brazil based ones – would be 
left without providers.   
Congress has been unable to agree on a solution to the 
immigration system, and the fate of millions of immigrants, including 
over five million children in mixed status families, cannot wait any longer. 
Obama’s 2014 proposed Executive Order for a Deferred Action for 
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Childhood Arrivals (DACA) extension and the Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability (DAPA) program (which would give temporary protection 
to undocumented parents of US-born citizen children) have been blocked 
in court by Texas and 25 other States. In early 2015 they sued the 
Obama Administration and secured a court injunction to stop 
implementation of these programs, as an unfair burden on their finances, 
and as exceeding the President’s authority. The injunction has been 
upheld despite the Administration’s appeal to the federal district and 
circuit courts.   
These proposed partial changes to the immigration system, that 
would have removed the threat of deportation for at least 5 million of the 
undocumented, raised the hopes of so many in the Boston Brazilian 
community. Sadly, it is likely that the final legal ruling on these new 
programs will not occur until the waning months of Obama’s Presidency, 
possibly as late as summer or fall 2016, when the Supreme Court is 
expected to judge the legality of his Executive Orders. 
 
Immigrants, Race, and the Undocumented in Massachusetts 
 
According to the Migration Policy Institute, Massachusetts is home 
to 940,000 foreign born of whom 182,000 are undocumented. The data 
show that the state’s undocumented immigrants come from all over the 
world. Figure16 below provides information on undocumented 
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immigrants in Massachusetts by countries of birth (Migration Policy 
Institute, 2012-2013). Brazilians are the largest group of undocumented 
immigrants in the state. 
 
Figure 16: Top 5 Countries by Birth of Undocumented Immigrants  
Residing in Massachusetts 
 
 
Of course complaints against the imputed criminality and laziness 
of immigrants are not new, as throughout history all immigrant groups 
have encountered resistance.  Now many of these earlier immigrant 
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groups (e.g., Irish, Italians, Polish, and Germans) have assimilated into 
American culture and society, ironically they are among the nativists 
who are resisting today’s immigrants, even though they are the sons, 
daughters, and grandchildren of those who themselves faced oppression 
as immigrants. The greatest difference between the groups who migrated 
to the U.S. before and after the turn of the 20th century is that they were 
white, and today the majority of undocumented immigrants waiting on 
immigration reform are people of color and seen as not as able to be 
assimilated.  
As Brazil enters into a deeper recession in 2016, the Boston-based 
undocumented immigrants’ concern with deportation increases. The 
threat of being stopped by police or Immigration Customs and 
Enforcement (ICE) is very real, and they worry about it all the time.  A 
respondent explained, 
Imagine the feeling that you can go to jail like a real criminal, 
someone who would never hurt a fly. It is very scary, I don’t think 
I could survive there, yet, I know it could happen to me because I 
don’t have papers. I don’t know, I would probably lose my mind. 
It’s been a long time since the U.S. has addressed the immigration 
“problem” and tried to fix the “broken” immigration system by creating 
long-term solutions. It has been since the mid-1980s since any real 
regularization schemes were directed at the undocumented.  More 
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recently, in 2000 there were small liberalizations in the Employer 
sponsorship program, and in March 2013 another very focused 
Executive Order from President Obama, which ruled that immigrants 
who entered the U.S. uninspected and married a U.S. citizen could apply 
for a pardon and wait here in the U.S. for permission to change status.  
This procedure is called the “Unlawful Presence Waiver.” This removed 
the requirement of a 10-year waiting period mandating that any such 
applicant return to their own country before being able to return to the 
United States to marry an American and secure legal status. This meant 
that it would be practically impossible for working families to apply to 
change their status, as most households depend on dual incomes to 
survive and could not endure a ten-year absence of a breadwinner.  
These seemingly unendurably long waits also result from petitions 
immigrant Americans make to sponsor family members. Even once the I-
130 application for this purpose is approved, it can take 15-20 years to 
bring a sibling. 
Another particularly egregious trap that current immigration laws 
impose on many undocumented people is to define their desire to reunite 
with their American families as a criminal act.  A conversation that I had 
with a respondent, a Boston business owner, touched on this topic.  
Natalicia: May I ask you something? [The business owner listened 
intently for me to continue.] I heard a rumor that sometimes 
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undocumented people get deported and they might try to come back 
to be with their families; but then they get caught again, and that 
act of returning uninspected after being deported becomes turned 
into a serious crime, and the person is considered a felon under U.S. 
law. Have you heard of any cases like that?    
Business Owner (smiling):  Yes, here at the store I hear lots of 
stories like this! Yes, I heard of many people, Brazilians, who were 
undocumented and were detained and were put in deportation 
procedures, and were deported, but who would return to the U.S. 
within a month by paying coyotes to help them with border crossing 
through Mexico.  In one family I knew the husband told his wife not 
to spend money on an immigration lawyer. It was best to save the 
money to pay for his return passage!  
I mentioned that I had heard that the ICE has imposed some very 
tough penalties for repeat offenders, requiring that if they are caught 
again they serve long jail sentences before being deported. Once you are 
picked up for the second time, you do not have the right to see a judge, 
but you go straight to jail.   I went on to say they should check with an 
attorney. 
Business owner:  Well, it is a difficult situation, when your entire 
family is here in the U.S.! What are you supposed to do? No one will 
wait ten years to return to their families.   
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Natalicia: Yes, of course, you are right, but the ideal would be for 
the whole family to move back to Brazil once one of the parents is 
deported, but that doesn’t seem to be case.   
He went on to explain that most people who are here with their whole 
family have a hard time saving much money, and if they return to Brazil, 
it would be extremely hard to survive there, especially after living in the 
U.S. for so many years. The wife in most such cases stays in the U.S. 
because here she can work hard and will be able to provide for herself 
and their children. But if she goes back with her husband, then they will 
all be in big trouble, since adequate remunerative employment — or even 
a job — is not certain.  Similarly, I heard from other respondent families 
that it is almost impossible to survive in Brazil after living in the United 
States for several years, unless you have real estate that you have 
invested in while gone, that can provide a source of income to you when 
you return. 
While conducting my research I also learned that during the Bush 
administration, Homeland Security’s Border Patrol created a program 
called “Catch and Release,” which meant that immigrants caught 
crossing the border would be released and receive a court date for the 
handling of their immigration infraction.  The coyotes began to use the 
system to facilitate border crossings. They would tell immigrants to allow 
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themselves to be caught, and then after their release from custody, the 
coyotes would collect them on the U.S. side of the border for delivery.  
The problem was that most immigrants did not understand what 
the program really meant, and never appeared in court for their hearing, 
resulting in arrest warrants being issued in their names. These warrants 
never expire. What resulted is that there are large numbers of 
undocumented immigrants from different communities, including the 
Brazilian, who have lifetime warrants for their arrest due to their original 
failure to appear in court. If such people are detained again, they are 
considered serious “criminals” with a record. These same people often 
have been living in the U.S. for a decade or more and have U.S. born 
citizen children. Despite these warrants against them, which many 
immigrants eventually become aware of, and the harsher penalties for 
second-time offenders, even when deported people continue to take the 
risk and return to live in this precarious situation, all in the interest of 
being with their families. 
 
Differences in Immigration Status also Divide the Community 
Overall, class differentiation in the Brazilian community is complex, 
with the community organized and divided into segments based on 
closely overlapping lines of class, education level, and immigration status.  
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I observed in my research that the following social classes appear to be 
emerging or are on display in Boston’s Brazilian immigrant community. 
1- Upper Middle Class: professors, doctors, business owners, 
professionals in U.S. state and local government managerial positions, 
corporate managers, and international students. 
2- Middle Class: Small business owners; some professionals, such 
as social workers and teachers, and non-profit employees, some with 
Brazilian higher education; young 1.5 and 2nd generation youth, in U.S 
universities as resident immigrant students. 
3- Working class: Owners and managers who operate smaller 
ethnic neighborhood businesses, mostly retail, construction, and 
cleaning; tradesmen (construction) and service providers (household 
workers) operating on the boundaries of the formal and informal 
economies; and, ESOL students 
4- Lower class: Working poor with less than a high school 
education, often of rural origins, living in collective quarters, working in 
the underground economy. 
 Chapters Three and Four emphasized how much class and race 
divisions, imported from Brazil, inform the new kinds of relationships 
migrants are often forced into because of their common culture and 
language that often bringing them together in ethnic businesses and 
organizations.  These interactions inside the ethnic economy, as noted in 
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Chapter Four, often run afoul of class based interactional codes whose 
violations can cause social frictions, but they can also lead to more 
overtly exploitative attempts at coercion that arise from class privilege. 
Thus differences in immigration status tend to mirror and reinforce old 
lines of power and privilege, particularly inside the ethnic community 
and economy. 
As Portes described the dynamic within ethnic economies in 
general (Portes 1981), vulnerable immigrant newcomers often find 
themselves trapped in conditions of exploitation when employed by co-
ethnic entrepreneurs.   My experience handling labor law violation cases 
at the Brazilian Worker Center has amply illustrated this exploitation. 
Workers report having to take inappropriate safety risks, or do 
unpleasant, onerous work for extra long hours, or be cheated of wages.   
Sometimes this exploitation is accompanied by intimidation through 
physical threats, active abuse, or name-calling.  Often their employers or 
others at their workplace use workers’ undocumented status and threats 
to report them to ICE to intimidate them into complying with illegal 
working conditions, accepting inferior pay, and not complaining.  
 For example, Jorge, an undocumented immigrant in his early 20s 
from a rural area, worked for an important Brazilian entrepreneurial 
family as a painter. They asked him regularly to work from 5:00 am until 
midnight so that they could fulfill their contract to paint hundreds of 
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dorm rooms for a local college.  He painted for one year but was never 
given his full pay. Finally, when the work was done, and they were 
supposed to finish paying him, they told him they were only going to give 
him half of the money he was promised.  When he complained, they 
called him “lazy,” and a “disgusting pig” who wanted to take advantage of 
his employer.  Not knowing what to do, Jorge went to his pastor at the 
same church he shared with his employer’s family. The pastor tried to 
intercede with the employer but was rebuffed. Finally, with the help of an 
attorney at an immigrant worker center, Jorge took the employer to 
Small Claims court and won a judgment. A year later, however, he still 
had not received payment. 
 In another case, an American contracting company hired 28 
undocumented Brazilian young men for a 24x7, three-day snow removal 
blitz after severe blizzards hit the region. At the end, however, even after 
55 hours of steady labor, the company announced they were not paying 
them anything for their work, and if they complained, they would report 
them to immigration. 
It is common in construction  (Lima and Siqueira 2011) and in 
housecleaning, two prominent occupational areas among Brazilian 
immigrants, that undocumented workers are underpaid, and even if they 
work 70 or 80 hours a week, be denied the overtime pay that labor laws 
mandate.  Undocumented restaurant workers who complain to 
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authorities or social service agencies about the situation are blacklisted 
among restaurants region wide and cannot easily find work.  As a 
resident told me, 
The employers know how scared we are of deportation, and 
they use it.   
The experience of my respondents reflects research studies on 
workers in the informal economy, many of them undocumented, such as 
the recent report of a national survey of domestic workers issued by the 
National Domestic Workers Alliance, entitled, Home Economics: The 
Invisible and Unregulated World of Domestic Work (Burnham and 
Theodore 2012). The survey discovered that 91% of the respondents who 
experienced abuse on the job did not report it to anyone, in order not to 
jeopardize their jobs. Over 45% of those who were fired were discharged 
after raising questions about or objecting to working conditions.  These 
levels of vulnerability were also confirmed by a more recent survey of 
Massachusetts house cleaners (Tracy et al. 2014). 
   These examples of wage theft that many of my Boston area 
respondents reported to me are instances of much wider trends visible 
nationally in the exploitation of undocumented workers. The NDWA 
survey, for example, also discovered a 16% “tax” on domestic workers for 
being undocumented in terms of average wages (Burnham and Theodore 
2012). Similar findings have come to light for farm workers, where the 
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“tax” is in the 13-15% range (Nisbet and Rodgers 2013), and for 
undocumented workers overall, 10% (Brown et al. 2009). 
 Sometimes, however, the status hierarchy between documented 
and undocumented among my respondents reverses itself.  For example, 
Joana was undocumented and had a small house-cleaning business with 
one worker who had a green card. Because of that, the worker was 
difficult to supervise. She seldom did what Joana wanted, left work 
whenever she felt like it, and frequently made threatening comments to 
her, such as: “I would not think twice about reporting someone 
undocumented to ICE,” and “Undocumented people should be caught 
and deported!” 
 My observations of cases brought to the Brazilian Worker Center 
have been that it is not only in the employment context that such 
exploitation around lines of immigration status occurs, but in virtually 
all types of commercial and economic transactions.  Employers not only 
pay the undocumented lower wages than other workers, and no or fewer 
benefits, but merchants of all kinds charge the undocumented more.  In 
buying a car, for example, undocumented consumers are asked to pay 
premium prices that can involve adding $500 to $1000 extra onto the 
cost, and they are similarly charged more for car insurance, and higher 
interest for loans (e.g., 14% instead of 4%).   
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 It is also quite common for those who are undocumented, or who 
simply reveal they do not have a social security number, to be illegally 
charged an extra two months of rent ahead of occupying a housing unit, 
in addition to the usual first and last month’s rent, plus a security 
deposit.  Sometimes the monthly rent is also raised. In addition to all the 
other dangers and limitations to living that undocumented status brings, 
including an unrelenting, nagging fear of arrest and deportation, 
Brazilian immigrants in Boston must face a continuous assault of such 
economic micro-aggressions and exploitations.   
 Sometimes the exploitation can be severe, and it can come not just 
from other Brazilians or Americans, but quite often from other immigrant 
groups.  In one case a respondent explained to me in detail how she and 
two co-workers went to a check cashing service operated by a Latina to 
cash a number of checks received from house-cleaning clients. They gave 
the clerk, who knew the Brazilians did not have proper government 
issued IDs, $1200 in checks. She handed them back only $800 in cash.  
She remarked, “That’s all I owe you.”  When the women protested, she 
said she gave them all their money and threatened to call the police if 
they did not leave. The police did come, but so did a community 
organizer that the women called to help them, and after a long 
negotiation in the store, the women received all the money they were due. 
Occasions such as these, unfortunately, are not uncommon for many 
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undocumented Brazilians, who are continually surprised at how others 
try to take advantage of them.  As one of my respondents, a community 
activist, pointed out,  
There are many good people in the community who help each 
other, but there are many that don’t miss the opportunity to take 
advantage of others. As an activist it makes me mad to see how 
much exploitation exists within our community.  As a Brazilian I am 
embarrassed by it!  Once people get papers they very quickly forget 
what it feels like to be undocumented.  
 
Impact of the Broken Immigration System on the Immigrant Family 
Being undocumented creates enormous insecurity and fear in the 
family.  The modal immigrant family with children in Boston is a mixed-
status one, with at least one undocumented parent, and at least one US-
born citizen child. Being undocumented is “sickening” to people in those 
situations, and when you speak with them, the response is: “ I have no 
choice,” “I wish I could change it,”  “Our livelihood depends on it,” and 
“Every day, going out is terrifying.”  
Not only is their continuing ability to parent their children at issue 
if they become detained and then deported, but the position of being 
undocumented and trapped in the shadows means they have to handle 
separations from their families left in Brazil that can include not only 
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parents and siblings but, as we saw in many cases, children.  They wish 
it could be different, and say,  “I wish I could have my parents here with 
me,” or  “I wish I could hug my wife and daughters,” or “My dream is to 
bring my son to live with me – it’s been 7 years!,” or  “What will happen 
to my [American] children if I get deported?”  
Statements such as these were quite common.  I heard this over 
and over again from my respondents, and now that I am more immersed 
in the community in my non-profit work, I have come to realize even 
more how prevalent these sentiments are.  As Brazilians become one of 
the largest foreign-born communities in Massachusetts and the one with 
the greatest number of undocumented people and mixed status families, 
the lack of immigration reform increases widespread panic and feelings 
of hopelessness.   
While over 32,000 Brazilians in the Boston area would be able to 
apply for the new DAPA (Deferred Action for Parental Accountability) 
program (Migration Policy Institute 2015), many are feeling desperate. 
The affected people are those who live in mixed status families. Their 
children were born here in the U.S. and are citizens, and their families 
have been residing in Boston for more than five years.  Their main 
concern is the welfare of their children. Many families, like the following 
one, said that they already had made some arrangements for their 
children in case something suddenly happened to them.  
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I wrote a letter stating that my sister is to take care of my 
daughter if I get deported. I worry about the state taking her and 
putting her in social services, you know, a stranger’s house.  I 
don’t want her to have to go back to Brazil, and I pray to God to 
keep us safe, to keep our family safe. 
There are other ways that immigration status differences can cause 
difficulties inside the family.  I have already explained in Chapter Three 
how this at times creates new kinds of authority relations between 
parents and children, but it also can affect relations between spouses or 
domestic partners.  Inside the family, being undocumented can become 
an issue within the conjugal and gender politics of domestic relations.  
As noted, older patriarchal notions that Brazilian men bring with them to 
the United States (as well as to Portugal) clash with the growing 
independence that immigrant women can and do achieve economically 
and socially.    
Some of my female respondents told me of several instances where 
their husbands or partners, to maintain control in the U.S., tried to 
coerce them into desired courses of action by threatening to report the 
whole family to immigration so that they would be deported, and this 
actually was reported to have happened on occasion.  Wherever 
interactions between the documented and the undocumented occur, the 
power imbalance that is present often leads to intensified forms of 
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exploitation that have their fundamental bases in other social ascriptions.  
My observation is that not only gender, but also class exploitation within 
the community can be strengthened. 
 
Imagining the Future of the Massachusetts Brazilian Community 
 after Immigration Reform 
 
What will the future hold for Boston Brazilians if immigration 
reform transpires and many of the currently undocumented population – 
who are at especially high numbers among New England Brazilians – 
gain temporary or permanent status, and perhaps even an eventual 
pathway to citizenship?  It is not hard to imagine some of the immediate 
changes that could come even from a program like the Deferred Action 
for Parental Accountability (DAPA), which President Obama attempted to 
institute by Executive Order in November 2014. If finally implemented, 
after its still ongoing court challenges, it will give parents of U.S. born 
children who have been in the U.S. for at least five years temporary 
protected status for a two- to three-year renewable period.  In other 
words, this measure is directed specifically at valorizing and preserving 
the majority – and the modal type – of mixed-status families among 
immigrants. 
DAPA will confer social security numbers and federal work permits 
on recipients, allowing them officially to work and probably in most 
states gain drivers' licenses, though that would be a state-level 
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decision.   At present, in response to the 2012 original DACA Program, 
those who received the protected status have been declared by 45 states 
to be eligible for the drivers’ licenses. This includes the 12 states that 
also grant licenses to all undocumented, qualified adults who can prove 
residence. Since five million U.S. citizen children have at least one 
undocumented parent, and 3.7 million of them are likely to qualify for 
the DAPA program according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) 
(Wong et al. 2014) DAPA is likely to go very far toward stabilizing family 
security for literally millions of families. 
From the beginning of his administration in 2008 during a period 
when family breakups due to deportation were very much in the national 
spotlight, President Obama gave many signals that he would emphasize 
family unity as a key principle in his advocacy for immigration reform. 
His administration took various steps to introduce prosecutorial 
discretion26 in determining priorities for deportation to protect many who 
had close family ties to American citizens.  Already case law had often 
granted dispensations toward regularizing the status of the 
undocumented who were doing essential caring work for U.S. citizens, 
whether the ill, disabled, elderly or children, typically in their own family 
                                       
26 In immigration matters, “Prosecutorial discretion extends to decisions about which 
offenses or populations to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and arrest; whether to 
detain or release a noncitizen; whether to initiate removal proceedings; and whether to 
execute a removal order; among other decisions. Similar to the criminal context, 
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context is an important tool for achieving 
cost-effective law enforcement, removal, and deportation.” 
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networks.  Unfortunately, none of these measures made more than a 
dent in the historic wave of deportations taking place under Obama, 
more than with any other President in U.S. history, that has destroyed 
far more family ties in mixed-status families than they ever preserved. 
DAPA could offer an even more encompassing and forceful general 
policy, however, that would have an even profounder impact.  One of the 
first and most obvious changes would be the elimination of any leverage 
that employers have over undocumented workers, whether they are in 
the ethnic economy, or have American or other immigrant employers.  
When the workers complain or organize against working conditions, they 
would no longer be so vulnerable to threats of retaliation by employers 
(clearly stated or implied) to report them to immigration authorities for 
being out of status. No doubt undocumented workers would also suffer 
many fewer wage theft and other labor law violations, and would be 
willing to file more complaints over abuses.  There probably would be 
many fewer abuses in commercial transactions, as well, such as the 
extra premium that the “undocumented” are routinely asked to pay for 
all kinds of goods and services. 
Rising incomes for immigrant families and communities are also 
likely to result.  If the experience with DACA-designated youth is any 
guide, research has shown that those DACA youth enabled to work 
legally, and not just under the table, improved their family income level 
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significantly.  The work permits that come with DACA also seem to be 
accepted by unions, and are beginning to eliminate long-standing 
barriers to immigrants’ gaining apprenticeships and union memberships, 
which have always been closed to those who lack legal status. For those 
receiving DAPA, mostly young adults, these same benefits will no doubt 
accrue. 
To gain a sense of what even temporary protection from 
deportation could mean for millions of working adults and parents in the 
undocumented community, it is instructive to look more closely at the 
effects that DACA has been having for the young adults who qualified 
and held the status for one or more years.  By 2015, half the eligible 
applicants, 750,000, had sought DACA. The National Immigration Law 
Center, and the Center for American Progress, under the direction of Tom 
K. Wong of UC-San Diego, completed a survey of 546 recipients, across 
34 states and the District of Columbia, and found a widespread advance 
in recipients’ fuller integration into economic life of their communities, 
and their achievement of economic mobility (Wong et al. 2015).   
Two thirds (65%) were using DACA to work toward degrees, and 
70% were employed.  More than two-thirds of those working since 
receiving DACA had changed their employment situation to find jobs that 
gave them higher pay, which almost three-fifths said helped them better 
support their families (and presumably collectively their entire 
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communities). On average their pay went up a significant amount, by 
45%, reflecting the evaporation of the undocumented “penalty tax” most 
of them had been paying earlier. In addition, the majority found jobs with 
better working conditions that also helped them become less 
underemployed by moving to work that better fit their education and 
training.  With the added income, many bought a new car, and of those, 
92% bought car insurance, and of those in school, more than 90% said 
they were now able to pursue opportunities to upgrade their educational 
credentials that had not been available to them before. 
Over two fifths also reported to be living in mixed-status families. 
This is the number that reported having native-born U.S. citizen siblings, 
and a similar percentage (40%) had parents eligible for DAPA under the 
proposed regulations, verifying that their undocumented parents had at 
least one US-born citizen child.   Although the DACA recipients 
themselves had been undocumented, one or more of their immediate 
siblings were thus citizens born in the United States.  The inequities of 
differential social, economic and political rights between citizens and the 
undocumented were thus always on full display in the intimacy of family 
life. 
Another survey by Roberto Gonzales and Angie M. Bautista-Chavez 
(2014) of a sample of 2831 DACA recipients, done for the American 
Immigration Council in Washington, DC, found similar economic and 
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social impacts, and expansion of opportunity for economic and social 
integration. Their survey noted that DACA also allowed a sizable number 
to obtain health insurance, to open bank accounts, to obtain drivers’ 
licenses, and to secure and pursue internships that would advance their 
professional training.  In addition, recipients were more likely to be able 
to obtain credit and secure a credit card.  All in all, the economic and 
social benefits that came to DACA holders have been substantial in a 
short period of time. No doubt if DAPA were to be implemented, it would 
carry benefits similar to those accruing to DACA recipients, especially in 
the area of working conditions, wages, and benefits, even if it would not 
be so likely these heads of families and providers would pursue further 
education.  
UCLA’s North American Integration and Development Center under 
Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda and Maksim Wynn in 2014 reported other 
projections of the economic impact of the President’s second executive 
order, extending DACA and establishing DAPA (See Table 3 below).  They 
forecast, based on existing studies of DACA beneficiaries, “extraordinary 
growth in the earnings of DACA beneficiaries” (Hinojosa-Ojeda and Wynn 
2014). Their economic projections forecast that “the labor income of 
individuals who receive deferred action through the program will increase 
by 7.1 billion dollars,” resulting in 167,000 new jobs, and 2.6 billion in 
new tax revenue (Hinojosa-Ojeda and Wynn 2014). 
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Table 3:  Results of Receiving DACA within first two years  
Results of Receiving DACA within first two years 
Measures from Wong et al. 2015 Survey 
Got a job with higher pay                  69% 
Increased earnings at work                                   45% 
Got a driver’s license or state ID                  89% 
Entered school pursuing educational programs                 
not previously accessible  
92% 
Became better able to help their families financially  57% 
Got better job more fitted to education & training 57% 
Got job with better working conditions                54% 
Bought new car                                      21% 
Bought car insurance for new or used car                 96% 
Measures from Gonzales and Bautista-Chavez 2014 survey: 
Obtained health insurance     21% 
Got first credit card      33% 
Got an internship                     21% 
Obtained driver’s license  57% 
Opened first bank account  49% 
 
They predicted further that DACA/DAPA, by lifting so much 
economic activity out of the shadow of the informal economy where many 
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immigrants are consigned to work, would increase United States’ GDP by 
15.8 billion dollars a year (Hinojosa-Ojeda and Wynn 2014). 
 As can be seen from many of these measures that have been 
observed among DACA recipients, it is not only better economic 
integration that would result from temporary protection for DAPA 
holders, but also many measures of broader social integration and 
quality of life.  One prime example would be all the effects that come 
from the ability to be mobile through gaining drivers’ licenses.  The 
choice of employment opportunities would be improved, and so would 
immigrants’ ability to support family members, travel farther to receive 
appropriate services such as health care, and to travel for personal 
reasons, including recreation.   
In my survey, whenever I asked respondents about travel, the 
response was usually a nervous laughter or rolling of the eyes.  Few 
undocumented workers are able even to think about taking a “vacation” 
under current circumstances, as traveling is difficult, and even 
impossible because of the lack of an official U.S. government ID. These 
immigrants in Massachusetts are completely unfamiliar with other areas 
of the nation, some even after being here for decades, due to not having 
been able to travel.  DACA has therefore already meant that many youth 
for the first time since their infancies or early childhood have been able 
to travel out of the country – after getting the special government 
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permission called “advance parole” – in order to visit grandparents and 
other extended kin in Brazil.   
When the Obama administration announced DAPA in November 
2014, Brazilians everywhere began immediately to discuss openly their 
plans to go home for a visit to see family members – often children, 
parents, brothers and sisters – that some had not seen for decades.  
Many people at the Brazilian Worker Center remarked on how many 
extra flights the airlines would have to add in order to accommodate the 
vastly increased travel Brazilians would be making on their trips home. 
Families overall would become more secure, not only from 
experiencing rising incomes and gaining safer mobility for their 
members, but also in the ability to find the best goods and services for 
the money. They would also be able to stop worrying about their ability 
to remain together and continue supporting one another, without fear of 
sudden deportation. Children would not be at risk of almost randomly 
losing a parent’s presence and economic support on account of a random 
police stop and detention. Parents would not have to always have a back-
up plan in place for who would take custody of their children in case 
they were to be picked up by ICE. Differences in immigration status – 
across the “legal”/”illegal” dimension especially – would no longer be 
available to serve as any kind of weapon in conjugal disputes between 
spouses. 
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Feeling more secure about their ability to remain in the United 
States, many immigrants will probably be more likely to invest energy 
and financial resources in business development in the U.S., instead of 
doing so in Brazil.  Such investments in Brazil have often been 
understood as a cushion to count on if the dreaded deportation actually 
were to occur. A family network supported by one’s remittances, and 
property such as houses, land, or businesses, always offered an 
important insurance policy against the prospect of a sudden deportation 
that would cause the loss of everything one had worked to accumulate in 
the United States, sometimes for decades. With this insecurity 
considerably reduced, so would the need be for fallback resources in the 
country of origin. 
The case of Adilson is instructive.  After 28 years in the Boston, all 
the while supporting his four children’s becoming middle class 
professionals and business owners in Brazil, Adilson, a tireless worker 
and skilled businessman, had accumulated considerable assets, 
including four houses, three multi-family rental properties that he 
maintained, a car wash, and a commercial cleaning business that 
employed 17 people, all fairly paid in accordance with U.S. labor laws. He 
also was civically active and generous in his commitments to his parish 
and community. 
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Undocumented during the almost three decades he resided in the 
United States, he also bought property and invested in Brazil for his 
retirement.  To protect everything he had built in the U.S., however, and 
to prevent being detained and deported for something like a broken 
taillight on his car, he completely avoided driving in more recent years 
and had one of his employees chauffeur him everywhere.   
His lack of documentation finally became too much for him to 
bear, and he sold all his accumulated holdings in Boston, including his 
businesses, and returned home to Brazil.  He had maintained strong 
relations with leaders, old friends, and relatives in his hometown, a small 
city of 10,000 in Santa Catarina, and when he returned in 2014, he and 
his wife were greeted with a welcoming parade attended by hundreds. 
For his many years as an immigrant, then, his circumstances forced 
Adilson to maintain two estates, one in the U.S. and another in Brazil. In 
the end to have to choose between them.  Adjustment of his status, had 
it occurred, would have permitted a fuller bi-national life where he could 
have maintained social and economic ties in both countries. 
In Chapter Three on the Family, the issue of the civic unity, or lack 
of it, within the Brazilian community came under discussion.  The 
community now has little political presence, as the majority is 
undocumented and thus not eligible to vote.  As of 2015, there is not one 
single elected Brazilian public official at the local or state level anywhere 
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in Massachusetts.  Brazilians do not coalesce as an ethnic group even in 
grassroots political actions that do not require citizenship and eligibility 
to vote.  Non-profit organizations that currently mobilize immigrants for 
civic action also are few in number, and do not enjoy much familiarity or 
support from the community at large, though they are effective in 
alliances with broader immigrant organizations.   
As discussed above in Chapter Four on Race and Class, my survey 
revealed that the Boston-area Brazilian immigrant community is made 
up of a vast majority of undocumented people who have an incentive to 
keep a low profile as regards civic and public roles, and the most 
prevalent kind of civic involvement they engage in is membership in faith 
communities.  These however are divided into more than 100 
congregations, furthering the community’s fragmentation into sub-
communities that have little connection to one another.  
Elite members of the community in their own turn seek to blend 
into U.S. society and culture, and have the cultural capital usually to do 
that.  Few of them, however, cast their lot as political or civic leaders 
interested in mobilizing their undocumented compatriots into any kind of 
unified constituency.  It is probable that Brazilians, despite their 
numbers, never will become an ethnic force in their own right, though 
segments of the community could well gain political capital through 
allying with pan-ethnic Latino groups and campaigns. 
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The pathway to citizenship that is likely to be made part of 
eventual immigration reform and, for certain, a growing second 
generation of American-born Brazilians have the potential of creating a 
sense of ethnic political identity and efficacy, however, within the 
community in the near to moderate term future.  This is a pattern that 
has generally been followed by many other immigrant and refugee groups 
that have preceded Brazilians to Massachusetts, such as Latinos, Cape 
Verdeans, Vietnamese, and Haitians. With these groups a significant 
voting-enfranchised second generation has developed to build the group’s 
political capital and furnish politicians who could compete for public 
office.  There will be more incentives, as well, for at least some elites to 
enter the political domain as leaders and brokers, even if many or most 
choose to maintain ethnic invisibility and assimilation into the host 
society.  Ultimately, the result is likely be the emergence of a distinctly 
Brazilian ethnic group identity recognized both within and outside of the 
Brazilian community itself in the next decade or two.   
 
A Diverse Brazilian Community will React to Immigration Reform in 
Different Ways 
The effects of immigration reform – whether it happens piecemeal 
or in a more comprehensive fashion – will affect the Brazilian immigrant 
community in different ways, depending on their current situation.  First 
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I will discuss projected impacts on the documented, mostly elite segment 
of the community, and secondly on the undocumented.   
For the elite who already have secure status and who are 
assimilating into the American class system at higher levels, there will be 
little change expected.  Some Brazilian professionals already act as 
ethnic brokers or representatives with agencies of government, 
universities, and corporations, and as the Brazilian community comes 
out of the shadows, may claim or be ascribed these brokerage or 
representative roles more often.  However, the incentives that ethnic 
business owners have to exploit their employees within the ethnic 
economy will be lessened when their workers are no longer 
undocumented and vulnerable to being paid reduced salaries and 
benefits. 
A certain number of elite, upper middle or upper class Brazilians 
come to Boston to study in one of the many local universities, generally 
on J-visas.  They quickly adjust to a comfortable life here with support 
from their parents at home in Brazil.  Regular travel back home is not a 
problem. To be accepted as an international student at most of Boston’s 
universities, even the city’s public university, the University of 
Massachusetts Boston, applicants have to show they have the financial 
resources at home to pay their college expenses, anywhere from $30,000 
(public) to $50,000 a year (private), plus living expenses, and have the 
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adequate academic preparation (e.g., in an American school), including 
English (validated through an appropriate TOEFL test score) in order to 
gain university admission.  There is next to no financial aid available for 
international students either. Immigration reform is not even a concern 
of young people such as these. 
For the undocumented, of course, the situation is quite different.  
The impact would be enormous, but even within this group there are 
large class differences.  A significant mid-level entrepreneurial class has 
emerged among the Brazilian immigrant community and operates 
successfully even while being undocumented in the Boston area. 
Massachusetts Brazilians in particular have a rate of business 
entrepreneurship greater than that of any other immigrant group in the 
state (Lima and Siqueira 2011).   
The story of Adilson above, a successful small businessman, has 
already been told.  Another case in point is Carlos, a college graduate 
and high school math teacher in Brazil, son of a well-to-do owner of a 
major printing company in Sao Paulo and a mother who is a university 
provost.  Overstaying his tourist visa in Boston, he supported himself by 
delivering newspapers to homes at night, and labored for a while as a 
line worker in a printing plant. Tired of the abuse he felt he received as 
an immigrant, he decided to start his own printing business in a Boston 
suburb, with the help of money from his father in Brazil.  His business 
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now nets $400,000 yearly, and he is a responsible employer of three 
workers.  He pays business and income taxes, complies with all other 
business regulations, and just bought his own building to house his 
business.   
With two American-born children, and a wife who is a DACA 
designee, however, he still is forced to drive regularly without a license.  
Moreover, as an undocumented person he cannot get credit, even for his 
business expenses, and has no credit card.  He is forced to pay for 
everything in cash, including the purchasing of expensive printing 
presses.  Immigration reform, even the simple DAPA program, would 
allow him to formalize and grow his business significantly, and reduce 
much of the risk and insecurity his undocumented status creates in his 
daily life. There are literally hundreds of Brazilian entrepreneurs at this 
level in the Boston area (Lima and Siqueira 2011), and many, if not the 
majority, are undocumented like Carlos and Adilson. 
For the average Brazilian immigrant worker in the service industry 
– restaurant work, construction, domestic service, or landscaping – the 
impact also will be substantial. As noted above in the already observed 
sharp rises in incomes of those who have temporary protection under 
DACA, incomes of the average worker will rise significantly, as will job 
training and educational opportunities.  Instead of having to work two or 
three jobs at substandard wages to make ends meet, many newly 
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protected workers might well be able to reduce their hours of work and 
devote more time to family, education and training, consumption of 
culture, entertainment, and especially to civic engagement, which they 
now typically have little time for. 
 Another estimated 10-15% of the more elite segment of the 
community reside in the Boston area on short-term, renewable visas, 
typically student visas, many of them converted from tourist visas that 
allowed these individuals to enter the country in the first place. They are 
long-term sojourners, who though lacking work authorization 
nonetheless work under the table in the informal economy to support 
themselves while living in the area, and to pay their school fees.  Because 
they entered on a visa and can adjust their status, many make another 
shift from student visas to work visas if they can find an employer 
sponsor willing to accompany them through the complicated legal work 
involved in sponsorship. It is not unusual in Boston to find individuals 
who have been in school for ten years, on a continually renewing student 
visa, or who do multiple degrees (e.g., three different masters degrees in 
succession), or who find marriage possibilities with Americans – 
Procurando amor com green card (“looking for love with a green card”). 
 Such people as these, of course, are completely left out of any 
current concepts of immigration reform.  For every legalization scheme or 
concept, there are also some people who just miss meeting the 
	 278 
requirements for qualification, and thus fail to receive any relief. Those 
who just missed an open door are usually quite hurt and resentful about 
this. Those who have struggled for years just to stay legal, studying 
endlessly to keep their F visas, and working under the table to survive 
economically, have generally been angry at the prospect of DAPA 
becoming law, given that it requires one to be a parent of a US-born 
citizen child. These individuals believe that their education, their strong 
work ethic, and their potential contributions as professionals and leaders 
easily qualify them for immigration relief quite as much as the working 
class is eligible for DAPA. 
 
A Side Glance to Portugal: Easier Brazilian Immigration to a Low-
Wage Country  
 For Brazilians, as noted earlier, entry is easy to Portugal.   They 
can enter for up to 90 days without a visa, and during this time, if they 
can obtain an employment contract for a formal job, they can receive a 
temporary residence permit. Once it is renewed annually over a six-year 
period, they are eligible for a permanency permit.   
Compared to the cost to the U.S., the cost of migrating to Portugal 
is significantly lower. Brazilians do not need to obtain a Visa to enter, or 
pay a coyote to help them to cross borders illegally.  All they need is 
airfare. I calculated the cost of airfare from three major sending states, 
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and I was able to find a round trip ticket from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon 
for as little as US$584.33. The table below illustrates some of the basic 
costs necessary to gain entry to Portugal.  
 
Table 4: Costs of migration from Brazil to Portugal  
 
Getting ready to travel to 
Portugal  
Cost in 
Reais 
Cost in 
Euros27 
Cost in 
Dollars28 
Brazilian Passport application 
fee (including cost of photos) 
 
R$360.28 
 
€82.55 
 
US$90.07 
Travel costs to the nearest 
Passport Processing Center to 
file the passport application 
 
R$480.00 
 
€107.33 
 
US$120.00 
Travel back to the nearest 
Passport Processing Center to 
sign & pick up the new 
passport  
 
R$480.00 
 
€107.33 
 
US$120.00 
Roundtrip airfare and hotel 
cost (bought one month in 
advance to travel in 
September, not including 
hotel cost) from Rio de 
Janeiro29 Brazil to Lisbon, 
Portugal 
 
R$2,337.32 
 
€522.63 
 
US$584.33 
 
It is recommended that you 
carry with you a minimum of 
€ 1,000 in cash during entry 
 
 
R$4,482.55 
 
€1,000.00 
 
US$1,113.25 
Total cost of one person’s 
travel arrangement to 
Portugal 
 
R$8,110.60 
 
€1,813.56 
 
US$2,027.65 
 
                                       
27 The amounts in Euro are based on the worth of the Brazilian currency in Portugal. 
28 For the purpose of this illustration I used Brazilian, Portuguese, and U.S. currency 
even though the destination is Lisbon, Portugal and the currency used there is Euro.  
29  The table above number 4 demonstrated the cost of a Brazilian departing Brazil for 
the United States from the State of Minas Gerais, but in calculating costs to Portugal, 
the most common departure city was Rio de Janeiro, that that is the cost shown here.      
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A second wave came in the 1990s when major public works 
projects, financed by the European Union, were launched to improve 
Portugal’s substantial infrastructure and created a need for unskilled 
workers in construction, domestic service, restaurant work, and farm 
work. Afro-Portuguese, mostly from the Portuguese-speaking former 
colonies, with Cape Verdeans the largest group, and later Ukrainians and 
Romanians, came to take these jobs. Brazilians constitute the largest 
single group, with a population of 105,622 in 2012 (Oliveira 2008: 23). 
Beginning in the 1950s and extending through the rest of the 
1900s, Portugal was primarily a country of outmigration, especially of the 
working-class labor pool available for unskilled work. As a consequence, 
full one third of the Portuguese nation, five million people, today live 
outside its borders, mainly in Europe, with the largest numbers in 
France, Switzerland, Germany, and Luxembourg.  The country has never 
received as many immigrants as it sends out as emigrants to other 
countries, and the value of remittances that Portuguese emigrants send 
back to the country is generally five times the value of what immigrants 
in Portugal send to other countries (Malheiros 2002). 
Political leaders in Portugal have always understood that the labor 
needs of the nation required a flexible and open immigration policy, and 
in 2007 established a national plan for immigrant integration.  It 
includes social service centers for immigrants, language classes where 
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necessary, job centers, intercultural and anti-discrimination training for 
government bureaucrats (especially in the employment centers), and 
programs to evaluate and recognize foreign technical and educational 
credentials immigrants might bring with them, especially in areas needed 
by the Portuguese economy.   
In the 1980s a wave of Brazilians came to Portugal and were 
mostly highly skilled professionals – dentists, doctors, advertising and 
marketing specialists, and the like (Peixoto and Sabino 2009: 30).  
Assimilation was not difficult for these highly educated people, whose 
educational credentials were mostly recognized and who had the right 
kind of class standing.   
With strong contingents from both immigration waves, the 
Brazilian immigrant population has the same diversity as seen in the U.S. 
today. As Peixoto and Sabino note, “Even despite their concentration in 
tertiary [service] activities, Brazilians were more evenly distributed 
throughout skilled and unskilled activities than other immigrant groups” 
(Peixoto and Sabino 2009: 30).   
Today immigrants make up almost 5% of the country’s population, 
and are mostly concentrated in Greater Lisbon, but constitute a full 10% 
of the nation’s labor force.  The country’s immigration policy is widely 
known in Europe as one of the most open and flexible, and it has been 
rated as a “success” and “leading in all indicators” under the Migration 
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Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) of the European Union. In this index, 
which ranks the quality of OECD nations’ overall integration policies for 
immigrants, Portugal is second out of 38 countries, ranking seven 
positions higher than the U.S., which is in 9th place (Lopes 2014).   
Since the world recession of 2007-9, and the imposition of wider 
EU austerity measures, as well as ones from the conservative-leaning 
governments inside the country, Portugal’s economy has considerably 
shrunk, salaries in the large public sector have been slashed, and 
unemployment has approached 20%, including 37.7% rates for well-
educated young adults (Dias 2013), large numbers of whom have 
emigrated to other parts of Europe, Brazil, and Africa (especially Angola).  
In the 2011-13 years the national GNP shrank, including by almost 6% 
in 2012, and Portugal during this period began to lose large numbers of 
immigrants who returned to their country of origin, including some 
Brazilians, perhaps numbering as many as 100,000. 
Today Brazilians also constitute the largest number of 
undocumented immigrants of any group, in Portugal perhaps numbering 
20,000, on account of their failure to obtain work under formal labor 
contracts, whereas securing work in the country’s large informal sector is 
much easier, especially in the job sectors where most Brazilians tend to 
work.  Even if they do have the qualifications, the low-wage immigrants 
often do not have the resources to afford the usually exorbitant fees the 
	 283 
government charges to secure a residency permit, which add up to 
several months of pay. The country does not have a deportation system 
in place, either.  As a respondent told me, for example, “I am here 
working at the bar seven days a week and from time to time police come 
in and ask to see customers’ residency papers. When they don’t have 
them, the police just usually berate and mistreat them, and tell them to 
go home. I saw a policeman pull over a guy on his motorcycle once, and 
he did the same thing – just humiliated him when he discovered he 
didn’t have papers. No one ever gets deported. Portugal doesn’t have the 
money for that!” 
Moreover, there have been frequent regularization schemes that 
are administered to give status to the undocumented, six times in the 
years since 1992, including a special bilateral accord between Portugal 
and Brazil in 2003 “allowing for the regularization of irregular Brazilian 
workers in Portugal as well as irregular Portuguese workers in Brazil” 
(Dias 2013: 39), that benefitted 16,000 Brazilians in Portugal.  Later 
regularizations in the late 2000s, as well, mostly benefitted Brazilians.    
The end result is that life as a Brazilian immigrant in Portugal is 
fairly secure, even if you are working-class, and undocumented.  Life 
there, however, is not particularly remunerative, as we indicated earlier 
in Chapter Three.   Unless they are of the more elite class, Brazilians can 
seldom afford even to pay their passage to travel to Brazil for a trip to 
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visit family. Because Portugal is a low-wage country within the European 
Union, where most Brazilians in addition work in low-wage service 
sectors of the national economy, and where the undocumented among 
them are generally paid 20% lower wages than regular workers (Peixoto 
and Sabino 2009: 280), the life of most is a rather modest one – better 
than they would have at home, but by an economic factor of two perhaps, 
instead of eight or ten as in the United States.   
Class and race mark the lives of Brazilians in Portugal as they do 
in the United States, shaping the forms of assimilation that are possible 
for the different sub-groups, and relations inside the community.  
Brazilians in Lisbon also feel more stigmatized and discriminated against 
than they do in Boston, both in terms of class and race. Moreover, the 
sting of that betrayal by the Portuguese is particularly hurtful, because it 
happens despite the considerable language and cultural affinities the 
Brazilians share with the Portuguese as post-colonials. 
 
The Future: The Cycle is Likely to Continue 
Because of a Congress deadlocked on comprehensive immigration 
reform, it is more and more likely that immigration reform will happen in 
small pieces, much like the DACA and DAPA programs. Already there are 
proposals for other types of “deferred action,” including action for hotel 
workers proposed by the labor union Unite Here, home care workers 
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proposed by the National Domestic Workers Alliance, and parents of 
“Dreamers,” proposed by DACA holding youth activists. But even if 
Republican and other anti-immigrant forces block all pathways to 
citizenship for the undocumented, the immigrants’ second-generation 
children are inexorably coming of age to vote. Those children have seen 
the struggles of their parents and the abuses they have faced.  Many of 
them also have undocumented siblings and understand all that entails.  
These second-generation children will be immigrant-friendly, and 
through the political change they will bring, the coming decade portends 
a shift in immigration policy that is more inclusive and that will 
regularize many of the undocumented, including their parents.   
Whether the regularization schemes occur or not, the 
undocumented will continue to come, and they will replenish the 
immigrant underclass who live in the shadows. At present a new wave of 
Brazilians is arriving on planes with visas and on foot through Mexico 
due to the downturn in the Brazilian economy, predicted to have shrunk 
more than 3% during 2015.  
 The reverse flow of immigrants, exhausted by their struggles here, 
will continue to return to Brazil, only to realize they cannot easily adjust 
to conditions there any longer – their savings run out, no good job 
opportunities, the streets not safe from crime, and the bureaucracy more 
corrupt and rigid than they remembered. Even knowing the difficulties 
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ahead, some will emigrate again to the U.S. This is a recurring cycle that 
is likely to continue in generations to come, so long as international 
economic divisions and unfair “free trade” arrangements keep preventing 
the Global South from developing sustainable economies that can 
provide opportunity for the people who live there. Meanwhile, the 11+ 
million undocumented already here will continue to dream about the day 
they will be safe to live securely in the U.S., be able to visit their original 
countries at will, and still return to their adopted and cherished homes 
to the north. 
 
Conclusions:  Major Findings and Limitations of the Research 
When I started this study examining Brazilian immigrants’ lives in 
Boston, and Lisbon, as in most research endeavors, I could only imagine 
the richness of the qualitative and quantitative portraits of the 
communities that it would yield.  Personal heroes though they are, 
immigrants’ struggles to achieve a better life for themselves and their 
families are deeply shaped by the intersection of class and race factors in 
both the sending and receiving societies, and the resulting transnational 
frame continues to define their lives as much before their departure as 
after their settlement in the host society. 
Boston and Lisbon Compared. It was an unexpected outcome to 
discover that, though I had expected major differences in the immigrant 
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experience in the two cities on opposite sides of the Atlantic, the 
similarities between life in Boston and in Lisbon were more striking than 
the differences.  As an artifact of the same history of episodes, or waves, 
of outmigration from Brazil, the class differentiation in the two immigrant 
communities was similar, as were many of the internal community 
dynamics, including more rapid assimilation of elites, and broadly 
similar changes in family structure and gender roles. In both cities, 
immigrants were challenged to overcome prejudice, social barriers, and 
racialization – mostly on cultural grounds.  
The diversity of expressions of transnational behavior, as well, 
were similar in the familiar mix of “low” versus “high” forms linked to 
unequal access to resources, and the ability to move back-and-forth 
internationally. In Lisbon, however, it was class of origin rather than 
immigration status that was the deciding factor for limiting working-class 
immigrants to transnationalism from below. Excessively trapped in the 
low wage, informal sector of the Portuguese economy, workers there 
could neither gain official residency, nor the resources for circular 
movement to Brazil. That mobility was permitted, but still not possible 
for reasons of cost. 
In the end, in Portugal, it was the huge wage differential between 
Boston and Lisbon, and its relation to even lower-wage Brazilian incomes, 
that made the difference in immigrant outcomes.  Portugal’s immigration 
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policy was much more open, and seriously encourages integration of 
migrants.  Language similarities and some cultural practices that 
Brazilians shared with the Portuguese in Lisbon, though they did offer 
some advantages to Brazilians’ incorporation into the service economy, 
still left Brazilians vulnerable to exclusion due to class, race, and colonial 
legacy of tropicalization. 
Class divides in the Brazilian immigrant community are 
severe.   I sought to provide an honest accounting of the class diversity 
in Brazilian immigrant communities, especially in the United States.  
Class diversity has been largely neglected in studies of Brazilian 
immigrant communities, both in the U.S. and in Portugal, in relation to 
the variety it produces in transnational behavior, adaptation, and 
incorporation at the family and community level. 
Class strongly defines the exercise of transnational relations.  
Class also shapes the form that transnationalism takes within the 
immigrant community.  The upper middle class who come with visas and 
occupy professional standing in the host society are cosmopolitans who 
engage with transnationalism at the high level, including free movement 
between countries.  The working class, including many downwardly 
mobile middle class Brazilians, due to being undocumented, engage in 
low forms of transnationalism at the family and grassroots community 
level, what I call “everyday transnationalism,” that especially includes the 
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maintenance of family relations across transnational space.  
 Cosmopolitan elites are not more transnational because they can 
travel back and forth between sending and host countries.  These two 
groups, though different, are each fully transnational.  With few 
exceptions, it is not possible to be a recent immigrant without being 
transnational. 
U.S. immigration policy shapes class relations among 
immigrants.  U.S. immigration policy is a key factor in shaping class 
relations among the immigrant community by making legal entry 
possible for elites, but closing it off to the lower middle and working 
classes, pushing them into entering without inspection. The 
undocumented life, in fact, is the modal form for the Brazilian 
community.  Once in the U.S., these Brazilian-based class segments 
encounter quite different economic opportunities and civil rights. 
The Brazilian case demonstrates complex racialization 
processes, where color plays some role, but stereotypical cultural 
attributes are used more to define the group as a lower-status, tropical, 
sensual, playful, and happy population who work hard but are not 
bothered by exploitation.  In Portugal the colonial legacy exacerbates this, 
and in the U.S. the tendency is for the host society to Latinize Brazilians. 
Reactive Transnationalism is usually explained too 
simplistically.  It is more complex than Guarnizo suggests.  Some 
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revision of Guarnizo’s notion of “reactive transnationalism” is necessary. 
The reactive transnationalism of the working class, in response to 
racialization and economic exploitation, does not reflect their marginality 
to the U.S. system, but instead their deep integration into subordinate 
economic roles in the informal service economy.  Labeling their 
transnationalism as only reactive obscures, in addition to their economic 
integration: a) their development of extensive hybrid Brazilian-American 
forms of life in the immigrant setting; b) their skillful parenting of well-
integrated U.S.-born citizen children; and c) their purposeful and positive 
maintenance of family ties with kin left behind in Brazil. 
Limitations of the research.  In acknowledging the limitations of 
the research, it is important to note that the sample sizes for my surveys 
in Boston and in Lisbon are small and may not have led to findings that 
are generalizable to the complex Brazilian communities in each nation.  
This condition also did not leave sufficient quantitative data to run 
meaningful cross-tabulations and correlation tests.  If I were to do this 
research again, I would expand my instruments to include more mixed 
methods, qualitative and quantitative, and I would extend my sample to 
include host country nationals and their views on Brazilian immigrants. 
Because of the limited time and resources available in Portugal, the 
Lisbon component of the study also never reached a comparable depth 
and comprehensiveness to the Boston research.  
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It is nonetheless my sincere hope that this research and my 
findings can give us a greater understanding of the life experiences of 
Brazilian immigrants in Boston, U.S., and Lisbon, Portugal and of how 
social and cultural features of their community and family experiences 
are shaped by their immigration status, class and race.  Hopefully this 
study will offer a touchstone for other scholars to build on in future 
research, to test if such findings apply to Brazilians residing in other 
countries within today’s extensive immigrant diaspora. 
  
	 292 
Appendix  	
 
 
 
Approved by BU IRB 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
1- Gender: M ___  F___  2- Age: _____ 3- Race______ 4- Religion ______ 
 
5- How old were you when you first came to live in the U.S.?  __________ 
 
6- In what city and state in Brazil were you born? City __________________  
State   _______________ 
 
7- Is there anyone living in this household that was not born in Brazil?  
 
8- Marital Status: ____________   if married, is your spouse living with you 
in the U.S.? ___  
 
9- Did you come to U.S. together? ______If you arrived at different dates, 
how long did it take for your family to unite? _________ 
 
10- How many children do you have? ___ How many are living with you 
in the U.S.? _______, and how old are they? _____________________________ 
 
11- How many people live in this house with you? ____ How are they 
related to you? 
 
12- Are you the head of your household? ____ If not, who is the head of 
your household? _____ 
 
13- Educational attainment in Brazil? _____ Has it changed since you 
moved to the U.S.? ____  
 
14- Do you plan to seek more education here? ______   
 
15- Occupation in Brazil________________and in the U.S._______________ 
 
ID	Number:		____	____	____	
	 293 
16- How many people in the household work:  20 hours or less ___, 
between 21 and 40___, 41 and 50___, 51-60___, and 61 hours or more, 
___do not work outside the household for pay. 
 
17- U.S.  yearly household income: 
___ Less than $19,999 ___ $20,000–$29,999 
___ $30,000–$39,999 ___ $40,000–$49,999 
___ $50,000–$59,999 ___ $60,000–$69,999 __$70,000 plus 
 
18- Do you own or rent your home in the U.S. _____ and in Brazil? _____ 
 
19- Do you have business investments in Brazil and/or the U.S.? 
 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
 
20- Please name the countries of which you and members of your family 
are citizens. 
  
21- Are you in touch with family members and friends in Brazil?  If yes, 
how often and in what ways?   
 
22- Do you send remittances to Brazil? ____ If yes, how much money do 
you send? ____ How often? ___ Do you know how the money is going to 
be used? 
 
23- Do you feel attached to both countries, the U.S. and Brazil, at the 
same time? _____ If so, can you explain how? 
 
24- Have you ever been active in political or civic activities at the local or 
state levels in the U.S.?  Or in Brazil? Can you explain? 
 
FAMILY DYNAMICS AND GENDER ROLES 
 
25- Has migration to the U.S.  affected your family life? If yes, in what 
ways? [Probe if necessary regarding:  family routines and understandings, 
daily schedule, distribution of family responsibilities] 
 
26 –If you have children, have your family’s ways of taking care of them 
changed, or stayed the same?  Please explain how. 
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27- Have the ways you handle household chores changed or stayed the 
same?  Please explain how.  
 
28. Are your family’s routines any different here than they were, or might 
be, in Brazil? 
 
RACE AND IDENTITY 
 
29- What is your impression about American race relations, and how 
does it compare with Brazil? 
 
30- Is your family multi-racial in its makeup, that is, does it have 
members of different colors?  Is race something you ever discuss in your 
family? 
 
31- How do others identify you? Are you mistaken for other groups? 
_____   If yes, which one(s)?   
 
32- Do you or your family consider yourself/ yourselves Latinos/as? 
 
33- Do you consider yourself to be a Brazuca? ____Why or why not? 
What does it mean to you? 
 
34- Have you or your family experienced discrimination in Brazil? If yes, 
what type? 
 
35. In what type of community do you reside?  
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL & NETWORK 
 
36- Did you have family members or friends in the U.S.  prior to 
migrating?  Did your family members or friends influence your decision 
to migrate to the U.S. in any way?  
 
37- Once you arrived in the U.S., who helped you and your family with 
the transition?   
 
38- Have you ever helped anyone, relatives, friends, or acquaintances, to 
migrate to the U.S.?  In what way?  Information?  Money?   Making 
arrangements for travel? 
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39- Do you belong to any Brazilian community organizations or other 
groups? ____ If so, can you name them?   
 
40- Do you work for a Brazilian business? _____Do you have a Brazilian 
boss? ______If not, please specify ____________  
 
41- During the past 3 months, have you visited any Brazilian 
establishments or organizations?    
 
LIFE EXPERIENCES IN THE U.S.  
 
42- Before you came to the U.S. how would you describe your experience 
with the U.S. consulate while you were trying to obtain a visitor visa or 
student or work permit?  [Modify to ask question about experience with 
Portugal immigration officials at the port of arrival-- given that Brazilians 
do not need Visas to gain entry.] 
 
43- What was the main reason you decided to come to the U.S.?   
 
44- Have you fulfilled your expectations in coming to the U.S.?   
 
45- Do you have plans to return to Brazil? ____If yes, _____ when? ______ 
Why? _____   
 
46- Would you recommend to others in Brazil to migrate to the U.S.? ____ 
Why/why not?  
 
47- How do you see your current social position in relation to your 
parents, relatives, and friends in Brazil? Has it improved or worsened? 
Please explain. 
 
48- As an immigrant, what have been the greatest barriers or difficulties 
you have encountered while in pursuit of your goals? 
 
49- How much of a gap or conflict do you think there is between 
American culture/Portuguese culture, on the one hand, and Brazilian 
ways, on the other? Please give examples.  Can you please elaborate? 
  
Are there any other comments would you like to add? 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME! 
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